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DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

WIDER EUROPE

NORDIC AND BALTIC LESSONS TO
POST-ENLARGEMENT EUROPE

EDITED BY FABRIZIO TASSINARI, PERTTI JOENNIEMI
AND UFFE JAKOBSEN

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Preface

UFFE JAKOBSEN

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 with ten new member states is perhaps the most significant development in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Eight of the new members were former East Bloc countries with a very different background and histories that contrasted starkly to those of the existing member states. This has changed and will change the EU internally. It has changed and will continue to change the new member states, and it has produced a number of new neighbours on the Union's Eastern frontier – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and others – and will produce a number of new challenges, as well, not least concerning democratisation, regionalisation and Europeanisation.

The EU and Democracy Promotion

From the early 1990s the EU addressed the formidable task of uniting Europe – to create a peaceful, secure, stable, prosperous, free and democratic Europe after the end of the Cold War. In addition to its main purpose of managing the economic and political integration of Europe, the EU also took upon itself the task of democracy promotion in foreign countries aspiring to EU membership. This was most evident in the 'Copenhagen Criteria' adopted at the EU Copenhagen Summit on 1993, and the impact of EU on the political development in Eastern Europe was negligible until then.¹ Most clearly, this was done at the 1999 Helsinki Summit when it was stated that democracy promotion was an indispensable component in the EU enlargement strategy. As part of this, the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) became the regional aspect of this strategy by bridging the Nordic and the Baltic countries, and by directing activities towards Russia. The EU actually became the prime actor promoting democracy in Eastern Europe, and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU has been the most effective instrument to that end.²

1 Vachudova, Milada Anna: *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

2 Pridham, Geoffrey: *Designing democracy: EU enlargement and regime change in post-communist Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Having accessed the EU, Baltic Sea Region countries are now in a unique position to share their newfound experience with democracy with their Eastern neighbours. The question, then, is how this would facilitate processes of democratisation and Europeanisation in the Wider Europe contexts. Thus, the central issue for this volume is whether and how the lessons learned in the Baltic Sea Region during the past 15 years, when the transition countries in the Eastern part of the region were the neighbours of EU, can be utilised in the 'European Neighbourhood Policy' (ENP) towards the new EU neighbours to the East.

During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea effectively divided East and West. On one side, the Nordic countries with their reputation for egalitarian values, participatory democracy and consensus culture – in some ways representing a third way between the excessive state regulation of the East and the neo-liberalist trends in the West. On the other side, were Poland and the three Baltic states with a lengthy history determined by great power tension and dominated during the Cold War by the Soviet Union either as federal republics within the Soviet Union, as was the case of the three Baltic states, or as member of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, as was the case of Poland.

The Eastern Enlargement of the EU effectively rendered the Baltic Sea Region a European inlet: with the exception of the Russian part of this 'lakeshore', the Baltic Sea is now surrounded by EU members. This put all the countries within the same framework of cooperation; however, it is by no means in no way a homogenised region. Apart from Russia, it consists of four post-communist member states (the three Baltic states and Poland), of two relatively recent Nordic member states (Finland and Sweden) and one older (Denmark) and Germany. This is certainly a highly diversified region with a number of similarities and numerous differences among the individual countries. Generally, the expectation is that further integration will diminish the degree of diversity.

A Few Caveats

An alternative scenario to the prospects of the new member states simply adapting to the core states – integrating into existing structures and preserving the internal balance and workings of the EU – would be one of either changing the balance of power in favour of the periphery or preserving the diversity between old and new member states and even enhancing the possibility of future diversity. By gaining membership status, accession countries also gain the means for articulating differences, since they acquire the right to co-decide on European matters. As noted earlier, the new post-Soviet member states differ from the existing members due to their contrasting his-

tories and backgrounds. The legacy that the new East and Central European member states have brought and will continue to bring along include etatism, collectivism, solidarity and, not least, reconstituted national identities and a classical view of sovereignty. In this manner, enlargement not only means convergence towards European standards, it also means enhancing diversity, since new members also have the opportunity of defending their specific visions of future Europe.³ This naturally raises the question of how to combine diversity and lessons to be learned from other European regions in connection with the new ENP towards the countries to the east of the EU.

However, some find that the very idea of talking about lessons evokes the old stereotypes of Eastern Europe as not being as European as Western Europe, or not (yet) belonging to Europe to the same degree, i.e. (still) lacking a certain amount of 'Europeanness'. In the enlargement discourse, the accession countries become learners or adopters of (fully) European norms and values and the enlargement becomes a learning process for the East European countries.⁴ Crucially, Eastern Europe is not perceived as an alien, pure and simple, in this othering process, but rather as a pupil in the classroom or a specimen in the laboratory, as it were, where the advanced rules of the game of Western Europe, could be applied more perfect than in Western Europe itself.⁵ On one hand, we thus get an undivided Europe, no longer divided in two by the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, however, we tend to end up with another Europe divided along different lines, this time divided into three: the European core, the Central and East European new member states together with the applicant countries, and an Eastern periphery excluded from membership.

The Baltic Sea Region as 'A Showcase Laboratory for Integration Processes in Europe'

Institutionally, however, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) – consisting of Germany, the five Nordic countries, the three Baltic states, Poland and Russia – is the best example of deepening cooperation at the political level in the Baltic Sea Region; however, numerous other institutions demonstrate the ability to pursue cross-border cooperation between parts of Europe that used to belong to 'the West'

3 Blokker, Paul: "Post-Communist Modernization, Transition Studies, and Diversity in Europe", in: *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 8, no 4, 2005, pp. 503-525.

4 Kuus, Merje: "Europe's Eastern Expansion and the Reinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe", in: *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 28, no. 4, 2004, pp. 472-489.

5 Neumann, Iver B: *The Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.

and parts of Europe that used to belong to 'the East'. Furthermore, the Nordic Council of Ministers have also been bridging the Nordic countries and the Baltic states together with Russia and other adjacent areas to promote Nordic values outside the Nordic countries among politicians, civil servants and civil society representatives. Naturally, the EU NDI is of central interest for region-building *in* the Baltic Sea Region and for the European integration *of* the Baltic Sea Region. The importance for Europe as such is demonstrated by a recent initiative from the Baltic Europe Intergroup of the European Parliament to make a 'Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region', seeing the emergence of 'a Baltic corner in the European house' as an important aspect of the changes resulting from the Eastern Enlargement of the Union, since it makes the Baltic Sea Region 'a showcase laboratory for integration processes in Europe'.⁶ This makes the study of the lessons learned in the Nordic and Baltic countries from the process of Europeanisation and the relevance for the development of the EU's New Neighbourhood Policy towards a 'Wider Europe' promising.

Since 1989, the former East Bloc countries have undergone a dramatic transformation, from one-party states to electoral democracies, from command economies to capitalist market economies; from state oppression as the norm in most social areas as the normal situation to expanding public spheres and civil societies, from centralised federations to sovereign nation states. A process of so-called 'triple transitions'⁷ process was initiated in the post-Soviet countries comprising the political, the economic and the social spheres of society simultaneously and causing worry as to whether this would protract the democratisation process, since the different processes could be mutually contradictory and conflicting. The nationalist turmoil in some of the post-Soviet countries had evidently economic and political roots, while the economic transition itself led to a decline in GNP and social welfare that, furthermore, to a large degree created economic inequality. This in turn caused problems for the political transition because the lack of societal cohesion created struggles regarding political rights and, ultimately, the question of who should belong to 'the people' (*demos*). Subsequent research has stressed the importance of nation-building and state-formation in the understanding of the democratisation of post-Soviet countries in contrast to waves of democratisation in other parts of the world.⁸ This has

6 Beazley, Christopher [et al.]: *Europe's Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region*, 2005, available i.a. at <http://www.hanse-parlament.de/Downloads/EuropeStrategyBSR.pdf>.

7 Offe, Claus: "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe", in: *Social Research*, vol. 58, 1991, pp. 865-892.

8 Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan: *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

contributed to developing the idea of the triple transition into the concept of 'quadruple transition'.⁹ Irregardless, common ground has been achieved in agreeing on the centrality of statehood and national identity in the post-Soviet transitions towards democracy.¹⁰

Since the beginning of a process of democratisation in the early 1990s, the former Soviet countries surrounding the Baltic Sea have now 'returned to Europe' and became members of the European Union in 2004, as well as other structures of European cooperation. They have engaged in a process of the Europeanisation of their nation states. In addition to the processes of democratisation, marketisation, nation-building, state-formation and Europeanisation, we have also witnessed a process of regionalisation around the Baltic Sea. The development of regional cooperation has moved steadily forward – trade, investments, trans-national NGOs and other forms of productive contacts are proving the case – and the results have been better than expected when the scenario of a conflictual process of a number of contradictory processes was made in the early 1990s.

A Research Agenda

However, the research agenda remains characterised by a kind of *triangularity* between democratisation, regionalisation and Europeanisation. Firstly, the EU borders countries in which democratisation remains a problematic issue, because of the potential conflicts between the transition to nation-state, market economy and democracy. Secondly, the process of accessing the EU and the continued process of Europeanisation have a problematic – if not outright contradictory – relationship to democratisation. On one hand, the EU has arguably been the most decisive factor in the comparatively stable process of democratisation in Eastern Europe. This position appears to be common ground for most of the academic literature on the Eastern Enlargement, but even if progress has been made in recent years it is still appropriate to maintain that EU enlargement as a form of democracy promotion is under-theorised.¹¹ On the other hand, however, the very process of Europeanisation has its own democracy problem, commonly known as the 'democratic deficit'. Related to this is the problem of the contradiction between the EU as a promoter of democracy in

9 Kuzio, Taras: "Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?", in: *Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2001, pp. 168-177.

10 Berg, Eiki & Wim van Meurs: "Borders and Orders in Europe: Limits of Nation- and State-Building in Estonia, Macedonia and Moldova", in: *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2002, pp. 51-74.

11 Raik, Kristi: *Democratic Politics or the Implementation of Inevitabilities?: Estonia's Democracy and Integration into the European Union*, Tartu University Press, 2003.

relation to accession countries but not in relation to the EU member states is eloquently coined as the 'Do As I Say, Not As I Do' problematic.¹² Thirdly, a decisive process of regionalisation within the area comprising the Nordic and the Baltic countries is taking place, raising research questions concerning regional institutions, common actions and trans-national identity within the region and in relation to the EU. All in all, this makes the Baltic Sea Region a highly relevant and promising object of study for the understanding of democratisation, regionalisation and Europeanisation in order to grasp future developments in Wider Europe.

The instrument of 'conditionality' has clearly been the strongest tool available to the EU in the attempts to promote democracy in the applicant countries. This conditionality generally consists of one actor's linking of benefits for another actor to this actor's fulfilment of certain conditions. In the case of the EU's Eastern Enlargement, membership has been linked to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria on human rights and state capacity to maintain these rights and other commitments, market economy and economic performance, democracy etc. This is actually an area where some theorising has taken place. In the case of EU Enlargement, the negotiating strategy consists of the EU's providing of external incentives for the governments of the applicant countries to make them comply with the EU's conditions and withhold the reward in cases where an applicant country's government fail to comply. The model applied here has been referred to as the 'External Incentives Model'.¹³ This point leads to a second area in which the EU's democracy promotion policies and the use of conditionality have led to a shift in theorising on democratisation.

Traditionally, democratisation has been analysed as primarily determined by national factors.¹⁴ In particular, however, analyses of the EU's successful attempts at promoting democracy have resulted in a common agreement on the growing importance of international factors in national democratisation processes.¹⁵ The relations between national processes of democratisation and external actors are, however, less simple than generally anticipated. Theoretically, therefore, as a further advancement

12 Johns, Michael: "Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights", in: *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 17, No.4, 2003, pp. 682-699.

13 Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier: "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004, pp. 661-679.

14 O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter: *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

15 Whitehead, Laurence: "The Enlargement of the European Union: A 'Risky' Form of Democracy Promotion", in: Laurence Whitehead (ed.): *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, 2nd ed., 2005, pp. 415-442.

of the understanding of this relationship, it can be viewed as the operation of a push-pull dynamic. In the case of conditionality, the pull-effect is the prospect of EU membership. This pull-effect in the applicant countries gives the EU considerable negotiation capital that can be invested in general criteria and specific demands to the applicant countries, i.e. the push-effect. The lesson of this is that the pull-effect and the push-effect are interrelated but the strength of the push-effect is clearly dependent on the strength of the pull-effect: only if a wish and possibility for membership exists can the EU's possibility and strength as a promoter of democracy also be at hand.

Acknowledgements

Finally, it would be inappropriate not to acknowledge those who made this publication possible with their generous financial support. DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies) has a well-established reputation in the study of the EU in general and especially the Eastern Enlargement of the EU, the Baltic Sea Region and Wider Europe. The University Copenhagen has more recently acknowledged the growing importance of the EU and the EU's Eastern Enlargement on the research agenda. By establishing the Priority Research Area of 'Europe in Transition', the university aims at strengthening this research activity by coordinating and further encouraging work on processes of change in Europe, thereby enhancing the presence of academia in the public debate and decision making by disseminating research results to the general population. The network of researchers at the University of Copenhagen within the subject area of developments in Eastern Europe focusses on democratisation, Europeanisation and region-building in Eastern Europe and on cross-border region-building across the former divide between Eastern and Western Europe. This is highly relevant for the Wider Europe developments and for the ENP. The research at the Department of Political Science also focuses on developments at the European level and on the ramifications of Europeanisation at the nation-state level, since these issues have important consequences for the conduct, understanding and study of politics. Europeanisation has decisively changed the framework for political actors, political institutions and political ideas. The establishment of the Centre for Baltic Sea Region Studies at the University of Copenhagen must be seen in this context. The Baltic Sea Region project is the most dynamic example of cross-border cooperation in Europe that also bridges the old East-West divide in Europe. In this respect, it may have significant repercussions for future political developments in Europe and for the 'new neighbours' of the EU.

Introduction¹⁶

FABRIZIO TASSINARI

Since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the digits ‘9/11’ have become synonymous with tension, tragedy and terror. As British scholar Timothy Garton Ash has noted,¹⁷ however, ‘9/11’ should not be read only ‘American-style’, as in September the 11th. It can and should also be read ‘European-style’, as in November the 9th. On that 9/11, 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall produced opposite effects: hope, enthusiasm and historic transformations.

At the time, Francis Fukuyama famously argued that 1989 would come to signify “the end of history”: The end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy.”¹⁸ While this prediction was later widely criticised, post-1989 developments in Europe did bring about some powerful changes along the lines laid out by Fukuyama. The post-Wall period has witnessed a metamorphosis of the geopolitical map of the continent; it has led to overarching political and economic transformations, especially in its Central and Eastern countries; and it has produced tremendous changes in the European power constellation.

These developments are significantly epitomised by the process of European integration. The European Union and, to a lesser extent, NATO have piloted the transformation of the continent. These organisations have widened and, more evidently in the case of the EU, deepened their respective political projects. They have stabilised the transition in Central and Eastern Europe. They have guided the ‘return to Europe’ of these countries, the promise of membership being the single most powerful instrument in this respect.

16 The author wishes to thank George Dura and Martina Warning of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) for their research assistance.

17 Garton Ash, Timothy: *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time*, London, Penguin, 2004, p. 60.

18 Fukuyama, Francis: “The End of History?” in *The National Interest* Summer 1989, p. 4.

Yet, European integration has also gone beyond this Europe of institutions and rules. European integration has considered Europe's multi-cultural and multi-ethnic traditions. It has been about encouraging the participation of multiple actors in the political arena. It has widened and deepened the agenda of international cooperation. European integration has been about Europe's diverse, *sui generis*, and eminently 'multi-perspectival'¹⁹ features.

Whither and Whether to Widen

The EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 is rightly regarded as a landmark of these developments. The promise of membership has constituted the Union's most successful tool to embrace and transform neighbours; it has elevated the EU *mission civilizatrice* of spreading prosperity, liberty and welfare to the whole of Europe. Most importantly, the prospect of full EU integration has raised the expectations and boosted the confidence of the candidate countries in a more secure future.

This massive expansion, on the other hand, has not come without consequences. The enlargement has confronted the EU with a number of unavoidable questions about its ultimate geographical scope, institutional setting, and 'absorption capacity' of new members, as is now called in the cryptic Euro-parlance. The 2004 expansion revealed that the enlargement strategy is bound, sooner or later, to exhaust its durability. It suggested that the project of building an integrated and secure Europe cannot be carried out only through enlargement, for the straightforward reason that the Union cannot continue to enlarge indefinitely. Put it another way, the enlargement made the EU all the more aware that there indeed exists a Wider Europe beyond the EU.

This Wider Europe encompasses Russia, the Western-most former-Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova), the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa: from Murmansk to Marrakesh, so to speak.²⁰ Such a diverse array of countries has inevitably produced a diverse set of relations with Brussels. Perhaps more importantly, it has also produced a very diverse range of priorities and challenges, ranging from environmental pollution to energy security; from migrations to poverty; from the promotion of democracy to Islamic fundamentalism.

19 Ruggie, John G: "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations", in: *International Organization*, No. 47 No. 1, 1993, p. 172.

20 Without including Russia, this Wider Europe is populated by an estimated 273 million people (the EU25 has a population of 456 million) and extends over a stunning 7 million square kilometres (the EU25 total area is about 4 million square kilometres).

Over the decades, the EU strategy towards its vast neighbourhood has been characterised by two paramount priorities: first, the EU has been concerned to making its periphery more secure and stable; second, it has sought to spread the benefits of its integration process to the rest of the continent.²¹ These two tasks are profoundly interrelated, as the enlargement process has demonstrated. Apart from enlargement, however, this twin quest for security and integration has not been combined very efficiently in the EU neighbourhood strategy. In fact, the enlargement has produced a dyadic picture of European security and integration: Brussels has either focused more on integration, by promising membership, and has thus gradually defused security concerns by inviting neighbours ‘inside’ the European project; or it has focused more on security, by offering its neighbours more or less attractive partnership packages, and has thereby limited their degree of integration by keeping them ‘outside’.²²

To overcome this deadlock, at the dawn of the 2004 enlargement, the EU launched a ENP. This Policy calls for a single, comprehensive strategy for its Eastern, South-Eastern and Southern neighbours: what former European Commission President Romano Prodi fittingly referred to as a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the Union.²³ Revealingly, the ENP is designed to offer “more than partnership and less than membership”, and to share with the partner countries “everything but institutions”²⁴ in exchange for internal reforms. By offering a relatively high degree of integration but not the promise of membership, such lexicon indicates that the ENP aims to introduce elements of the EU enlargement strategy within those of more traditional partnership, thereby blurring the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the EU.

Nordic and Baltic Lessons

The main assumption underlying this volume is that the political developments proceeding in the Baltic Sea area over the past fifteen years can be regarded as a significant ‘laboratory’ in which to study these wider European developments.

21 See, for instance, Alyson Bailes’ article in this volume.

22 For a more detailed discussion on the membership and partnership strategies in the neighbourhood see: Tassinari, Fabrizio: “Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: the Case for Regionalism” *CEPS Working Document N. 226*, Brussels, 2005. For an overview of the EU neighbourhood instruments see: Missiroli, Antonio: “The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood: Stabilisation, Integration and Partnership: *Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a Wider Europe*, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 2003.

23 Prodi, Romano: *Europe and the Mediterranean: Time for Action* Speech at the Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve on the 26th of November 2002.

24 Prodi, Romano: *ibid.*

The Baltic Sea area was heavily affected by the momentous events of the late 1980s: the ‘Solidarity’ movement rose in the city of Gdansk, on the Polish Baltic coast; the fall of the Berlin Wall led to the reunification of Germany, a prominent Baltic Sea state; the independence regained by the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania anticipated the demise of the Soviet Union by some months.

Over the following years, this region has undergone an intense process of multi-dimensional and multi-level regional cooperation, where contacts among municipalities, NGOs, and firms enhanced regional linkages, and laid the foundations for greater institutional cooperation.²⁵

The wider European dimension has always been a defining trait in the Baltic Sea area. The EU enlargement round that was completed in 2004 concerned, in this region, Poland and the three Baltic states. Previously, the fourth EU enlargement involved Sweden and Finland. Moreover, the linkage between European developments and this peculiar way of practising regionalism has been epitomised by the NDI. The Northern Dimension, an EU policy that has been promoted by Finland since 1997, is devoted to add value to EU foreign and security policy by enhancing regional cooperation in Northern Europe and by actively integrating Russia in different policy sectors, such as the environment, social well-being, and economic development.²⁶

What is perhaps most striking about the Baltic Sea area – and emblematic of Europe’s ‘multiperspectival’ features – is the region’s *diversity*. After the meltdown of the Iron Curtain, the Baltic Sea looked like a very jumbled-up puzzle. The Sea was surrounded by some countries with a tradition of neutrality (Sweden and Finland); EU and NATO member states (Denmark and Germany); post-communist (Poland) and post-Soviet states (the three Baltic states); and the main Soviet successor state, Russia. And the puzzle only starts there. The Baltic Sea is also a mosaic in terms of cultural and societal aspects, and not least economic structures. The presence of Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox traditions renders the region a sort of crossroads of Christianity. The Baltic is a miniature ‘Tower of Babel’ with Germanic, Finno-Ugric, Baltic and Slavonic languages represented. The region is the meeting place of mature welfare economies with others that have been undergoing post-socialist restructuring.

25 See, most notably, the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 1992.

26 See Marius Vahl’s contribution in this volume.

Amidst these broad differences, the sea that used to divide became a uniting element, and regional cooperation has emerged and thrived: it has accompanied the enlargement process; it has sought to include Russia in cooperative efforts; and it has encouraged the participation of non-state as well as supranational actors in the regional framework. This set of developments spontaneously raises a number of questions: how and to what extent has regional cooperation developed? What are the implications of the 2004 enlargements on it? And more importantly: what can the Wider Europe learn from this region?

Russia's Position

In order to provide answers to these questions, one cannot underestimate the fact that the Baltic Sea area is also the place where the EU physically meets its largest and arguably most important neighbour, Russia.

Russia's role in Northern Europe is shaped by a broad array of issues. Moscow's prickly relations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania²⁷ are a fitting example of Russia's often problematic approach to its eventful past. The positioning of Kaliningrad – the Russian region sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland – is symptomatic of the variety of security threats coming from the former Soviet Union: from smuggling, to communicable diseases, to environmental pollution. Russia's privileged relations with some EU member states are epitomised in this region by its bilateral relations with Germany, a country that depends heavily on Russia's energy resources. As noted above, the launching of the NDI and of a plethora of regional organisations were also motivated by the need to tackle these challenges.

What is perhaps more remarkable, however, is that Russia's multi-faceted positioning in Northern Europe can be regarded as a sort of microcosm of Russia's role in Europe as a whole. Russia does indeed retain a prominent role in European affairs, where it faces challenges that are, in some respect, analogous to the ones characterising Northern Europe.

Moscow exerts considerable leverage vis-à-vis the many European countries that consume Russian oil and gas. Moreover, Moscow has significant clout among those 'common' neighbours that were part of the Soviet Union. This is blatant in the case of

27 See Marko Lehti and Elzbieta Tromer's contribution in this volume.

Belarus, whose authoritarian government is supported by Russia. But it is perhaps just as evident in the case of countries like Georgia and Ukraine, which staged those peaceful, ‘coloured’ revolutions that in 2003 and 2004 removed pro-Russian oligarchs from power and which are now facing Russia’s political and economic pressure.

The EU has acknowledged the importance of Russia in Europe, so much so that the two parties have elevated their bilateral relations to the level of an ambitious ‘strategic partnership’.²⁸ For some statesmen and observers, the relations between Russia and the EU are reminiscent of the Gaullist dream of a *Grande Europe* from the Atlantic to the Urals, a space united by common historical ties and a joint geopolitical future. More humbly, a ‘strategic partnership’ is motivated by the fact that the two parties are each other’s major counterparts on the continent in many fields of cooperation.

Disappointingly, however, the reality of the bilateral relations is more modest. On the one hand, although Moscow has welcomed the principle of European integration, it frequently laments alleged imbalances that are caused by it. Moreover, Russia demands to be treated as an equal partner by the EU while, at the same time, it has a tendency to delegitimise the EU as a political actor by dealing with EU member states bilaterally. On the other hand, the EU tends to be rather inconsistent and insubstantial, by speaking out on fundamental issues such as democracy promotion and human rights protection in Russia, while being aware that it is not speaking with one voice. The EU’s Russia policy is indeed an appropriate example to illustrate the Union’s dubious foreign policy credentials, with a number of Russia-friendly EU member states often taking positions that counter Brussels’ official line.

Against this background, the contributions contained in this volume contend that developments in Northern Europe can also be regarded a prism through which observe and analyse Russia’s role in the wider European context.

Structure of the Book

This book is organised around three themes. The first theme provides overviews and interpretations on the broader challenges of post-enlargement Europe. In the first article, *Gianni Bonvicini* takes stock of the implications that the establishment of the ENP is to have on European security structures. He argues that the core methodolo-

28 See Alexander Sergounin’s contribution in this volume.

gy of the ENP underlines the linkage between security, foreign policy and defence, both inside and outside the Union. He then spells out the areas in which the ENP can give concrete substance to the EU's quest for security beyond its borders. In the second contribution, *Alyson Bailes* sheds light on Europe's quest for security, integration and reform. She does so by explaining the correlation between the EU enlargement on the one hand and European civilisation and identity on the other. Lastly, she substantiates this argument by discussing the cases of Russia and Belarus in the Northern European context. Lastly, *Noel Parker* proposes a conceptual reading of Northern Europe as a 'margin' of Europe. He contends that actors at the margin possess room to manoeuvre and can do so 'constructively' in relation to the centre. The case of Northern Europe is presented to elucidate this mode of analysis.

The second theme of this volume is devoted more specifically to the Northern European power constellation and provides compelling, albeit different, arguments about how to read the wider European reality through Nordic and Baltic lenses. *Marius Vahl* discusses possible models for the ENP by analysing the cases of two EU policies directed at non-EU members: the European Economic Area and the NDI. *Marko Lehti* conceptualises the role and identity of the three Baltic states in the post-Cold War era. By classifying the three Baltic states according to different discursive labels, he argues that the Baltic states constitute a nodal point for defining the new Northern Europe. *Elzbieta Tromer* analyses the role of Russia in the approaches of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to national security and to the European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP). Three relevant examples are discussed to carry out the analysis: the concepts of 'threats' and 'security'; the need for governmental regulation of foreign direct investment; the failure of defence sector reforms in Russia.

The focus of the third theme is Russia. *Mark Urnov* presents an overview of Russia's domestic and geopolitical contexts, in which he contends that Russia's numerous internal challenges ought to be correlated to the country's external aspirations. In the second article of the section, *Alexander Sergounin* critically assesses the EU-Russia strategic partnership, by analysing the content of the 'Roadmap' that the two parties have agreed upon.

Pertti Joenniemi concludes this collection of articles by summarising the main arguments provided by the authors and, as this volume claims in its subtitle, deriving the 'lessons' that Northern Europe can provide to the Wider Europe. He argues that although the notion of Northern Europe as a 'laboratory' has made its way into the policy and academic debates in Europe of the past few years, the way in which regionalism has manifested itself in practice needs to be treated with caution. As the

Northern Dimension project slows down in the post-enlargement period, a more centralised, standardised rationale seems to emerge in the wider contexts of Europe's power structuration, which is also backed up by Russia's choice to remain outside the ENP. On the other hand, Joenniemi concludes, recent developments in the Northern Dimension context suggest that the dynamism of Europe's North may have not exhausted its potential just yet.

The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Linkage with European Security

GIANNI BONVICINI

The European Union has through the years used its enlargement policy to increase its importance as an international actor. The greater critical mass and the addition with each enlargement of the foreign policy interests of the new member states objectively expanded the Union's area of geopolitical influence. This was particularly evident with the last enlargement in 2004 to ten Eastern and Southern countries, which put the Union into direct contact with new areas of strategic interest.

The main objective of the enlargement policy, however, has not been to increase the Union's political weight, but to extend the area of security beyond its borders, progressively including those countries seeking stability and economic prosperity. There can be no doubt, looking at past results, that this policy has been a huge success for all – the Union and the new member states. Suffice it to think of Spain, Portugal and Greece, to mention some of the most important positive examples of the past.

In parallel, starting in the seventies with the first enlargement to Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland, European foreign policy (then named European Political Cooperation – EPC) and, subsequently, CFSP/ESDP has developed.²⁹ The Union has used these policies not only to raise its international profile, but also to contribute to bringing stability and security to those countries and regions that cannot necessarily be called new candidate countries: this is certainly true of most Mediterranean countries and, for the moment, of countries and regions in Eastern Europe, from Belarus to the Balkans. It was the need to continue to play its role as a supplier of

29 A most recent book on CFSP/ESDP is: Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith: *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, where several chapters deal with the evolution of the European Foreign and Security Policy, including the defence aspects.

security while for the time being suspending its process of enlargement that gave rise to the ENP. At least this was the motivation that drove several European governments and the Commission headed by Romano Prodi to work out the documents that were later to lay down the conceptual framework for ENP.³⁰ Thus, security and ENP are closely linked. Despite this evident origin, the link between CFSP/EDSP and the new ENP must be underlined once again in light of the difficulties encountered by the European integration process and the continuing requests for security and stability coming from the areas surrounding the European Union. Although the reasons for emphasising this link are evident, it might be worthwhile going over them once more:

- a) the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty has deprived the Union of the prospect of incorporating into its institutional set-up some essential instruments that would in theory make its foreign and security policy more effective and credible: a Foreign Minister with coordination and executive powers; a President of the European Council elected for two and half years with the task of representing the Union abroad; a Foreign Service; the solidarity clause; the provision for military missions; structured cooperation in the defence field, etc. As a result, the present institutional ambiguity persists and the chances of projecting security more effectively into the periphery remain limited.
- b) Enlargement policy which, as mentioned, was a powerful factor in the Union's projection of security beyond its borders, is no longer a vital interest that can be easily presented to the European electorate. In the long run, the negative attitude of public opinion towards further expansion could even have a backlash effect on neighbouring countries' desire and demand to draw closer to the Union, making EU security policy less effective and attractive.
- c) For the time being there is still great pressure on the Union to act beyond its borders. Europe is openly requested to act by countries in the East, from Ukraine to the Caucasus countries, and in the South, from countries of the Greater Middle East to those of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean.

30 The two basic documents of the Commission on ENP are: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003. Communication from the Commission European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy Paper, COM (2004), 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004.

Given the weakening of enlargement policy as a credible instrument of the Union's security policy, the EU is called upon to develop a new kind of political strategy, combining as much as possible its newly launched ENP with its traditional Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and even defence policy (ESDP). The objective is to secure Europe's borders while projecting security into the neighbouring regions.

Looking at the concepts underlying the ENP, it is clear that the issue of security lies at its core. This can also be seen in the documents laying out the principles on which EU security is developing. Two major documents, among others, illustrate this linkage:

- a) The European Security Strategy Paper (12 December 2003), produced by Javier Solana;³¹
- b) European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper (12 May 2004), based the Communication of the Prodi Commission of March 2003.

The first clearly states:

- "Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, ... it also encourages criminality, deters investments and makes normal economic activity impossible." The economic dimension of security is underlined as a decisive criterion for the Union to intervene and offer its well-known political and economic mechanisms to neighbouring regions: "we need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours ...".
- "The best protection of our security is a world of well governed democratic states", therefore arguing that the Union's mission should be to promote democracy and human rights in its neighbourhood.
- "The Union should promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean"; a kind of protective security belt around the Union which was stressed by the concept of 'a ring of friends'.
- "Spreading good governance, rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means to strengthen international order";³² a policy which looks like a peculiar (and different) European response to the American neocons doctrine on the promotion of democracy.

31 *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003. For a comprehensive comment on the origin and content of this paper see: Bailes, Alyson K.: *The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 10, SIPRI February 2005.

32 Solana's Strategy Paper (cit.) devotes a full paragraph of part II to "Building security in our neighbourhood".

The second document makes a clear reference to some of the ENP's fundamental goals:

- “to share the benefits of EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security, and well-being for all concerned”;
- “to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours ...”;
- “to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation”

In theory, the linkage between security, foreign policy and defence, both inside and outside the Union, is also underlined by the new core methodology which is the ENP's main innovation: a single, all-encompassing framework covering all basic aspects of cooperation with neighbouring countries, including security and, to some extent, even defence. The intention of the Commission, as clearly expressed by its president, Romano Prodi, in a speech in Brussels in December 2002, was to allow countries neighbouring on the East and South to participate in Union policies, including those relating to foreign and security policy (under the chapter of the political dialogue) on the basis of a single reference framework, the neighbourhood policy.³³ As regards CFSP in particular, this calls for a drastic change in method with respect to the past: recourse will no longer be made to the old instrument of common strategies towards one country or another (for example, Russia or Ukraine, etc.) but the ENP will be adopted as the baseline for all. Both the Council and the Commission believe that this can make the ENP and consequently CFSP more effective and credible.

In addition and in order to make the ENP a real policy tool, an implementation instrument called ‘Action Plan’ has been devised for the ENP to be negotiated with each country. As a result, there are actually two instruments: a multilateral one (ENP) and a bilateral one (Action Plans). The framework, therefore, seems to offer both coherence and flexibility.³⁴

33 Prodi, Romano: “Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability”, speech given at the Sixth ECSA World Conference on peace, stability and security, Brussels, 5 December 2002.

34 On the origin and development of ENP, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome) has promoted a research which has been published: Alcaro, Riccardo and Michele Comelli, *La politica europea di vicinato*, IAI Quaderni, Rome, No.22, March 2005. One chapter of the book has been published in English: Comelli, Michele: “The Challenges of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, in *The International Spectator*, 3/2004, pp. 97-110.

At the same time, by launching the ENP, the EU has tried to dispel some of the ambiguity that emerged in recent years concerning its foreign and security policy and its enlargement policy, making clear that providing security is not synonymous with enlargement and that, consequently, the ENP does not necessarily lead to enlargement. This approach was made evident by the apparently incongruous decision to include both the Eastern and Mediterranean countries in the same policy framework, even though it is well known that the prospects for future adhesion to the Union may be more feasible for the former than the latter. This decision, establishing the ENP as a new tool in Europe's foreign and security policy kit, obliges the EU to seek new instruments for collaboration with its neighbours that are no longer simply a promise of future adhesion to the Union. The Commission document, mentioned above, sets out the areas on which to structure Action Plans so as to give concrete substance to the ENP.

Cooperation can involve a broad spectrum of interests common to the Union and third countries:

- the prospect of partial integration in the common market;
- trade and economic cooperation, promotion of foreign direct investments;
- several aspects of EU external actions: fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflict resolution, crisis management, etc.
- liberalisation of visa regimes, cooperation in migration policies, fight against organised crime.

In the Commission document on strategy, the security aspects dealt with are mainly internal issues of justice and the fight against crime. The objective is to make the Union's borders safer and to keep application of the Schengen regime to the circulation of individuals from creating an unsurpassable barrier to economic and trade relations with third countries. The Union does not want to seem like a 'Fortress Europe', but at the same time it must not underestimate the risks of instability that could arise from difficult or uncontrollable situations in neighbouring countries.

Projection of security to problem areas in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean is a different matter which falls into the CFSP/ESDP sphere. Here, possible actions described in the Commission document are linked to those set down in the European Security Strategy paper drafted by Javier Solana, in which the emphasis is put on participation in crisis management or conflict prevention missions carried out by the European Union. It is clear that the confines of the cooperation that can be envisaged in this sector, unlike the internal security sector, are not so precise. This is

a field strongly affected by the halt in the Constitutional Treaty ratification process. For the moment, ESDP is wholly intergovernmental; the Constitutional Treaty envisages procedures (military missions, reinforced cooperation, etc.) that could make it more credible and open it up to contributions from third countries. At the same time, both CFSP and ESDP have always been viewed rather circumspectly by some groups of countries, in particular, Mediterranean countries which fear that their interests could be damaged by possible Union military or security operations, even if carried out for peacekeeping purposes. Finally, certain European security operations could be undertaken without the assent of the third country directly affected by the conflict or risk, as could be hypothesised in the Balkans in the absence of a legitimate government or after a coup d'état. Apart from these limitations, ENP Action Plans are political agreements, capable of ensuring stability and security around Europe by taking into consideration the specific security interests of the third countries.

The ENP is meant to be a credible alternative to enlargement policy as a security instrument and tries to move from the concept of integration as the final step in a cooperative process with a high degree of conditionality to a looser concept of regionalism, in which sub-regional cooperation and broad partnership are the main objectives. In ruling out accession to the European Union as the ultimate goal, the ENP relies on policies and mechanisms with less conditionality.³⁵ A comprehensive policy like the ENP, addressing a wide range of countries both in the East and to the South of the continent cannot be based on the strict Copenhagen Criteria used for candidate countries. That is why the ENP Action Plans are tailored to individual circumstances to make conditionality working more effectively. Conditionality can then be relaunched on the basis of cooperative individual and/or sectorial policies with each country.

This leaves the door open, in individual cases, for the implicit possibility of future integration into the Union, but the main goal is to encourage forms of regional cooperation with the European Union and among third countries in regions close to the Union.³⁶ The opinion of the Commission, as expressed on its Strategy Paper is that the ENP can really “reinforce existing forms of regional and subregional cooperation and provide a framework for their further development”. A strategy of regionalism

35 Missiroli, Antonio: “The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilisation, integration and partnership” in Batt, Judy and Dov Lynch et al, *Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe*, Chaillot Paper 64, IIS, Paris, September 2003, p. 11.

36 On the issue of regionalism and security see the comprehensive paper by Tassinari, Fabrizio *Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood. The case for Regionalism*, CEPS Working Document, Brussels, No. 226, July 2005.

therefore seems most suited to the Union's interests. It has three advantages: the first is that it returns to a well tested model of Union foreign policy called 'group to group policy', with which the Union developed and worked out effective cooperation mechanisms. The second advantage is to familiarise third countries with forms of multilateral cooperation: de facto, the Union is exporting an integration model, albeit secondarily, which in any case provides a good exercise in dialogue for both the Union and the neighbouring countries. Third, regional and sub-regional cooperation creates more security on the Union's borders, as it is based on instruments of good governance and regulations that are more advanced than those generally in force in the third countries themselves. And finally, through regionalisation, the ENP "will reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict resolution".

There can be no doubt that the ENP is a very ambitious policy, much more so than those who drew it up may ever have thought. The central challenge is to combine the various elements that compose it: the multilateralism of the reference framework; the bilateralism of the Action Plans for each country; the regionalism or sub-regionalism to be encouraged with and among third countries; and finally a high level of conditionality (with respect to human rights, good governance, free market, democratic institutions), without which it is difficult to promote sufficient security on the Union's borders. Given these complex tasks, ENP presents itself not only as the continuation of the European security policy but also as an essential dimension of the Europe's broader foreign policy. It contemporarily encompasses instruments for economic cooperation and for border sharing, as well as policies for immigration and asylum, for participation in certain security actions, civilian and military crisis management, the fight against terrorism, to mention just the main elements of the Commission's communication on the ENP and of Solana's European Strategy Paper.

It follows that it will be up to the Union to ensure consistency between its policies towards third countries and between the various decision-making procedures that mark the 'three pillars' of the Nice Treaty – an old problem that has become topical once again, given the stall in the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty which seems to offer greater guarantees as far as consistency in the Union's procedures and institutions is concerned.³⁷ Therefore, consistency must be the guiding principle in effectively combining the two documents, the European Security Strategy and the ENP Strategy Paper referred to at the beginning of this brief comment: it is no coincidence that they were formulated at the same time; the ENP could become the lit-

37 On consistency as a key element for CFSP effectiveness see: Nuttall, Simon: "Coherence and Consistency", in Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith, *International Relations and the European Union*, op. cit., pp. 91-112.

mus test for a broader concept of European security and the Union's foreign policy.

Nevertheless, above and beyond an overall positive assessment of ENP, it should be remembered that it is a far from perfect policy. There are several risks inherent in it, some of them are already evident:

- it does not curb the tendency, particularly among Eastern countries, to consider it as the starting block for future entry into the European Union;
- it downgrades the objective differences between Eastern and Southern countries;
- it emphasises the exception of Russia as a privileged partner of the Union, raising further anxiety and competition with Eastern neighbours;
- it does not eliminate the ambiguity between regional/sub-regional and integrative policies;
- the effectiveness of Action Plans still has to be proven.

In any case, for the security of Europe, the ENP represents one of the few reasonable instruments of foreign and security policy, aimed at making its borders more stable while avoiding the risk of being considered a 'Fortress Europe' by third countries. The ENP therefore constitutes a necessary factor;

- to keep the Union open;
- to avoid further indigestion from enlargement (with the exception of Rumania and Bulgaria) in the foreseeable future;
- to maintain a positive long-term prospect for neighbouring countries of closer links with the Union;
- to make CFSP/ESDP more attractive both for the Union's members and for neighbouring third countries.

But in order for this to happen, the Commission, the Council and High Representative – the Troika provided for by the Treaty of Amsterdam – have to work out urgently and in close collaboration all the Action Plans needed to concretise the ENP. This will call for an enormous effort, taking account of the current bilateral and multilateral agreements for cooperation and the different framework envisaged by the ENP. The Union's activity must not come to a standstill until the process of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty picks up once again. Security is also a top priority for the European public and the EU 'government' is called upon to give precise signals in this direction. The ENP must put uncertainty and debate behind it and demonstrate its effectiveness in the field and the contribution that it can offer the security of Europe and the Mediterranean.

Thoughts on Civilisation, Security, Integration and Reform

ALYSON J.K. BAILES

This contribution is offered by a long-standing student and friend of the Nordic-Baltic region, but – also with an eye to balancing other contributions – in the spirit of a critical friend. It will dwell on broader European problems that are illustrated and heightened by Nordic/Baltic experience, rather than looking just for positive lessons from the North. More specifically, without denying this region's remarkable successes in maintaining peace and stability while advancing the frontiers of integration and democracy, this paper will pinpoint some perhaps inconvenient questions about just what the 'Nordic model' is and how useful it could be for other sub-regions. The discussion is grouped under two issue-clusters.

Enlargement, Civilisation and Identity

First, current debates on enlargement reveal a confusion of different understandings about what the integration process is *for* in connection with *civilisation and values*:

- to bring together states that already have similar civilisations and compatible interests;
- to combine states that start out with (somewhat) different civilisations and interests, but ones that *could* be made compatible with the help of common disciplines and the incentive of a common gain; or
- to become more effective in spreading the collective civilisation to further countries, whether neighbours or others, for their own benefit as well as our own.

The first assumption lies behind the most conservative line that has been taken on individual cases for membership, like Turkey, but also behind the general debate on how 'wide' Europe should be and how urgent it is to develop permanent alternatives to full integration. The second and third models also have their adherents and arguably – given the remarkable speed with which large numbers of former Communist states and Warsaw Pact members have been integrated – fit better with the actual history of the EU to date.

The interesting point that Norden may add to the argument is that common civilisation and lack of conflicting interests can actually fail to lead to integration, or stand in the way of deepening it. The five Nordic states probably have more common civilisation than any other group of five neighbours in Europe, and are also close to the three Baltic states; and since the end of World War Two and the success of de-Nazification in Germany it has been easier to recognise what Germany and indeed Poland also have in common with the Northern family. But the development of the formal Nordic Cooperation centred on the Nordic Council, as well as other joint Nordic or Nordic/Baltic enterprises, has remained at a very low level of institutionalisation, collectivisation and standardisation with – in particular – no attempt and no wish to create domestically intrusive common laws. This region also has a unique cluster of four democratic states (Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden) who could have joined both NATO and EU but have declined to do so, and all except Finland currently have some kind of opt-outs in the institutions they do belong to. Conversely, those states of the South coast of the Baltic who felt the need for a very complete integration – for both positive and defensive motives – have never been able to find a satisfactory solution *within* the region but have in practice had to go straight to Brussels and find their place in a *pan-European* structure supported by Europe's great powers (and by the US in NATO). To put it in another and simpler way, the waves of the great late-20th century integration experiment have never flowed out of Norden but always towards it, and they have never really wet it through.

This thesis could provoke many directions and levels of debate; but this author's own conclusion that it would be a poor concept of integration, in Europe or anywhere else, that would offer its benefits only to people who do not really need it because they are already so compatible. Translating that, essentially moral, stance into the concrete terms of neighbourhood and enlargement policy is, of course, quite a different challenge: and the rest of the analysis here will move to a somewhat more practical level to address the dialectic between the integrative impulse and *security*.

Integration and Security

The whole European integration process and the structure of Nordic relations after World War Two have this in common: that they had a very deep underlying security rationale about the suppression of past and avoidance of future conflict; but that they involved deliberately refraining from *talking about security* in the resulting frameworks of cooperation, for periods as long as 40-50 years. This could happen partly because the main job of providing security was done by someone else at the time: it was NATO, including the role of the USA within it, which in practice pro-

vided the strategic umbrella both for the EU as a whole and for all the free democracies of the Nordic region. Both the EU and Norden are now however, facing a time of profound and perhaps accelerating change in which, on the one hand, the security and defence agenda can no longer be separated from the political, economic and functional agendas of cooperation; and on the other hand, *all* are increasingly expected to take charge of solving their own security problems and even to help in exporting security to other regions. This has all sorts of interesting and difficult consequences, but the point pursued here will be how it impacts on received ideas about the duality of security and integration and even more specifically, the challenge of applying these concepts to policy on the wider Europe.

The question, put very simply, is whether the prime motive of the EU's policy towards its neighbours (beyond Bulgaria and Romania) should be first and foremost to protect the security of the EU itself and its present members: or is it the Union's prime and historic responsibility to extend all the benefits of integration (including the many non-security ones) to as many Europeans as possible when they are ready and, indeed, positively to help them get ready? Taking the security logic as primary does not have to imply a zero-sum relationship, and still less a prospect of conflict, with the EU's neighbours because in all the modern dimensions of security from terrorism, crime and smuggling onwards though disease or environment problems an integrated Europe can only be more secure when its neighbours also suffer less of these things on their territories and are able to block these things from passing through from outside. However, under a security rationale the general idea of *stabilisation* for neighbour regions including, for example, the strengthening of the central governments' hands in all fields of security would tend to dominate: and Europeans would not be in a hurry to encourage either regime changes or re-drawing of borders where these might entail a period of greater risk and uncertainty. At bottom, it might even be seen as a European interest for Russia to keep some leverage and restraining power over its neighbours, rather than for relations between them to be in free fall with no limit on even the most violent extreme expressions of nationalism. The logical consequence for enlargement policy would be that no more states should be taken in if they create more security burdens and liabilities for the Union than they can bring in security resources and advantages. (Ironically, Turkey might look quite good under that calculation!)

Now, it is arguable that the EU and especially its largest members do follow this security logic for quite a lot of the time, if only subconsciously and through inaction as often as action; and the specific decisions which it leads them to are often supported by other members in the heart of Europe who feel strongly about the other side of the

equation, i.e. not so much ‘more security’ as ‘less integration’. The trouble is that the security imperative produces its own contradictions and policy dilemmas, both at the strategic and the tactical level. Strategically, in the medium to longer term, it seems very unlikely that any of the older threats or newer threats to security in the EU’s neighbour regions (including the frozen or simmering conflicts of the former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa), could be solved except by major changes in the governance as well as the policies of the countries concerned, and perhaps most crucially in the ways that they conceive their identity and vital interests as nation-states. Those changes, even while driving towards positive results, will inescapably affect stability and the EU’s policies thus need to include a much greater and more explicit element of *change management* than at present (a task, incidentally, in which a renewed EU-OSCE partnership might help quite a lot). Tactically and in terms of process, the familiar dilemma is that it is very hard to identify any leverage available to the EU that might be strong enough to change its neighbours’ security behaviour to the necessary extent *without* offering the ultimate incentive of accession. It took European elites nearly a decade to acknowledge that the answer to that question is No for the Western Balkans, and it is still to be seen whether even the full integration dynamic can solve all problems there. For other neighbour areas notably including North Africa and the Middle East, most people are still reluctant even to confront the question clearly; and the status of the EU’s eventual borders on the East and South-East of its present territory, including where Turkey will end up, must be considered a grey area at best.

How does the security/integration dialectic play out in the North? First, the integration method of producing security has worked excellently through the first three waves of EU enlargement affecting the region (from Danish accession onwards), which have left especially Finland, the Baltic states and Poland safer than at any time in their history – and also, safe from each other and from Germany. Secondly, however, this region now illustrates in its most direct form the challenge that faces the enlarged Europe with its next set of neighbours. It is here and only here that the single largest and most problematic neighbour, the Russian Federation, comes into physical contact with NATO and the EU through Norway, Finland and the Baltic states; and here that we face the single state most resistant to integration, namely Belarus. These challenges, moreover, are ones that are ‘owned’ by NATO and the EU much more obviously and directly than those arising – say – in the West and Central Asian regions or the Mediterranean, with their greater diversity and different balance of strategic actors.

Challenge and Response in the North: Russia and Belarus

To look more closely at the nature of the challenge in the Nordic/Baltic region, it is worth first underlining how much the states of this area including Russia do have in common in the civilisational terms of history, culture, language and ethnicity – and even in political structure and governance. Large though the existing values gap may be, and the performance gap much wider again, consideration of the challenges of (say) the Middle East or even the Black Sea region immediately puts Norden's starting-point for integration in a brighter perspective. It should not be overlooked, either, that substantial numbers of ethnic Russians are now living within the borders of the EU in the Baltic states and Finland – a growing proportion of them as EU citizens. On the other hand, Russia and the Soviet structure and wider Warsaw Pact structure that it presided over for many decades of the Cold War has been a more serious and present threat to the security of all Europeans – perhaps most of all the Baltic peoples whom it subjugated – than any other neighbour could possibly be alleged to be. The 'old' security threats associated with Russia of territorial intrusions, economic and political blackmail are far from having faded from Baltic (and Finnish?) minds; but even under the most impeccably 'new' agenda it would be necessary to worry about things like pollution, disease, smuggling, terrorism, criminality and uncontrolled migration spilling over from Russian territory with or without the authorities' collusion. (Russia is also implicated in the new-style *conflict* agenda because of Chechnya and of its dubious role in various other post-Soviet bilateral and internal clashes). Adding to the complexity of these contradictions is Northern Europe's considerable and growing dependence – and the political impact of *perceptions* of dependence – on Russia for its energy supplies; while Russia's economic dependence on its European neighbours is harder to pin down, more intermittent (as a function e.g. of how much Russia benefits from high oil prices at a given time), and apparently never as much as of a conditioning influence on Moscow's behaviour as the West might have hoped.

As already noted, Norden's second-largest immediate neighbour – Belarus – is also the most resistant of all Europe's border-states to integrative and Europeanising influences. When Russia is considered as a subject for integration, most people's verdict would be immediately negative on grounds of its size ('can the writ of Brussels ever run as far as Vladivostock?') as well as its standards of economic and political governance. Perhaps just as important in the longer term is the problem that even the most new-thinking Russian élites seem to have in reconciling inherited ideas of Russian identity and safety with some of the most fundamental features and demands

of integration European-style: partial surrender of sovereignty, open borders, formal equality with other states within the system, and acceptance of the direct and intrusive application of tens of thousands of pages of European legislation.

How has Norden itself coped with this uniquely intense and interwoven security-and-integration challenge? Contrary to where many other analysts would begin the story, this writer would argue that the guiding line of Nordic and Baltic policy has effectively been a 'security first' one both during and after the Cold War period. These states have seen Russian first as a security problem and only secondly or dimly as a challenge for integration; have had clear ('old' or 'new') security motives for those sectoral and institutional cooperation initiatives they have launched towards the East; and have consistently declined to gamble on a chance of transformation in Russia where this would have meant a gamble on any significant feature of their own security dispensation. Conversely, the Nordics as well as the Baltics (if somewhat less demonstratively than the latter) have always done at least the minimum that was necessary for each of them to keep the degree of strategic cover it required from the USA nationally and/or NATO institutionally.³⁸ Apart from the different degrees of integration that they have thought necessary for themselves, the most obvious difference between Nordics and Baltics has been the greater readiness of the latter to stir up change and actively weaken Russian influence in other post-Soviet states like Georgia and Ukraine. Of the remaining Baltic powers, Poland has been close to the Baltic states on this last point but has balanced its Russia policy, at least at times, somewhat closer to the integration axis; Germany has professed more open 'integrationist' goals but has arguably often sacrificed the cause of change in Russia to the cause of *stability* in its own bilateral, and EU-Russian, relations. While refusing to label Russia as a security threat, Berlin has gone to lengths in trying to create mutual understanding and interdependence with Moscow that are hard to understand unless pre-empting such a threat (from Russia itself and/or wider post-Soviet instability) is part of the game.

38 It is more obvious what Norway, Denmark and Iceland – and now the South Baltic powers – have done to get strategic cover, namely to join NATO. Sweden's and Finland's neutrality policy was, in the Cold War, an only apparently paradoxical means to the same end: it helped NATO, and helped the US and NATO to provide a de facto strategic umbrella for the whole region, by denying the territories in question to the Warsaw Pact. It is a much more open question what Finland and Sweden are doing now to maintain the same result in changed circumstances, and whether they are doing the right thing; although parts of the answer clearly include their activism as 'partners' of NATO, their role in the EU's ESDP, and their generally conciliatory handling of direct bilateral relations with the USA.

What is clearer in the Nordic/Baltic situation is that the main guarantees of the region's security continue to come from outside. The nations and other interest groups most concerned to explore integrative possibilities with Russia are also based elsewhere. Neither from inside nor outside the region is any active policy being pursued towards Belarus. Against these negatives must be set the positive parts of the picture that many of the contributions here will highlight: the inventiveness of local states in building inclusive networks for practical cooperation (with at least an indirect security functionality) across all kinds of dividing lines, and their success – especially as measured against other European sub-regions – in engaging all kinds of sub-state actors within these frameworks, with clear gains for democratisation as well as the stabilisation of frontier regions.

Concluding Questions

All this analysis, solid or not, is merely the launch-pad for a fresh set of questions that might shed light both on Europe's North and the prospects for Europe's frontiers generally. First, are the challenges of security and integration on the EU's North-Eastern border affected in any way, for good or ill, by the limited nature of Norden's own integration? In the Cold War, the Eastern Nordics' abstention from NATO and EU membership was instrumental in the so-called 'Nordic balance' and in the relatively low-cost stability that it helped to preserve for decades. It is tempting for local policy-makers and analysts to re-adapt these perceptions to the post-Cold War dispensation and to argue, for instance, that the diversity of Nordic nations' institutional statuses both calls for and facilitates inclusive networking across the region. Non-Nordic observers may be excused for being less convinced. Even if they can see some security advantages for Europe as a whole in the somewhat 'fuzzy' strategic horizon with Russia that the Nordic special statuses imply, they are unlikely to see how Russia's understanding of the integration proposition can be helped by having 'only' the Baltic states as fully integrated neighbours. (That said, it would be unhistorical to fail to recognise to what degree the problem is a circular one: it is partly the geo-strategic shadow of Russia that has perpetuated the Nordics' typically heightened sensitivity over national integrity, independence and fear of the multinational 'melting-pot').

This leads on to the question about how effective the 'softer', more specialised and less intrusive variants of multi-state cooperation represented by the Northern sub-regional organisations (Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Arctic Council (AC), CBSS) and other variants of local networking really are and can be in tackling the security challenge, the integration challenge, or both. If some positive answers can be found – and they surely can – the more difficult question is how well these models

could be transferred to other parts of the enlarged EU's frontier. Something comparable to the level of historical, ethnic and linguistic overlap that has facilitated Northern ventures may be found along what could be called the central Eastern border (Moldova and Ukraine), but not elsewhere. The Northern security agenda is also difficult to match in its underlying focus on 'hard' or 'high' security – and the degree of outside help that is available to deal with that; in the relative remoteness of new-style conflict problems; and in the degree to which the local Western players down-rate or think they can afford to down-rate the new transitional challenges like terrorism. Last but not least, the Western players in the Northern exercise are among the richest (per capita), most open and competitive economies in Europe and have at least the potential to sustain much local cooperation with their own resources, while the same is hard to say of (for example) the Black Sea or East Mediterranean neighbourhood.

Thirdly, how to explain and how to rationalise the way that all concerned in local cooperation are 'working round' the territory of Belarus without any real attempt to address the security, integration, and (indeed) severe human rights challenges associated with that country? Could there be a psychological link with the elements of denial and self-denial associated with the traditional 'Nordic balance', or at least with the Nordics' Cold-War assumption that the really toughest problems should be somebody else's business? At all events, the consequences for the new Northern dispensation could be major, should the Belarus regime suddenly change for any reason and should it advance even to Russia's level of internal and external governance: a hypothesis that would lend itself to some useful scenario studies.

A fourth question already hinted at is whether Norden can continue to rely on the local security balance being maintained from outside the region, and in the same way (or at the same price) as before. While the region's strategic stability does not presently seem at risk, there is all sorts of evidence that the burden of maintaining it is shifting steadily (if less obviously than in other areas like the Balkans) from the shoulders of NATO to the EU, from the USA to the Europeans themselves, and from other Europeans to a situation where every member state is expected to pay its due, including the Nordics and Baltics. The latter are already paying a higher price most obviously in the shift of their national military efforts towards overseas interventions, but also in terms of adopting more burdensome and intrusive EU common policies in fields of internal and 'soft' security where the gain to their own populations is far from clear. Up to now, what stands out is the relative smoothness with which both Nordic and Baltic elites have adapted to these changes, without major frictions with their publics, and without letting themselves become too clearly labelled as an 'awk-

ward squad' within the EU or (where relevant) NATO. If the trends continue, however – and one point surely beyond doubt is that no local state or even local grouping has anything like the heft needed to stop them – it is hard to see how much further the region's democratic states can go without either standing up more clearly as a special-interest group and protest group within the Western community, or submitting to more thoroughgoing absorption (both conceptual and mechanical) into the integrated European mainstream.³⁹

Last and not least is the issue which no-one in Norden, but very few indeed in the rest of Europe, have so far been willing to confront head-on: the finalité of EU-Russia relations in terms both of security and integration. Is the integration of Russia into the European venture, in whatever qualified form (and perhaps after the integration process itself has changed considerably), a realistic subject for policy or not? If it is, Northern Europe will again be thrown into a front-line position, in a new context that will to say the least challenge its present and instinctive 'safety first' policies. If not, it follows that the security-and-integration dialectic is not one that can ever be fully resolved either in or by this region, and the Northern 'model' is not one that Europe should hasten to apply on the other stretches of its frontier.

39 These issues are examined from both functional and national perspectives in a forthcoming SIPRI publication from OUP (end-2005): *The Nordic States and the European Security and Defence Policy*, Alison J.K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius (eds.).

Northern Europe as a 'Constructive Margin'

NOEL PARKER

Since about 1999, a number of like-minded researchers first in England, then in Copenhagen and beyond, have been pursuing an analytical idea which can be referred as the 'marginality approach', which appears to give powerful insight into the situation *and the potential* for action of many political entities and social groupings. The approach is first described in print in a book called *Margins in European Integration*.⁴⁰ It therefore becomes my aim here to introduce the approach and set out the promise that it holds out in pursuit of our theme of 'lessons' from Northern Europe.

The purpose of this article is, then:

1. to describe the 'marginality approach' as a way of analysing political actors and their possibilities in the dynamics that arise from the position of being marginal.
2. to explain how it can be possible, on the basis of this approach, to identify the sometimes unexpected ways in which 'marginal' political subjects possess room to manoeuvre 'on the margin'. The claim that they are 'constructive' in their marginality expresses the notion that they may even impact upon the overall field where they are ostensibly 'marginal'.
3. to show how this approach reveals possibilities for – indeed strengths of – Northern Europe, such that the mode of analysis may usefully be extended to elsewhere in Europe.

40 Noel Parker: "Integrated Europe and its 'Margins': Action and Reaction", in Noel Parker and Bill Armstrong (eds.) *Margins in European Integration Basingstoke*: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 3-27.

The 'Marginality' Approach Abstractly Described

The marginality approach concerns position and 'geometry'. The latter is meant in the purest sense of the expression, the study of 'the relative arrangement of objects or parts'.⁴¹ We are interested in analysing entities in relation to each other, within the arrangements between 'object or parts' which their various relationships exhibit.

Note that this does not at all confine the notion of entity and position to territorial senses – though this is the easiest and most familiar understanding of these things for modern observers of a world of territorial states. Conversely, there are good reasons to be sanguine regarding the easy dominance of territorial boundedness.⁴² To be sure, Scandinavia has territorial boundaries – though they are shifting and imprecise, as the position of Iceland and Finland illustrates. But Scandinavian design has no evident territorial footprint, just a vague connection with styles once developed by various Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian and Danish designers and subsequently marketed as 'Scandinavian'. Likewise, social classes can shift their territorial location from one to another (e.g. when a class moves to certain suburbs), or have no territorial footprint by detaching themselves from territorial bases altogether.⁴³ In short, we do not expect to confine our attention to territorial geometry and territorial marginality.

In any 'geometry', some entities will be larger than others and/or possess a concentration of resources which tends to group others around them. There will thus exist a 'geometry' in which some others' positions will be marginal with respect to the first. Margins and centres are defined via their interrelationship: i.e. a margin is that which can be plausibly perceived to lie on the edge of another's (a 'centre's') concentration of resources over a certain field of impacts. We focus upon those in marginal positions, and the effects of their marginality, in the expectation of showing how the margins fit into the 'geometry' that is constructed *and may be reconstructed*, around socio-political entities. In a world of 'large' entities, it is easy to miss the fact that the 'lesser', marginal ones are also part of the geometry, with consequences for the whole: the action of large entities meets intersecting action by marginal ones.

Margins and centres are, then, linked together in the geometries that their mutual relations sustain. But the position of each has specific implications for the scope of

41 *Oxford English Dictionary*

42 Albert, Mathias David Jacobsen and Yosef Lapid (eds.): *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2001.

43 Sklair, Leslie: *The transnational capitalist class*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001; Sassen, Saskia: "The Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics" *The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 2, 2003, pp. 41-66.

their identities and their actions. While acknowledging that the centre commands resources that the margin does not, the approach concentrates upon the specifics of the margin's position, anticipating that the action of the margins will have repercussions, including for the centre and for the geometry of the whole.

So there are a number of specific questions that the approach poses as a situation when is considered:

- What centres and what margins are present? This is not so straightforward a matter as might be supposed, since there is no single determination of the size or the resources of an entity: Japan is a major *economic* power in the Far East, but has little if any *cultural* impacts; so there appear to be distinct, overlapping centre-margin geometries in this case.
- Who or what is positioned at the margins? Given the difficulties of definitively determining the centre-margin patterning, this is not so straightforward either. And it often turns out that a centre in one field is a margin in another. Germany was for a long time the central economic power of the European Union, but a new boy as a liberal-democratic political entity with a dubious past and limited political say; France, by contrast, was economically secondary but the political centre.
- In what ways does their marginal position either constrain *or enable* the marginal entities present? It was the Benelux countries, on the margins of both France and Germany, that often took the lead in promoting integration.
- How might such constraints, and any developments around the margin's impact on the overall geometry of the centres and margins?

As mentioned already, wherever instances are sought, it is easiest to provide the familiar territorial instances. Yet the approach can be applied as widely as the notions of 'entities' in a 'geometry' are valid. Thus, the sociological analysis of classes in the terms developed by Pierre Bourdieu⁴⁴ suggests strongly the presence of central and marginal entities, for which a marginality analysis could be appropriate. It can be expected that the sociology of globalisation will likewise be a promising area for marginality treatment;⁴⁵ for *ex hypothesi* the world it addressed is described as a complex

44 Bourdieu, Pierre: "Social Space and the Genesis of 'Classes'", in *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge: Polity, 1991 pp. 229-251.

45 Bauman, Zygmunt: "The Making and Unmaking of Strangers", in *Post-Modernity and Its Discontents*, Cambridge: Polity, 1997.

of interrelations, in which some must be centres and many others margins. The anthropology of boundary-formation found in the work of Frederic Barth⁴⁶ suggests how the form of marginality can also be applied within that discipline. This author's current work is intended to develop out of marginality analysis resolving difficulties implicit in post-structuralist accounts of self-identity. None of these, however, is the topic here.

The Possibilities at the Margins

Up to now, the word 'margin' has been studiously used in preference to a number of cognate terms: edge, boundary, border, frontier, periphery. Whilst there is no definitive position in stipulative definitions, by the use of the term 'margin', we do have it in mind to point up a specific quality: namely, that what lies on the edge, boundary etc of a large political entity and its field of influence may possess capacity independent from, or even in opposition to the centre and its impacts in structuring the geometry around it. In the graphic phrase 'margins can bite back' at the centres which seem to dominate them.

There are two broad lines, which are not mutually exclusive, to analyse the situation and potential of 'margins' in this sense. Which is most appropriate depends upon whether the margin's identity is or is not an open issue. Where the self-identity of the margin is established and more or less stable to a degree, there appear centre stage a number of possibilities which can be mapped out in a basically game-theoretical manner. The focus, that is to say, can be upon various *tools* which marginality provides for the margin to manage to advantage its relationship to the centre(s).

The Tools of the Margin

Some of these latter are game-theoretical possibilities derivable from the margin's being able convincingly to claim a potential to shift closer to, or further from one or more centres. As game-theoretical possibilities, they derive their structuring from the numbers of players in the situation and the options that the players can be seen to possess. Thus, the presence and nature of that which is other to the given centre alters the situation quite markedly. In the sequence below, we move from situations with one dominant centre plus others of markedly lesser standing, to two or more comparable centres, to situations where the margin marks a boundary of the centre's field with an indeterminate and potential unruly unknown beyond.

46 Barth, Frederic: *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1969.

1. Obtaining benefits from the centre in return for not moving away to enhance another centre. This produces, for example, Germany's gain from the US nuclear umbrella during the Cold War, or a variety of benefits which states granted in the course of history to outlying rural populations (up to and including the EU's Common Agricultural Policy). These benefits are offered by the centre out of fear of the margin's separatism.
2. Persuading the centre of one's importance at the boundary between the centre's sphere of influence and one or more others. Turkey's case for membership of the EU includes the notion that it can act as a medium of communication and negotiation with the Middle East and/or Islam, both of which lie beyond the EU's sphere and are necessary but difficult to handle. In this case, the leverage of the margin, i.e. Turkey, is that it can offer the centre a specific gain: a better intermediary with others outside.
3. Leap-frogging another margin, to act as (and enjoy the gains from being) the centre's intermediary in relation to another. This occurs where one margin seeks to replace another as the point of contact or defence on the edge of the centre's field of influence. Since joining the EU, for example, Finland has sought to demonstrate to its EU partners that it is the best medium for dealing with Russia.
4. *Pretending* to adopt from the identity of the centre(s). This appears to be shifting identity, but is not. Rather, in what Merje Kuus dubs 'strategic appropriation'⁴⁷ apes the West's favourite values in order to appear as something familiar and so obtain favourable terms for cash injections. Many a Western statesman – or indeed academic! – returns from a visit to Eastern Europe blithely convinced that people there wish only to become like the West has the good fortune to be already: 'liberal', 'free-market', 'democratic' etc. etc. It would, conversely, be unusual if 'strategic' appropriation were not also accompanied by a measure of *real* appropriation: that is to say, some of those at the margin will

47 Kuus, Merje: "Those goody-goody Estonians': toward rethinking security in the European Union candidate states", in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 2004, vol. 22, pp. 191-207.

48 Classically these were charges levied for passage through the Sound (see: Parker, Noel "Marginal Manoeuvres: Danish and British Postures in European Patterns of Power", in Heurlin, Bertel and Hans Mouritzen, (eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000*, Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 2000 pp. 31-60). A more subtle recent instance, however, would be comparatively cheap membership of NATO in return for a base to watch Soviet shipping movements in and out of the Baltic.

genuinely seek to adopt the values of the centre. But this is not in itself a tactic, and indeed may put the margin at a *dis*advantage by leading it to compete the centre's strengths.

5. 'Rent-seeking' for movement in or out of the centre's space: as in the case of the charges Denmark used to extract for movements in and out of the Baltic Sea.⁴⁸
6. Playing one centre off against another, so as to create an auction of benefits/concessions. This is a sub-category of 1 above, available to a plausibly unattached marginal player located in between two or more approximately evenly matched centres.⁴⁹
7. Stressing that one offers an alternative to a dominant centre. This possibility also gains where existing centres are evenly matched, since that makes more plausible the freedom to be one or the other, or a *fortiori* something different altogether. In the 20th century, the USA promoted its strength at world level partly by being seen *not* to be a colonial power after the model of existing imperialism. Sweden, and to some extent the other Nordic countries, asserted alter-nativity in their image/self-image as 'neutral' during the Cold War, since they could present themselves as a non-aggressive alternative to the foreign relations and the modern prosperity of the USA/West.⁵⁰
8. Providing order in the unknown beyond the centre's sphere. Russia's post-1990 attempts to be a military force against instability and 'terrorism' in the Caucasus and Central Asia are a case in point; they involve insisting that Russia can, as a basis for its relationship with the Western centre, re-organise a space beyond the West's capacities, which has become the space whence 'terrorism' threatens.⁵¹

The Discourse of the Margin

But it can also be the case that the self-identity of the margin is *not* stable. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the way that the margin acts at the margin is

49 I am grateful to Michael Emerson for pointing out that this constituted a separate category of the margin's tools.

50 Parker, Noel: "Differentiating, collaborating, outdoing: Nordic identity and marginality in the contemporary world", *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 9, 2002, pp. 355-381

51 Barnett, Thomas, PM: *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004.

altered by how the margin itself, the centre(s) and/or marginality as such are conceived. There are two issues: *whether* the marginal possesses a self-identity; and *how* the marginal conceives whatever self-identity it establishes. The first is worthy of a lengthy analysis in itself; in fact, this is logically prior to the game-theoretical dynamics that was described above. It stretches from the virtual absence of self-identity where the margin sees itself without identity, merely as the centre drained of the centre's essential strengths (what Friedman⁵² calls 'narcissism' when he finds it in a third-world African capital) to conscious self-identity of the margin in its marginality and of its potential alternativity. But this is not primary concern where we wish to analyse a given geometry with centres and margins. The 'how' question then comes to the fore.

If the self-identity of the margin is not stable, a discursive context of marginality will then become a crucial variable in the margin's behaviour and impacts – something which greatly interests Chris Browning and Pertti Joenniemi.⁵³ The reason is that the way that those at the margin perceive themselves, and how others perceive them, become factors in what the margin *seeks* to gain from its marginal position, and in what it *can* obtain. Where the margin's self-awareness develops to capture its own identity, its relatedness to one or more centres, *and* its scope for manoeuvre within these constraints, then it is likely to exploit to the maximum such 'cards' as marginality can provide.

We could identify five levels on the way to that degree of self-awareness as a margin: *being* in a marginal position; *seeing oneself* in a marginal position; being *conscious of the possibilities* implicit in being marginal; *using those possibilities* to advantage; seeing in one's marginality a *potential to redefine others' boundaries*. This last can be captured by that neologism 'alternativity' used earlier: the marginal's scope for constituting itself as distinct in relation to the dominant established geometry around the centre, so as to attract others to it *as* an alternative centre. 'Alternativity' thus refers to the potential of the marginal both to see itself as alternative and present itself to third parties as semi-autonomous in relation to the given centre.

52 Friedman, Jonathan: *Cultural Identity and Global Process*, London: Sage, 1994.

53 Browning Christopher S. and Pertti Joenniemi: "Contending Discourses of Marginality: The Case of Kaliningrad", *Geopolitics* 9, no. 3, 2004, pp. 699-730.

Where the margin's self-identity is subject to modification, we look for a number of possibilities:

1. Asserting more or less the relative autonomy of the margin, with consequent impact upon the plausibility of the game-theoretical moves set out above.
2. Adopting certain items from the identity of the centre(s) in the expectation of replicating *or* outdoing it/them, with attendant corollaries in dealing with the centre or third parties that also deal with it.
3. In a relational set-up, determining one's own identity entails as well that one determines the identity of others deemed to be like/unlike favourable/unfavourable and so on. This appears when a margin and/or a centre engage in projection and counter-projection. Over centuries, Russia has presented itself as an alternative to Europe/the West seen in a particular light – unfeeling or alienated in the 19th century, inefficient or inherently unjust under during the early Soviet era, unable to control the forces of disorder in the contemporary situation. The way that the USA has recently tried to determine a new margin in Europe ('New Europe' as it was called) is an instance of aggressive projection, dubbed 'altercasting' by Pertti Joenniemi.⁵⁴
4. Defining one's difference in a fashion that makes it a source of legitimacy. Again, Russia has frequently presented itself as a positive alternative to Western European industrialisation. Likewise, the 'Nordic model' has appeared a strength to the peoples of Scandinavia and to its advocates in other parts of the world. It is not too much to say, as well, that the entire line of critical thinking around post-colonial literature has valorised the colonised margin. The strategy was first pursued in Fanon's idealisation of the 'wretched of the earth'. Subsequently, the formerly colonised have been able see in themselves various foundations for difference, strength, virtue and/or understanding – what Salmon Rushdie referred to as the Empire 'writing back'.

Northern Europe as a Constructive Margin

This account of possibilities at the margin has frequently been illustrated with examples from the North of Europe. It is no accident that analysing margins in terms of

⁵⁴ Joenniemi, Pertti: "The Challenges of 'New' and 'Old: The Case of Europe's North", in Smith, David, J., (ed.), *The Baltic States and their Region: New Europe or Old?* Radopi, Amsterdam/New York, pp. 67-85, 2005.

marginality and its potential for impacting on the whole has been especially taken up in connection with northern Europe. For the North of Europe has been on the edge of many centres at many times in its history, and continues to be so. Accordingly, it has frequently exhibited the effects, and the effectiveness of the margin. These conditions continue to apply.

The difficulty of organising human social life in the North of Europe has usually meant that developing forms of social order have moved northwards, to be tested there and modified in relative independence.⁵⁵ State development could take place on the basis of a semi-autonomous agricultural and fishing base which limited scope for outside interference both from other states to the south and from local administrative centres.⁵⁶ Industrialisation came later here than in most of Europe, as a result took place in relative isolation, conditioned by the very smallness of northern European societies.

Scandinavia has long dominated the access to certain natural resources (timber, ore) needed by European society further south, but too remote to be directly controlled from there.⁵⁷ In this it has been more fortunate than resource-rich Third World lands, which frequently find their independence undermined. It continues to possess a special know-how in mastering northerly and polar conditions for the organisation and exploitation of resources. These are corollaries of Northern Europe's being on the margin between socio-economic order(s) and 'the void' to the north.

Northern Europe has likewise frequently found itself on the margin *between* orders emanating from larger centres to the south and west. When larger orders have clashed to the south and west, this has not removed the relative independence of northern European orders. Nomadic, and subsequently Islamic peoples' attacks upon prominent centres of civilisation in Europe have side-lined Northern Europe, which was neither attractive nor manageable enough to be the targets of such attentions. Sweden could choose to intervene in the post-Reformation religious conflicts and then, under pressure of the Russian expansion, withdraw (albeit unwillingly) into

55 Tilly, Charles: *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD990-1992*, Cambridge, Ma, & Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

56 Gustafsson, Harald: *Political Interaction in the Old Regime: Central Power and Local Society in the Eighteenth-Century Nordic States*, A. Crozier, tr., Lund, 1994.

57 This dynamic operated for example against Denmark, a relatively southerly state which found itself unable to put out of commission its Swedish rival, safe in its large, inhospitable territory further away from other centres of power: Jensen, Frede P.: "Den danske, "indkredsning", af Vasa-tidens Sverige" in *Historisk Tidsskrift* 76, 1976, pp. 1-23.

independence. Thereafter the demand for the rights of the neutral power to trade with both sides in the major powers' conflicts became the common stock of Nordic countries.⁵⁸ This state of affairs was mirrored even during the Cold War clash between Soviet and Western liberal systems. Nordic countries managed to maintain varying degrees of independence and neutrality, both in strategic and in socio-economic terms.⁵⁹ They were neither so committed as others to one or the other side, nor so implicated in the socio-economic orders insisted upon under respectively American or Soviet dominance.

The present situation sustains this. Cold War neutrality survives in post-Cold War Northern Europe in the lower level of integration of the area into the EU and its relatively high representation in centres of neutrality such as the CSCE. Nordic societies maintain the neutrality that has allowed Norway to develop special skills in brokering conflict-resolution and Denmark to act as the intermediary of the West in relation to the Baltic states of the former Soviet Union.

Finally, the peculiar geometry characteristic of Northern Europe continues to mean that settled forms are relatively hard to impose. This is what Uffe Jakobsen refers to as the Baltic Sea Region's 'triangularity': that is to say, the way that influences, interests and claims repeatedly meet in patterns made by more than two. A consequence is that orders in the North of Europe frequently live with the instability inherent in multiple groupings and pulls, and establish willy-nilly patterns which cannot be resolved into a simpler, binary patterns. The indeterminacy of overlapping, negotiated orders in Nordic and Baltic Sea areas is striking: cross-border regions, regional inter-governmental organisations and supra- or cross-national identities are significant still. This has led it to be regarded by some⁶⁰ as a test-bed for post-modern/post-state political order.

These are all aspects of the marginality that has obtained in northern Europe. Neither outside nor fully absorbed into larger centres of power and value in the world, Nordic Europe gives scope for play on the margins which can *mark* a difference and *make* a difference to the whole.

58 Holbraad, Carsten: *Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1991.

59 Childs, Marquis W.: *Sweden: The Middle Way*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1947. 60 Joenniemi, Pertti and Marko Lehti: "The Encounter between the Nordic and the Northern. Torn Apart but Meeting Again?" in Lehti, Marko and Smith, David, J., (eds.), *Post-Cold War Identity Policies. Northern and Baltic Experiences*. Frank Cass: London, 2003, pp. 128-157.

Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Economic Area and the Northern Dimension

MARIUS VAHL

Introduction

The suggestion that EU policies towards Northern Europe could serve as a potential model for the EU's relations with its other neighbours has emerged in recent years, both in the Convention on the Future of the EU in 2002-03 and in some of the proposals for the EU's new ENP. This paper focuses on two particular EU policies towards non-EU members in Northern Europe: the Northern Dimension (ND) initiative and the European Economic Area (EEA). These two policies are analysed in light of two broader themes: first, how the EU organises its policy towards its neighbours more generally and, secondly, the enlargement process and how the EU has attempted to develop alternatives to EU membership.

The Northern Dimension represents a regional approach to the EU's neighbours, and stands in contrast to a bilateral approach whereby the EU relates to its neighbours on a country-by-country basis. A number of arguments can be raised for and against a regional versus a bilateral approach. These will be analysed in light of the experiences of the Northern Dimension, as well as EU policies towards other regions in its immediate neighbourhood.

The Agreement on the European Economic Area between the EU and the three EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) is the most comprehensive agreement between the EU and any third country short of full EU membership. The EEA has recently been discussed as a possible long-term model the EU should aim for in its relations with other neighbouring countries. The prospects of this, and how this is linked to past and possible future EU enlargements, will be analysed by comparing the proposals for a ENP with the realities of the EEA.

The Northern Dimension Model(s)

In order to analyse the NDI as a potential model for EU policy towards other neighbouring regions and states, it is necessary first to have a clear idea of what the Northern Dimension is. Diverging views on the ultimate scope and purpose of the initiative have been voiced since its gestation in the late 1990s. In view of these conceptual differences it is more correct to speak, not of one Northern Dimension model, but of several partially overlapping models.

In the speech that put the Northern Dimension on the EU's agenda in 1997, Finland's Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, claimed that the "ultimate goal of an EU policy [for the Northern Dimension] is peace and stability, with prosperity and security shared by all nations [in the region]".⁶¹ Such ambitious objectives were supported in a number of academic studies that called for a radical re-organisation of the EU's relations with neighbouring countries. A 'Europe of regions' in a structure of 'Olympic circles' would complement or even transform the current dominant approach of hub-and-spoke diplomacy in a structure of 'concentric circles', with the EU at the core, accession candidates occupying the 'inner circles' and non-candidates relegated to the outer circles.⁶² Such a regional approach, it was argued, could counteract the trend towards the creation of new dividing lines in Europe and create stronger incentives for the countries in the 'outer circles' to converge on European norms and values.

While stating the need for a "comprehensive strategy, an institutional framework and adequate financing arrangements", Lipponen⁶³ pointed out that cooperation in Northern Europe was "already organised well enough to make major new institutional arrangements unnecessary" and that therefore no new financing was required. Some observers noted early on in the process of establishing the Northern Dimension that a certain 'scaling down' of the initiative had occurred.⁶⁴ This was evident in the official documents from the EU on the Northern Dimension, one of which stated that "the Commission considers that neither new permanent structures

61 Lipponen, Paavo: "The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension", speech at Conference on the Barents Region Today, Rovaniemi, 15 September 1997.

62 Emerson, Michael: *Cosmos, Chaos and the Backbone for a Wider European Order*, CEPS Working Document No. 130, CEPS, Brussels, March 1999. See also, Pertti Joenniemi, *Bridging the Iron Curtain? Co-operation Around the Baltic Rim*, Working Paper 22, COPRI, Copenhagen, 1999.

63 Lipponen, Paavo: "The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension", speech at Conference on the Barents Region Today, Rovaniemi, 15 September 1997.

64 Joenniemi, Pertti: *Bridging the Iron Curtain? Co-operation Around the Baltic Rim*, Working Paper 22, COPRI, Copenhagen, 1999.

nor new budget lines should be considered”.⁶⁵ According to the first Action Plan for the Northern Dimension (2000-2003), adopted by the Feira European Council in June 2000, the “aim [of the Northern Dimension] is to provide added value through reinforced co-ordination and complementarity in the EU and Member States’ programmes and enhanced collaboration between the countries in Northern Europe”.

There were thus two clearly distinct Northern Dimension models proposed in the early phases of the initiative. Meanwhile, it appears that the ambitions concerning the NDI have been lowered and that the discrepancy between these (perhaps) overly ambitious aims and the resources the EU has been willing to put into the initiative has been reduced.

The Northern Dimension in Practice

The NDI could be assessed in terms of how it has dealt with the main contentious issues in the region. It is notable that many of these have been beyond the competencies of the EU as such, and that to the extent that they have been confronted, this has occurred without the direct involvement of the EU. Issues on this list include hard security matters such as the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states, NATO enlargement, first to Poland and then to the Baltic states, and the possible extension of the CFE Treaty (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) in the region. On other issues, where the EU could have become involved, for example concerning the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia, these have been deferred to other international institutions, in this case to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its commissioner for minorities. This was in part due to the allocation of the Northern Dimension portfolio to the external relations department in the European Commission, which further limited the possibility of a more comprehensive regional multilateral approach by excluding questions relating to enlargement and the enlargement candidates. While the Northern Dimension contributed to putting the special challenges of Kaliningrad on the agenda, it did not provide sufficient impetus to find an early solution to the problem. This led to the ‘crisis’ of 2002, until then arguably the most serious crisis in the history of EU-Russia relations. While the regional approach has made inroads in Northern Europe, it is hard not to agree that the European Union is indeed a ‘reluctant regionaliser’.⁶⁶

65 European Commission: *A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union: An Inventory of Current Activities*, Working Document, 1999.

66 Haukkala, Hiski: *Two Reluctant Regionalizers? The European Union and Russia in Europe's North*, Working Paper No. 7, Ulkopoliittinen instituutti, Helsinki, 2001.

In spite of this, the Northern Dimension arguably provided ‘added-value’ beyond the ‘minimalist model’ and the limited aims of many, if not most, EU member states.⁶⁷ In political terms, the Northern Dimension has been appreciated by the EU’s partners for its inclusive approach, with extensive consultations on priorities creating a sense of ‘joint ownership’.⁶⁸

In operational terms, the main result of the NDI is the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership and its activities in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, financed in part by the Commission and the European Investment Bank. The creation of an additional programme can be criticised as going against the aim of improving coherence between the various initiatives in the region. There has also been criticism that the EU has not made use of existing institutions such as the CBSS and the BEAC.⁶⁹ Despite the insistence that no new financing would be made available, considerable funds (€110 million) were promised to the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership in July 2002. Furthermore, the commitment to annual high-level conferences and the Second Action Plan for the period 2003-2006 ensure that the Northern Dimension has become a going concern.

The relative success of the NDI may be attributed to the fortuitous sequencing of EU presidencies, rather than reflecting a principled change in the EU’s approach towards its ‘near abroad’. The three Nordic EU member states – Finland, Sweden and Denmark – held the EU Presidency in autumn 1999, spring 2001 and autumn 2002, respectively. Their active support for the initiative ensured that the Northern Dimension became a fixture on the EU agenda. Indeed, it has been claimed that the principal lesson of the NDI is the way Finland managed to ‘customise’ the Union and use its EU membership and its Presidency to promote stronger EU policies in areas of national interest.⁷⁰ The Northern Dimension has been seen as an example of how an EU member state could use its membership and the presidency to promote its national interest, by turning a policy question of national importance into an EU

67 Selliaas, Andreas: *EU's nordlige dimensjon – I Norges interesse?*, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek 6, 2002. See also Bonvincini, Gianni, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), *The Northern EU – National Views on the Emerging Northern Dimension*, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, UPI/IEP, 2000.

68 European Commission: *European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper*, May 2004.

69 Catellani, Nicola: “The Multilevel Implementation of the Northern Dimension”, in Hanna Ojanen (ed.), *The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?* Helsinki, Ulkopoliittinen Instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik, 2001, pp. 54-77.

70 Ojanen, Hanna: *How to Customize Your Union: Finland and the ‘Northern Dimension of the EU’*, Northern Dimensions, UPI, Helsinki, 1999, pp. 13-26.

project. This ‘lesson’ was an important reason for the Polish proposals for an ‘Eastern Dimension’ during 2002.⁷¹

The 2004 EU enlargement transformed the rationale on which the Northern Dimension is based, as most of the questions of coherence and coordination of policies and programmes will be greatly reduced. Whereas the task until 2004 was to coordinate economic assistance programmes targeting member states, candidates and non-candidates, this is now limited to coordination between EU internal assistance and aid to Russia. This is unlikely to change much in practice, as the key issues confronted so far in the Northern Dimension have been essentially bilateral EU-Russian affairs. From 2004 onwards, the Northern Dimension became essentially a regional element of EU-Russia bilateral cooperation.

EU enlargement does not, however, spell the end of the utility of the regional approach in Northern Europe. Some of the key outstanding issues on the NDI’s agenda, such as energy and environmental security, involve third parties, notably Norway, but also Iceland, the US and Canada. This is reflected in the growing use of the term the ‘Arctic Window’ in official texts on the Northern Dimension. These indicate that the regional approach of the Northern Dimension could remain relevant also after 2004, although this utility seems in part to depend on widening the scope of, and participation in, the NDI.

The Organisation of EU Policy towards its Neighbours

The regional approach exemplified by the Northern Dimension is, of course, not the only way in which the EU can organise its relations with its neighbours. In principle, the EU is faced with two principal ways in which to approach cooperation between itself and neighbouring countries, and indeed to third countries more generally: *bilateralism* or *multilateralism*.

According to a *bilateral approach*, EU policies, strategies, programmes, initiatives and economic assistance are targeted towards individual countries, and contractual arrangements between the EU and neighbouring countries are bilateral. In a *multilateral approach*, by contrast, political dialogue would take place between the EU and a group of neighbouring countries. There would be multilateral policy initiatives on, for instance, multinational cross-border economic assistance programmes and multilateral agreements between the EU and two or more neighbouring countries.

71 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz: Speech at the inaugural forum “Together – on the future of Europe”, Warsaw, February 18, 2002.

Theoretically, there are an infinite number of ways in which the EU could organise its third-country relations multilaterally, ranging from global to trilateral initiatives and from comprehensive arrangements to sector-by-sector cooperation. Here, focus will be on the *regional approach*, of which the Northern Dimension would be an example, in which cooperation primarily takes place between the EU and a smaller group of neighbouring countries, which together with parts of the EU constitute well-defined geographical and historical regions.

The EU Neighbourhood Policies

So which of these two approaches – *bilateralism* or the *regional approach* – has the EU availed itself of in its policy towards its neighbours? At the most general level, the EU has divided its neighbours into about half a dozen groups, and has had different types of contractual agreements and economic assistance programmes with each of them.

The erstwhile EU candidates in Central and Eastern Europe constituted one group, with bilateral Europe Agreements and assistance through the PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programmes. For the countries of the Western Balkans, the EU has established a Stability and Association Process, with bilateral Stability and Association Agreements (SAAs) and assistance through the CARDS programme. Turkey and Andorra are part of the EU customs union through bilateral agreements. The countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) constitute another group, with bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and assistance through the TACIS programme. The countries of the Southern Mediterranean are in the process of concluding the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with the EU. The states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are either part of the European Economic Area or have bilateral sectoral agreements with the EU.

The distinctions between the various agreements and programmes are marked, reflecting in particular the priority accorded to the enlargement process. There are large differences in terms of the economic assistance provided. In the EU's financial perspective for 2000-2006, the enlargement candidates received almost €1,200/capita, the Western Balkans approximately €200/capita, while the CIS countries received on average €13/capita in assistance from the EU budget.⁷² Although assis-

72 Council of the European Union: *Presidency Conclusions*, Berlin European Council, March 1999 (available at <http://europe.eu.int>).

tance is allocated on a 'group-by-group' basis, almost all support and most projects created are bilateral.

Integration between the EU and its neighbours is to a considerable extent a post-Cold War phenomenon. These arrangements are increasingly embedded in bilateral *association agreements* between the EU and the country concerned, with the number of third countries with which the EU has association agreements increasing from three, at the end of the 1980s, to more than 20 in 2004. Previous trade and cooperation agreements have successively been replaced with second-generation association agreements, all of them providing for more comprehensive and deeper integration with the EU.⁷³ With further integration in the second and third pillars, the EU's neighbours are increasingly associating with the EU also in other domains, such as justice and home affairs and foreign, security and defence policy, either through their more comprehensive second-generation agreements, or through new bilateral association arrangements.

Since around the time of the accession of two more Nordic states – Finland and Sweden – to the EU in 1995, the preference for bilateralism has been tempered by more active regional policies by the EU towards the Baltic region. This started with the preparation by the Commission of the Baltic Sea Region Initiative, presented to the CBSS Summit in spring 1996,⁷⁴ and was later followed by the NDI. However, apart from this, regional approaches have been virtually absent in the EU's relations with its Eastern neighbours,⁷⁵ and the EU has, for instance, been unwilling to engage further with regional cooperation in the Black Sea region.

Regionalism as seen in the Baltic region arguably plays a more limited role in the EU's relations with the Balkans. Although regionalism was one of the main novelties of the Stability and Association process, this consists of regional cooperation among the countries of the region, rather than multilateral cooperation between the countries

73 The difference between association agreements and trade and cooperation agreements is mainly one of internal EU procedures, and not the scope of commitments made. Association agreements are based on Article 310 of the Treaty of Nice and require unanimity in the Council. Trade and cooperation agreements are based on Article 133 and require only a qualified majority in the Council. In spite of the connotations of closer relations in the term 'association', there is not necessarily a difference in substance between agreements concluded in accordance with Article 310 and those concluded on the basis of Article 133.

74 Joenniemi, Pertti: *Bridging the Iron Curtain? Co-operation Around the Baltic Rim*, Working Paper 22, COPRI, Copenhagen, 1999.

75 European Commission: *European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper*, May 2004.

of the region and the EU itself.⁷⁶ Furthermore, a considerable part of EU policy towards South-East Europe is channelled through institutions other than the EU, from organisations such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the international financial institutions, to initiatives such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe launched in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo war, all of which include countries outside the EU.

The regional approach was pioneered in the Mediterranean region with the launch of the so-called 'Barcelona Process' in 1995, later renamed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This 'Southern Dimension' was explicitly used as a model for the Northern Dimension.⁷⁷ The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a framework for bilateral and multilateral relations between the EU and its 12 Mediterranean partners, initiated by the 1995 Barcelona Conference. The aims are broad and include creating a common area of peace and stability and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. As in EU policy towards the Balkans, a key element of the Barcelona Process is the upgrading of bilateral contractual relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partners.

Bilateralism versus Multilateralism

What are then the major pros and cons of the various approaches available to the EU for its neighbourhood policy? A bilateral approach enables the Union and its partners to tailor cooperation according to the different needs and requirements of individual countries. Considering the widely diverging levels of economic, political and social development among the EU's neighbours, the emphasis on the principle of differentiation is easily justifiable. From the perspective of *realpolitik*, a bilateral approach accentuates the power asymmetries between the EU and its smaller and/or weaker neighbours and thus makes it easier for the EU to shape the relationship and to determine common and cooperative policies. This asymmetric bilateralism, however, with the EU the policy-maker and the neighbours policy-takers, stands in sharp contrast to the EU's professed preference for multilateralism. In practice, it amounts to little more than EU unilateralism, with proclamations of equality acting merely as political window-dressing.

76 Nicholas Whyte: "Analysis of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed between the European Union and Macedonia on 9 April", *Europa South-East Monitor*, Issue 21, March 2001, Brussels, CEPS.

77 Lipponen, Paavo: "The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension", speech at Conference on the Barents Region Today, Rovaniemi, 15 September 1997.

Beyond such ideological concerns, the proliferation of bilateral sectoral agreements, processes and initiatives is in practice becoming increasingly difficult for the EU institutions to manage. The growing complexity creates a significant burden of cooperation and coordination of policies and programmes, difficulties which are compounded by the multi-tiered nature of governance in Europe, as national policies, regional organisations and international financial institutions multiply the number of programmes to be coordinated. A bilateral approach could make it more difficult to develop and implement coherent EU policies, given the considerable interdependencies between not only the EU and its neighbours, but also among the neighbours themselves. That such differentiated bilateralism could lead to trade distortions as well as trade creation is well known: overlapping, non-congruent free trade agreements open up possibilities to free-ride for producers in third countries, requiring detailed rules of origin, to take one example.⁷⁸ Even if unintended, differential treatment may cause resentment among those neighbours who are accorded less favourable terms with the EU. The development of new bilateral arrangements with an increasing number of partner countries creates problems of precedence, with pressures for ‘concessions’ given by the EU to one country to be extended also to other countries. Instead of developing into a ‘ring of friends’, as called for by then Commission President Prodi,⁷⁹ there seems to be a growing sense of frustration with the EU among many of its neighbours. An inclusive regional approach could counter such developments.

Although the number of associates was reduced as a result of the 2004 enlargement, this does not spell the end for a continued demand for upgraded contractual relations. First, there is the continuing process of negotiating second-generation agreements with the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Stability and Association Process. Many of the countries with which the EU already has such second-generation agreements are calling for either a revision of these or for new associations. The EU and Russia are discussing how to develop four ‘Common Spaces’ (on economics, external security, internal security, and research and education) which is quite likely to lead to new bilateral agreement(s), perhaps replacing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The EU-Russian relationship has already been upgraded institutionally, through the creation of the Permanent Partnership

78 Brenton Paul and Miriam Manchin: *Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of Origin*, CEPS Working Document No. 183, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2002.

79 Prodi, Romano: “A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability”, speech at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference on Peace, Security and Stability, International Dialogue, and the Role of the EU, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 2002, 5-6 December.

Council, which met for the first time in spring 2004. Ukraine is also calling for an association agreement as a stepping-stone towards membership, a long-term objective not yet endorsed by the EU, whilst Moldova has requested to be included in the Stability and Association Process with its prospects for full membership in the EU.

Finally, and in more general terms, many of the challenges the EU faces in its relations with neighbouring countries go beyond the concerns of individual partner countries. This is because they are either by nature, trans-national, for instance energy and environmental issues, or because the neighbours face similar challenges, with the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe as the most obvious example, or because of shared aims in relations with the EU, with the goal of creating free trade as an example. Indeed, “over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close co-operation with the neighbours”.⁸⁰

The EEA as a Model for the European Neighbourhood Policy

The potential of the European Economic Area as a model for EU relations with its neighbours was discussed in the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002-2003, in connection with a provision for special arrangements with neighbouring countries. In its draft proposal for the EU Constitution of 18 October 2002, the European People’s Party (EPP) suggested that the “EU should offer institutionalised cooperation to States which can not become members for the time being. The EPP proposes the creation of a ‘European Partnership’, open both to Eastern Europe and to Mediterranean countries – similar to the European Economic Area – but including a political component”.⁸¹ Questioned about relations between the EU and Russia, Spanish Socialist MEP Carlos Westendorp suggested “a sort of EEA-EU arrangement with a political content”.⁸²

The EEA was also mentioned in the first Communication by the European Commission⁸³ on the ‘Wider Europe’. This new policy was launched in 2002, focusing initially on the ‘new neighbours’ Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Renamed the ENP, the initiative was subsequently expanded in stages to include also the EU’s

80 European Commission: *Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM 104 final, Brussels, 11 March, 2003.

81 EPP (European Peoples Party): *A Constitution for a Strong Europe*, 18 October 2002.

82 Bolkenstein, Fritz: *The Limits of Europe*, Belgium, Lannoo Press, 2004.

83 European Commission: *Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.

Southern Mediterranean partners, Russia and the South Caucasus. According to the Commission, “the long-term goal ... is ... an arrangement whereby the Union’s relations with the neighbouring countries ultimately resemble the close political and economic links currently enjoyed with the EEA”.

The European Economic Area and the European Neighbourhood Policy

The EEA Agreement between the three EFTA states Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein and the EU is an association agreement like many of the other agreements between the EU and its neighbours discussed above. However, the EEA Agreement differs from these other agreements in a number of ways that are of relevance if the agreement is to be used as a model for the EU’s relations with its neighbours.⁸⁴ First, it should be noted that the EEA Agreement, in contrast to other association agreements, is a multilateral agreement. However, the three EFTA states are required to speak with one voice, and from the EU’s point of view, these agreements thus consist of two parties, similar to other association agreements. From the associate’s perspective, however, the difference is profound, as it makes agreement on any issue dependent on acceptance by the other two EFTA states.

Bilateral Action Plans covering a 3-5 year period are the principal instruments of the ENP, and the official documents emphasise the need for ‘differentiation’ between the participating countries. The first seven Action Plans were developed during 2004, in close consultation with the countries concerned.⁸⁵ Endorsed by both sides, the Action Plans set out common objectives and a timetable for their achievement, and are to be reviewed annually through the existing institutional cooperation framework with the partner countries. The Commission has also suggested the possibility of entering into new European Neighbourhood Agreements as part of the ENP. The scope of these is to be examined after existing contractual agreements have been fully implemented. It is emphasised that these “should not override the existing framework for EU relations” with the partner countries, and “would supplement existing contractual relations where the EU and the neighbouring country have moved beyond the existing framework, taking on new entitlements and obligations”.⁸⁶

84 Emerson, Michael, Marius Vahl and Steven Woolcock: *Navigating by the Stars: Norway, the European Economic Area and the European Union*, CEPS Paperbook, Brussels, 2002.

85 Namely, Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine.

86 European Commission: *Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.

The question of economic assistance has been high on the agenda for both the EEA and the ENP, although the former is unlikely to be seen as a model for the latter, as the flow of assistance is *from the EFTA states* to the EU in the EEA. It is envisaged that funding to the ENP countries would be increased ‘significantly’ through a new Neighbourhood Instrument.⁸⁷ This new instrument, partially inspired by the experience in Northern Europe and the Northern Dimension, will apply both inside and outside the external border of the Union, in order to avoid creating dividing lines in Europe.

More than a decade after it was signed, the EEA agreement remains “the most ambitious and the most complete agreement ever signed by the Community with a group of third countries”.⁸⁸ Through the EEA agreement, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are essentially part of the EU’s Single Market, with the partial exception of the common policies on trade, agriculture and fisheries. The EEA differs from most other EU agreements by being a ‘dynamic’ agreement, with detailed provisions for the regular inclusion of new EU *acquis* into the agreement. Most other EU agreements with third countries are ‘static’, with substantial changes requiring re-negotiation of the entire agreement, or alternatively, a new agreement. One of the complaints of the EEA is exactly the dynamism inherent in the agreement. Critics claim that it has become more comprehensive and encompassing than originally envisaged, with new rules being incorporated that fall outside the intended scope of the agreement.⁸⁹ Although the EEA contains the right of reservation to specific directives and regulations, no EFTA state has ever used this right, often erroneously referred to as a ‘veto-right’, presumably because the political price was regarded as too high.

In the early ENP proposals it was suggested that the partner countries would be given “a stake in the EU’s internal market”, with “further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital”, in return for approximation with EU law and economic reform more generally. While the ENP Strategy Paper calls for “privileged relations” and “enhanced preferential trade relations”, it is clear that the extent of economic integration through the ENP has been scaled down and will fall far short of the EEA. Indeed, there are no direct references to the ‘four freedoms’ in the 2004 Strategy Paper, as there were in the 2003 Wider

87 European Commission: *European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy Paper*, May 2004.

88 Phinnemore, David: *Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?*, UACES/ Sheffield University Press, 1999.

89 Nei til EU: *Nei til EU's Motmelding en analyse av Norges muligheter utenfor EU og et kritisk blikk på EUs utvikling* (Counter-report of the Norwegian ‘No to the EU’-movement, an analysis of Norway’s possibilities outside the EU and a critical view of the development of the EU), Oslo, 2001.

Europe Communication.⁹⁰ Considering that the ENP has a medium-term perspective, this seems realistic. As seen during the accession process of the new members in Central and Eastern Europe, adopting and implementing the Single Market rules and regulations is the most difficult part of the process. Few, if any of the states included in the ENP have the administrative and institutional capacity required to participate in the EEA.

The EEA has the most complex institutions of any EU association agreement. In addition to the regular institutions of EU associations, with a ministerial council, a committee of senior officials and a joint parliamentary committee, an EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and an EFTA Court have been established to monitor compliance by the EFTA states and to settle disputes that may arise. These thus play a somewhat similar role to that of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice *vis-à-vis* the Single Market and the EU member states. The EEA is frequently described as a ‘bureaucratic monster’, and there has also been concern about the role played by the ESA, which has been regarded as being too pro-active in ensuring compliance with the EEA, further contributing to the gradual expansion of the scope of the agreement. In contrast, monitoring of the ENP is to be undertaken within existing frameworks, complemented with periodic progress reports drawn up by the Commission. This has much more in common with the monitoring of EU accession candidates than with the EEA.

Many proponents of an EEA model want this to be supplemented by a ‘political component’. While the ENP Strategy Paper calls for strengthening political dialogue, it does not provide any specific proposals. In the EEA, political dialogue takes place in the ministerial-level EEA Council, which meets biannually, with the EU represented by the ‘Troika’. Political dialogue with some of the ENP countries, for instance with Ukraine in annual summit meetings, is however already more extensive than the EU-EFTA dialogue.

The EEA Agreement does not extend participation in the decision-making process in the EU Council of Ministers to EFTA representatives, although EFTA ministers have been invited to informal Council meetings on an *ad hoc* basis in recent years. However, national experts from the EFTA states participate in the more than 200 committees assisting the Commission in preparing new legislation. Being excluded

90 Moshes, Arkadi and Hiski Haukkala: *Beyond the Big Bang: The Challenges of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy in the East*, FIIA report 2004/9, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, 2004.

from EU decision-making bodies, the inclusion in the preparatory phases of EU policy-making – ‘decision-shaping’ – becomes a key channel through which the EFTA states can influence EU policy that will eventually become binding on them. However, this participation in decision-shaping is becoming less significant. Since the EEA was negotiated in the early 1990s, the balance between the EU institutions has shifted, with a strengthening of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament at the expense of the Commission and national parliaments. The Council and its working groups play an increasingly important role in shaping EEA-relevant legislation, and the European Parliament has become an increasingly important actor in the process of EU decision-making.

The EEA states are also engaged in more traditional types of international cooperation with the EU through the EEA Agreement, participating in dozens of EU-led programmes and initiatives. They also participate – as full participants, associates or observers – in the work of the growing number of Community autonomous agencies, either through the EEA, or through separate bilateral arrangements. The ENP Strategy Paper⁹¹ calls for increased participation in EU programmes and expansion of programmes on and including the countries of the new EU Neighbours Policy, for instance through opening the European Research Area (ERA) which is now being established. The ENP Strategy Paper is hesitant towards the idea of participation in Community agencies, but envisages a “gradual opening of certain Community programmes” to the ENP countries.

One of the main slogans of the Prodi Commission on the ENP has been ‘Everything but institutions’. According to the 2003 Communication, the neighbours are not to have “a role in the Union’s institutions” along the lines of the various models of participation accorded to the EEA countries. Combined with the relatively limited economic integration envisaged, the ENP that emerges falls far short of the EEA agreement.

Beyond the EEA: Cooperation and Integration in JHA and the CFSP

Norway and Iceland are increasingly integrating with the EU in areas not covered by the EEA, notably in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and foreign security and defence policy (CFSP and ESDP). In the JHA area, this takes place principally through agreements of association with the Schengen regime on external borders and the Dublin Convention on asylum. The Schengen association agreement

91 European Commission: *European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper*, May 2004.

probably goes the furthest among third-country agreements in including non-member states in the decision-making process of the EU. Through the so-called ‘Mixed Committee’ established by the Schengen association agreement,⁹² the associated states participate in what is in effect the Justice and Home Affairs Council, COREPER and the Council working groups relating to the Schengen agreement. While the Schengen associates have the right to make proposals, they do not have a vote, and the adoption of new acts is reserved to the competent institutions of the EU. The Schengen association agreement stipulates that in case the non-EU participants decide not to accept new legislation, the entire agreement could be terminated.

Border management is, according to the ENP Strategy Paper, likely to be a priority, although the proposals on the movement of persons are limited to considering the possibilities for facilitating travel for select groups such as participants in EU programmes and diplomats. This could be followed by an examination of the “wider application of visa free regimes” if the “necessary conditions are in place”, notably readmission agreements. The idea of a visa-free regime, currently being discussed bilaterally with Russia, is not mentioned, reflecting the great difference between the current level of cooperation and integration with the EFTA states in the JHA area and the more modest proposals of the ENP.

As part of the recently developed European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), various non-legally binding arrangements for dialogue and participation on security and defence issues with third countries have been created. This includes dialogue at the ministerial level in a 15+6 and 15+15 format, with non-EU NATO members and EU candidates, respectively. As members of NATO, Norway and Iceland participate in both configurations. Closer dialogue on CFSP and ESDP is also envisaged in the ENP, with “burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity”. This is to include a more active EU role in the conflicts of the new neighbours, although the EU’s role is to be primarily in the post-conflict stages, with a role in conflict resolution limited to support of the OSCE and other mediators. The ENP Strategy Paper also proposes “the possible involvement of partner countries in aspects of CFSP and ESDP”. While the specific content of this is uncertain as of early 2005, the proposals for enhanced cooperation in CFSP and ESDP again appear to fall short of the close relationship the EFTA states enjoy in these areas.

92 The Mixed Committee operates at the level of senior officials and ministers. It is comprised of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of EU Ministers plus the ministers of the associated states, minus ministers of EU member states that are not parties to Schengen cooperation (UK and Ireland). The Mixed Committee meets either just before or just after meetings of the JHA Council.

Neighbourhood Policy as Ersartz Enlargement

The EEA did not turn out as Jacques Delors proposed in January 1989. His idea of a ‘common European economic space’ was intended as an alternative to full EU membership. However, three of the six EFTA states that negotiated the EEA – Austria, Finland and Sweden – opted instead for full membership, and were parts of the EEA as EFTA members for only one year before entering the Union as full members in 1995.

In contrast with most EU associates, none of the three EFTA countries in the EEA seeks EU membership, and the EEA Agreement is thus to be regarded as a permanent alternative to membership. However, and in contrast to all other EU neighbours, the Northern European members of EFTA could easily fulfil the criteria for EU membership, and accession remains a strategic option available to both Norway and Iceland at their discretion.

A Polish non-paper on the ‘Eastern Dimension’ in late 2002 suggested that the EU should hold out the prospect of EU membership for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. However, according to Commission proposals, the ENP is “distinct from membership” and the medium-term goal is “not ... to include a perspective of membership”. Instead the aim of the ENP is, in the words of Commission President Prodi, to create a ‘ring of friends’ around the Union.⁹³ The exclusion of membership has dominated discussion on the ENP in countries such as Moldova and Ukraine. This should not come as a surprise. Although the EU recently was enlarged for the fifth time, the EU itself has in fact been consistently reluctant to reciprocate expressions of interest in membership with acknowledgement of their EU prospects.

The UK government filed its first application for membership in the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961. Following the two famous rejections of British membership by French President de Gaulle, Britain became a member in 1973, 12 years after its first application. Greece concluded an association agreement with the EEC in 1961, but had to wait for 20 years until it became a full member in 1981. Spain and Portugal requested association arrangements from the Community in 1962, and applied for membership soon after their ‘democratic revolutions’ in the mid-1970s. However, it took more than 10 years before they joined the Community in 1986. In response to the events in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, French

93 Prodi, Romano: “A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability”, speech at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference on Peace, Security and Stability, International Dialogue, and the Role of the EU, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 2002, 5-6 December.

President Mitterrand proposed the creation of a European confederation. However, the states concerned opted instead for full membership, filing applications from 1994 onwards. In the end, these countries became members in May 2004, almost 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The five countries of the Western Balkans were given the prospect of EU accession as a long-term goal by the EU in 1999. Apart, perhaps, from Croatia, it seems unlikely that any of these will become members during this decade, i.e. within 10 years of being given EU 'perspectives'. Turkey's 'Europeanness', and thus in principle its eligibility for membership, was acknowledged by the Community upon the conclusion of an association agreement in 1963, although its prospects for eventual accession were not confirmed until 2002, almost 40 years later.

This brief survey of previous EU enlargements highlights the Union's general reluctance to enlarge. This has manifested itself in various ways, from outright rejection to proposals for alternative arrangements such as the EEA, the European confederation and now the ENP, and only when these fail, attempting to draw out the process of accession as long as politically possible. While the creation of stricter conditions for membership through the elaboration of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 was a natural consequence of deepening integration in the EU and the need to safeguard the credibility of the Single Market, these criteria also served to limit the speed and scope of enlargement, allowing the EU to undertake the necessary institutional changes to accommodate additional member states. However, the EU has now itself become constrained by the Copenhagen Criteria: if a European country fulfils them, there is in the end little the EU can do to prevent new applications for membership, and, eventually, new members of the EU.

Conclusions

Although the regional approach has played a limited role in confronting strategic challenges and resolving politically contentious issues in EU neighbourhood policies, it has nevertheless become an important albeit secondary element of the EU's 'structural diplomacy'.⁹⁴ An increasingly complex network of association and cooperation between the EU and its near abroad, with bilateralism the dominant mode of operation, has gradually emerged. The Northern Dimension is frequently referred to as a model for the ENP in official texts. The inclusive nature of the initiative is usually cited as the main lesson to be learnt from the Northern Dimension.⁹⁵ In contrast to the Baltic region, where the EU has only one partner, Russia, following the 2004

94 Keukeleire, Stephan: *The EU as an International Actor*, Centre for Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester, November, 2000.

95 European Commission: *European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper*, May 2004.

enlargement, it is faced with several partner countries in the Balkans and the Mediterranean region after the fifth enlargement. There is thus inherently a bigger role to play for multilateral mechanisms such as the NDI. In many cases, such mechanisms are already in place, with the notable exception of the Eastern neighbours of the enlarged EU.

The Black Sea region stands out as an area where a regional approach could acquire more prominence, drawing on the lessons of the Northern Dimension. The inclusive nature associated with the regional approach seems increasingly relevant as relations with the EU's eastern neighbours, such as Russia and Ukraine, are becoming increasingly difficult. In light of the existence of indigenously developed regional structures, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation (BSEC), the criticism that regional organisations in the North were not utilised sufficiently in the NDI seems highly relevant. It may seem that this lesson is acknowledged in the Commission's proposals for the ENP, which state that the EU "is not seeking to establish new bodies or organisations, but rather to support existing entities and encourage their further development".

The recent enlargements of the EU could be regarded as a result, in part, of the EU's inability to create association arrangements that are attractive enough to third countries in Europe when compared with full membership. The EEA stands out as the first, and the ENP perhaps the second, serious attempt to create such a 'neighbourhood policy'. Although the EEA is generally regarded as functioning well in a technical sense, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the arrangements in the EFTA states, which have recently called for an update or an upgrade of the Agreement. In spite of invocations for an 'EEA-model plus a political component' for EU neighbourhood policy, the initial proposals from the EU for its ENP fall far short of the sort of relations currently existing between the EU and the three EFTA states in the EEA. Given the state of political and economic reform in the ENP countries and the 3-5 year perspective of the ENP, this is understandable. But even in areas where it would be possible to approximate an 'EEA model', for instance concerning inclusion in EU programmes and agencies, participation in EU 'decision-shaping' and in the CFSP, the ENP official documents point towards a cautious approach on the side of the EU.

The ENP countries are faced with many of the same economic challenges of economic transition as those faced by the EU accession candidates of Central and Eastern Europe, and also the countries of South-East Europe, for whom EU membership is a more distant prospect. Although the ultimate aims for candidate states are the most

far-reaching among the EU associates, the agreements themselves provide for less integration in the short- and the medium-term than the agreements between the EU and the non-candidate countries of EFTA. While the scope of the agreements is as broad as in the EEA, the commitments are less numerous and contain no evolutionary clause. The agreements contain rather limited commitments on the date of entry into force, and more ambitious aims to be achieved progressively and in the long-term, for instance the liberalisation of trade or participation in EU policies and programmes. From this perspective, the agreements that these countries have with the EU – Europe Agreements and Stability and Association Agreements, respectively – could appear to provide more suitable models for the ENP than the EEA.

However, the prospect of eventual EU membership is a fundamental premise underlying the Europe Agreements and the Stability and Association Agreements. For candidate countries, the underlying expectation is that full participation follows and depends on the introduction and implementation of all EU rules and policies. This asymmetry is acceptable to the associate countries because of the provision of assistance, because they are allowed certain derogations and exemptions, but mainly because it is temporary and will be followed by their full participation as members of the EU. The principal benefit of association with the EU is thus not to be found in the association agreement itself, but rather upon its termination, which makes certain provisions and institutional arrangements acceptable to the associated states that they might otherwise find objectionable. The agreements with candidates for EU membership may thus not provide the most appropriate models for countries unless they are at the same time provided with the prospect of full EU membership. This conundrum is likely to dominate the debate on EU neighbourhood policies for years to come.

Eastern or Western, New or False? Classifying the Balts in the Post- Cold War Era

MARKO LEHTI

Words are powerful. They organise the world we observe. They signify objects and make them meaningful. This applies also in regards to the sphere of international relations in which the meaning of geopolitical labels like ‘Baltic’ or ‘Balkans’, ‘East’ or ‘West’ extends far beyond geographical coordinates.

The Balkans, for example, is far more than a mere geographical definition: by assigning a label, we are defining the nature of a nation or a state that is called ‘Balkan’. This is a strong tool of othering by the West but sometimes – even if in a far lesser manner – a source of uniqueness among the Balkan peoples. With that label, we are describing what Balkan looks like and how the Balkan people behave but we also define an imagined location on the edge of Europe and between the West and the Orient.⁹⁶ In a similar manner, the term ‘Baltic’ stands both for a description and narration, but has also been open to various readings and usages other than the Balkans. It does not carry with it a similar burden of the past, although, from time to time, it has nonetheless been regarded by the Balts as a tool of easternisation and marginalisation.

Beside ‘Baltic’, several other terms and labels have been used by the Balts themselves and by others to classify the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania⁹⁷ – since the regaining of independence in 1991: Nordic/Northern, European/Western, False Europe and New Europe. Some of these, like Nordic or Baltic, can be regarded as a source of regional identity. Some of them, like Western or Europe, are merely politi-

96 Todorova, Maria: *Imagining the Balkans*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

97 In this particular chapter I am concentrating primarily on Estonian and, secondary, on Latvian discourses.

cal programmes. And some of them, like False or New Europe, have been viewed as tools of othering or at least of marginalisation. These terms not only define these particular states but the whole northern Europe and beyond. They are looking at past experiences, can introduce directions for the future, and can also include a divergent reading of the international order. That is why it is here argued that the Baltic states constitute the discursive nodal point of defining the new northern Europe. It is argued that, since 9/11, the Balts have taken a more active role. They are no longer automatically accepting external labels as such and instead increasingly define themselves as something special. Such a move can provide the Balts with increased discursive power in order for them to contribute to the European configuration and in particular to the notion of the EU's Eastern border.

The Balts as Nordic and the Nordics as Baltic

The Balts

Although the most obvious term to depict Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consists of the *Baltic*, this notion is far from being unproblematic. The term as we know it today was introduced after the First World War when these states first gained their independence and emerged from the ruins of the Russian Empire. It often covered also Finland and even Poland, particularly once used by outsiders as a descriptive term. Notably, the Finns and the Poles never themselves felt comfortable with the term but for the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians it became a source of their regional identity referring to smallness, marginality and location in between two great powers – Germany and Russia. In addition to this rather deterministic reading in its early phase, the term was also regarded as a synonym of democracy and of political programmes seeking unity around the Baltic Sea area.⁹⁸ The annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the Soviet Union in 1940, finally clinched in 1944, reserved the term only to the new Soviet Republics. Consequently, it was soon almost forgotten in the West.

The Baltic states returned to a wider consciousness only in the late 1980s as a result of their 'signing revolution'. Baltic solidarity was then characterised by strong and joint demonstrations – in particular, the human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty – which expressed a feeling of common interests and a shared position. Joint institutions of the Baltic Council and the Baltic Assembly were created immediately after regaining

98 Lehti, Marko: *A Baltic League as a Construct of the New Europe. Envisioning a Baltic Region and Small State Sovereignty in the Aftermath of the First World War*. Frankfurt-am.Main: Peter Lang, 1999.

independence among the Baltic parliaments and governments, but soon solidarity started to fade away and, by the late 1990s, the notion of Baltic was rarely used in public. It was even taken to represent something shameful. Estonia's foreign minister Ilves expressed the most striking argument when he wholly denied Estonia's belonging to the Baltic group: "I think it is time to do away with poorly fitting, externally imposed categories. It is time that we recognise that we are dealing with three very different countries in the Baltic area, with completely different affinities. There is no Baltic identity with a common culture, language group, religious tradition."⁹⁹ These statements of Ilves, however, met also criticism in Estonia, in particular, among the business elite that feared that it could harm their businesses.

Instead of the 'Baltic' label, the Balts began to define their nations with other terms – European, Western and Nordic. Since the early years of the 1990s, the omnipresent programme in all three states was a 'return to Europe or the West', an idea also familiar in the other former communist states in East Central Europe. Initially, the two labels – Europe and the West – meant literally the same thing and no clearly stated difference was given, although Europe was the term used most commonly. Two institutions, the EU and NATO, symbolised a sense of belonging to Europe and the West; and thus the declaration to be European or Western implied a clear political programme of joining these institutions. In this context, also the division between 'normality' and 'abnormality' dominated the Baltic rhetoric, as Eglitis¹⁰⁰ points out. The Soviet era as a whole was doomed to represent 'false history' and a state of abnormality, but the normality towards which the Balts struggled for was not any imagined state of affairs in the future but one which already existed in the West. So, what needed to be done in order to be transformed into 'normal' states was to integrate oneself into Western institutions.

The principle of 'legal continuity' constructs a bridge over the Soviet times to the interwar republic thus turning everything in between into something illegal and foreign. In order to become 'Western' and 'European', it was necessary to deny this 'Eastern' influence. In this reading, the Baltic label, even though it has its origin in the interwar years, was seen as a reminder of Soviet times. "What the three Baltic States have in common almost completely derives from shared unhappy experiences imposed upon us from outside: occupations, deportations, annexation, sovietization,

99 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: "Estonia as a Nordic country" speech given at the Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs 14 December 1999, www.vm.ee.

100 Eglitis, Daina Stukuls: *Imagining the Nation. History, Modernity, and Revolution in Latvia*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004, pp. 8-10.

collectivization, russification” is how Ilves expressed the basis of common Baltic heritage.¹⁰¹ The usage of the Baltic label was hence seen to express a continuation of ‘easternisation’ by signifying those post-Soviet countries in transition, while the Balts desperately tried to distance themselves from the Soviet legacy and to envisage a dividing line of civilisations on the Baltic-Russian border.

However, when the Balts finally reached their goal of membership in 2004 in both of the institutions symbolising the West, it turned out that the West was not something fixed and premade. Instead it figured as something fluid and contested. Subsequently, answers to political goals did not appear anymore as simple and obvious as they had been seen during the ‘heroic age’ of struggling towards the West.¹⁰² Firstly, their treatment by Western Europeans as ‘Eastern’ and somehow immature, which received its expression in the Accession Treaties through several transition period rules, striped away the idealism towards Western Europe that had existed since the late 1990s.¹⁰³ For the second, events following 9/11 – the war on terror and the Iraq war – introduced a more drastic challenge to the uniformity of the West. Muslim terrorism replaced the old East as the Western Other, but the threat was not comprehended in a similar manner in Europe and America. Although the Balts have no indications that the East was to be replaced by terrorism, the threat of terrorism does have indirect influences on the Baltic as well. The rise of terrorism gave birth to a transatlantic crisis due to reactions that impacted the US strategy and policies. This, then, turned into a dividing factor within Europe and within European states in such a manner as to challenge the unity of the West and to emphasise the birth of two Wests, one European and another American. The concept of the West is thus no longer unproblematic, as it opens up crucial questions in regard to Brussels, Washington and even Moscow.

Besides Western or European, the Estonians in particular have since the early 1990s described their country as being Nordic, as the then foreign minister Lennart Meri¹⁰⁴ did when he argued that “Estonia maintains its Nordic characteristics as its inheritance”, or as was the argument put forward by the deputy foreign minister Toivo Kuldsepp¹⁰⁵ once declaring that “we Estonians have always felt that we belong to the Nordic world”. Some kind of culmination of nordicisation of Estonia took place dur-

101 Ibid.

102 Goble, Paul A.: “Redefining Estonian’s national security”, in Andres Kasekamp (ed.), *The Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2005*. The Estonian Foreign Policy Institute 2005, pp. 19–20.

103 E.g. Ilves: “Constructing a New Europe”, 5 February 2001, www.wm.ee.

104 Meri, Lennart: “Eurooppa on Viron ohjelma”, *Helsingin Sanomat* 2.12.1990.

105 Kuldsepp, Toivo: “Viro ja Pohjola. Takaisin Eurooppaan” *Kanava* 1991.

ing Toomas Hendrik Ilves's period as foreign minister. In the first place he denied that Estonia is a Baltic country and argued that it has instead turned into just another 'boring Nordic country'. Notably, what was understood as Nordic in Estonia differs in a rather drastic way from the meaning this term is given in the old 'Norden'. Since the Second World War Nordic has been seen to be characterised by the idea of a welfare state, peacefulness and the dominance of social democracy enriched with a feeling of certain global moral consciousness. These features have been regarded as strange in the case of the Balts, whose 'economic miracle' has been based on neo-liberal economic policy and rather low attachment to the public sector. Thus, the labelling of the Estonians of themselves as Nordic amounted, in fact, to a redefining of what Nordic should and could be. That is perhaps why a better term to use is northern or 'Yule-land', i.e. a term introduced by Ilves in his imaginative speech. Ilves's interpretation outlined a special Lutheran or Protestant North extending from Estonia and Finland over Scandinavia to the British Isles, in contrast with the Orthodox East and Catholic South. His North was characterised as being premised on protestant ethics and seen as being part of hard-working and progressive modernism.¹⁰⁶

In the 1990s it seemed that the North and 'northernness' would constitute something new and receive new political importance whereas the old Norden would lose its exclusiveness.¹⁰⁷ Norden has, however, remained resilient and even if it has opened up eastwards, the Nordic core has remained exclusive. The North may have gained new importance not as a constitutive story of nation-states but merely in the rise of their role in the 'margins'. Estonia has obviously not changed to be included in the category of the Nordic even though it has become a close partner. In essence, it is still a Baltic partner.

The Nordics

Whilst the Balts felt uncomfortable with the Baltic label, the Western Baltics – Swedes, Danes and northern Germans – defined their 'balticness' in a very different manner compared to the other side of the Baltic Sea. This is so as the Western Baltic understanding concentrates on focussing on the whole Baltic Sea area and simultane-

106 Ilves: "Estonia as a Nordic country", 14 December 1999, www.vm.ee.

107 Waever, Ole: "From Nordism to Baltism" in S. Jervell, M. Kukk and P. Joenniemi (eds.) *The Baltic Sea Area. A Region in the Making*. Karlskrona: Baltic Institute, 1992. Jukarainen, Pirjo: "Norden is Dead – Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North: Geopolitical Re-making of Norden in a Nordic Journal" In *Cooperation and Conflict* 34 (4), 1999, pp. 355-382; Joenniemi, Pertti and Lehti, Marko: "The Encounter between the Nordic and the Northern: Torn Apart but Meeting Again?" in M. Lehti & D.J. Smith (eds.) *Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences*. London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 150-152.

ously maps traces of common Baltic history and constructs brave visions of a future European region. The origins of this new reading of 'Baltic' may be traced back to late-1980s when the first signs of collapse of the eastern bloc emerged. The idea of the new Hansa was then launched from Schleswig-Holstein premised on a vision of a common future based on the common heritage of the medieval Hanseatic League. Later in the early 1990s the Swedes, the Danes and even the Finns narrated their national past beyond existing state-borders. In that context they re-founded and re-interpreted the past Swedish or the Danish Baltic presence on the eastern side of the Baltic Sea. In the case of Finland, this referred to the broader community of the Baltic-Finns. These themes had been silenced for a long time. For example, Swedish public memory used to refer to the Swedish great power era as an unnatural phase of Swedish history, while in the context of the Cold War Finland the bond of kinship with the other Baltic Finns, a popular idea in the interwar years, remained a politically incorrect theme. The new national imagination exceeded beyond state borders and in particular beyond the old Iron-Curtain, finding similarities and common heritage among the Baltic Sea states. The Baltic concept thus turned into a new identity coordinate among the Western Baltic nations representing an answer to the post-Cold War challenge.¹⁰⁸

The need to depict a new order and to redefine one's own location in Europe was strong in the Nordic states after the end of the Cold War. Changes in the East – namely the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communist rule but also in the West or more precisely South of Norden, i.e. the deepening integration and the rise of regions – worried the Nordic states. The comprehension was there that the changing international order cried out for new departures. The Baltic Sea area was the answer to both worries. Importantly, recognising a shared past with the eastern Baltic lands also includes an idea of moral responsibility which gained its expression from time to time as aid and support policies towards the Balts. The image of the Baltic Sea as a joint growth area was therefore introduced as a counter-vision to Central and Western European growth regions (often called 'bananas' in the language of regional geographers). The Baltic Sea area was presented as a future region well on its way of becoming one of Europe's leading regions. It was a programme to prevent marginalisation and simultaneously to support the eastern Baltic nations and help them to switch over from post-Soviet anarchy to Nordic order. But this also called for a new kind of identity coordinate to be included in national identities, and

108 Lehti, Marko: "Possessing a Baltic Europe. Retold National Narratives in the European North", in M. Lehti & D.J. Smith (eds.), *Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences*. London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 14-18, 31-32.

introduced a vision of a new kind of international order based on regionalism and blurred borders.¹⁰⁹

Apparently, however, there was a lack of common understanding as to what the Baltic meant in the Eastern and Western shores of the Sea. For some it referred above all to the Soviet legacy shared by three Baltic states, while for others it represented a brave new vision and reinterpretation of the past and a response to a changing world. It is easy to trace and locate the roots beneath these fundamental differences in understanding. Overall, sovereignty and borders were the dominating principles for the Balts engaged in rebuilding their nation-states. On the other hand, the Swedes, the Danes, the Finns and the Germans were looking for new models of international organisation beyond the existing sovereign states and configurations based their visions on fuzzy borders to dilute old exclusive divisions. These contrasting understandings have been depicted as being part of modern and post-modern departures.¹¹⁰ Although it was obvious that regionalism appealed as an option to the Nordics while it remained unusual and strange for the Baltics states still recovering their state sovereignty, the Nordic people were not totally post- or late-modern, nor are the Balts to be regarded entirely modern. Be it as it may, the result of this divergent emphasis was nonetheless a lost opportunity. Efforts to find a common understanding for the Baltic label and for the possibility to create a shared Baltic identity did not yield dividend. By the late 1990s, the Baltic Sea area lost momentum, it appears, and its political importance as a future-region for the Nordic people was in decline. What was left was primarily a scenario of regional cooperation based on shared interests and certain limited elements of the past.¹¹¹

Return of Europe In-Between?

The position of the Baltic states during the interwar years could be best described as being located in-between two potential great powers, Russia and Germany. Despite that, after the First World War, these two powers were temporarily in a state of weakness, the threat of being sandwiched was there. The experience has had an enduring impact grounding an omnipresent marginalising discourse. Consequently, even if the context in the post-Cold War Europe differed considerably, the fear of being doomed to remain in between Russia and the West, as symbolised by the EU and NATO, has guided the Baltic's foreign policy since their regained independence.

109 *Ibid.*, pp. 21-34.

110 Waever, Ole: "The Baltic Sea: A Region after Post-Modernity" in P. Joenniemi (ed.), *Neo-Nationalism or Regionality. The Restructuring of Political Space Around the Baltic Rim*. Stockholm: NordREFO, p. 315.

111 Lehti, Marko: "The Future of the Lost Future? The Baltic Sea Area after the Transition Era" in *NORDEUROPAforum* 1/2003, pp. 43-54.

According to this logic, there were only two options for the future: to be fully accepted by the Western community or to be doomed to remain within the Russian sphere of interest. Since the late 1990s, two projects have re-depicted the Baltic states as a new kind of in-between zone. One project is the Russian division of 'true' and 'false' Europe and the other consists of the US dominant labelling, the so-called 'new Europe'.¹¹²

False Europe

Russian authorities have for some time accused the Balts of being not only ultra-nationalistic and xenophobic but also hostile and Russophobic. Thus they tend to fall in to the category of the 'false'.¹¹³ The juxtaposing of the 'true' and 'false' Europe has a long tradition in the Russian discourse on Europe, as Morozov¹¹⁴ argues. However, it was only in the late 1990s that the Baltic states gained a leading role as the 'false Europeans'. According to this discourse, Russia stands side by side other European great powers in defending European values against forms of barbarism, a phenomenon that has different faces in different times. The Russian role in the victory over Napoleon or Hitler is emphasised in this context, as well as the Holy Alliance of the 19th century. In Putin's Russia, the victory over Nazism is currently cherished as a constitutive story defining Russia's position in Europe. Some kind of culmination of this was the celebration of the 60th anniversary of Victory Day in Moscow in spring 2005 which gathered leaders of the leading great powers to Moscow. Notably, the unity of the Baltic front broke down over this issue with the Latvian president Vaira Vike-Freiberga accepting Russia's invitation, while the Estonian and Lithuanian presidents refused to participate. For the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, the problem pertaining to participating was that the same victory that marked the end of Nazis represents for them the beginning of the Soviet occupation and Stalin's terror. In turn, the Russians do not recognise any burden carried by what they regard as their greatest victory and instead accuse the Baltics of forgetting their collaboration with the Nazi occupiers. Moreover, the Kremlin insisted that the Baltic states were not occupied, and it was a question of annexation or even legal integration.¹¹⁵ This interpretation challenges the Balts' constitutive story premised on sovereignty.

112 Joenniemi, Pertti: "America's Old/New Meets Russia's True/False: The Case of Europe's North" in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19(2), 2005, p. 230.

113 *Ibid.*, pp. 236-7.

114 Morozov, Viatcheslav: "The Baltic States in Russian Foreign Policy Discourse: Can Russia Become a Baltic Country?", in M. Lehti & D.J. Smith (eds.), *Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences*. London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 219-220.

115 See comments by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Information and Press Department, in connection with remarks by some European politicians regarding the 'occupation' of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union and the need for Russia to condemn this, 4 May 2005, www.ln.mid.ru.

Interpretations and reminiscence of the annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union in 1940 and of the Soviet and Nazi occupations during the Second World War constitute particularly contested issues in the Russian-Baltic debate. Although this phase still has great national importance for both Russia and the Balts, it is somehow surprising that still in the year 2005, these questions led to such a heated debate over their shared history. The first debate of 2005 pertained to a new Latvian textbook on 20th century history. The Russian Foreign Ministry reviewed and criticised the book immediately after it was published. The authors were accused of siding with the Holocaust in not using the term ‘concentration camp’ in the case of the Salaspils-camp. Instead they settled for the term ‘educational labour camp’. Undoubtedly, this was the manner in which it was referred to in the caption. Yet it is hard to read this as undermining the Holocaust as the term ‘concentration camp’ was used in the main text.¹¹⁶ This particular incidence notwithstanding, the underplaying or forgetting of the Holocaust has not been an unusual practice in the public history debates in the Baltic states. A good example of this practice consists of the Estonian Museum on the Occupation, founded in Tallinn in 2003. The museum offers narrated high-quality documentations of several periods from 1939 onwards. It is however somehow surprising and characteristic that the fate of the Estonian Jews is not brought up among the creeping stories that are narrated.¹¹⁷

The crucial point of this dispute, however, concerns who was a victim, who was guilty, and who was the saviour during the War.¹¹⁸ The Russians want to see themselves as the saviour of Europe whereas the Balts regard themselves as victims of the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships. All interpretations challenging these respective roles are seen as a threat to one’s national pride. It is also a question of legality and illegality of the past development which is seen as crucial in the definition of the post-Cold War positions.

Another target of Russian criticism has been the rights of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia. The so-called question of compatriots in the former Soviet republics popped up already in the early 1990s. From Moscow’s perspective,

116 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information and Press Department, Commentary regarding the presentation of the book “Latvia’s History: the 20th Century”, 2 February 2005, www.ln.mid.ru. In the following month the Russian Foreign Ministry published an open note criticising the anniversary of the Latvian SS legion. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information and Press Department, Commentary regarding march of former SS men in Riga, 16 March 2005.

117 Okupatsioonide Muuseum, www.okupatsioon.ee.

118 See also Judt, Tony: “From the House of the Dead: On Modern European Memory” *The New York Review of Books* Oct 6, 2005.

Russia still has a legal responsibility to look after the interests of all Russians within the former Soviet Union. The Baltic-Russians were thus perceived as a common concern that received considerable publicity in the domestic discourse but also in the West, (although the legal position of Russian-speakers in the Central Asian republics was even more controversial). The Baltic states have, in this context, been presented as immature small states in-between Russia and the Western powers, oppressing their minorities. They are thus contravening true European values, albeit Moscow's support has remained more or less verbal and rhetorical. Yet this rhetoric – complemented with the Russian media reaching out to Baltic-Russians – has kept a kind of post-Soviet space alive and extended it well beyond the EU-Russian border.

Russian rhetoric describing the Balts as 'false' Europeans, i.e. a grouping that does not appreciate 'true' European tradition, amounts to a cherishing of the notion of a Europe as one composed primarily of classical great powers. Thus, this narrative speaks for targeting Berlin, Paris or London, including targeting the domestic public whereas the flip side consists of endeavouring at marginalising the location of the Baltic states. The latter are regarded as being located in-between traditional great powers and the policy to be pursued boils down to efforts of diminishing their presumably negative influence on the EU's Russian policy. This rhetoric is also downgrading the EU's role as subject in addition to trying to divide Europe in a rather traditional way into small and big powers. This *Realpolitik* logic is more familiar to Russian thinking as claimed by Morozov.¹²⁰ He has also argued that since 9/11 the position of the Baltic states has been changing in the Russian discourse concerning Europe. They have been moved from the category of false to new Europeans. Yet the tension created by the Russian-Baltic history debate in 2005 shows, it seems, that from the Russian perspective the Balts still belong more to 'false Europe'.

New Europe

On the eve of the Iraq war January 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defence, famously introduced the split in Europe between the 'new' countries favourable to the US and the 'old' countries incarnated by the Franco-German axis.¹²¹ Reflecting on the *ad hoc* position taken by various countries in the pre-war period, this depiction was also based on a growing tendency within neo-conservative circles in the US to depict Europe as an American 'Other', an entity unable to recog-

120 Morozov, Viatcheslav: "Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: Desecuritization or Deregionalization?" in *Cooperation and Conflict* 39 (3), 2004, pp. 317-331.

121 Mark Baker: "Rumsfeld's 'Old' and 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide", 24 January 2003; "Rumsfeld Again Refers to 'Old' and 'New' Europe", 11 June 2003, *Radio Free Europe*, www.rferl.org/nca/features/.

nise the realities of the hard world thus enforcing the US to carry the whole burden.¹²² As a result of such an articulation, the US not only becomes a divisive factor in Europe creating divisions between ‘Euro-Atlanticists’ and ‘Euro-Gaullists’ member states, but also among EU countries at large. This division is not only about the US, but it also reflects for example diverging opinions concerning enlargement. The Euro-Atlanticist tend to view it as the EU’s most successful foreign policy, while the ‘Euro-Gaullists’ due to their pursuance of cohesion within the original club view it with considerable suspicion.¹²³

The dichotomy between the Euro-Atlanticists and the Euro-Gaullists is related to the ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe dichotomy but does not entirely overlap with it. Even if it was possible to pinpoint a number countries supporting the US foreign policy around the Franco-German core (e.g. Denmark, the United Kingdom, José Maria Aznar’s Spain and Italy) as ‘new Europeans’, this denomination was mainly used to refer to states in the East and before Rumsfeld’s statement, it was even used to refer to the changing European configuration as a whole.

Although during the past two and a half years – and in particular, after the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO – the division of Europe between ‘old’ and ‘new’ has lost some of its political topicality, the notion of a ‘new Europe’ has been fixed to characterise the new EU member-states in the East. The division between ‘new’ and ‘old’ has also remained in active use in the US. An internet review simply entitled ‘New Europe Review’ constitutes the latest expression of this division. The review is a part of the new media policy of the US government.¹²⁴ It is published in the 16 languages¹²⁵ spoken in the ‘zone of the states between Berlin and Moscow and the Baltic and the Black Seas and in English. In the first issue, May 2004, the title of the review was explained in the following way: “What should we call a region that is no longer the Eastern Europe of the Cold War nor yet fully integrated portion of the European Union to which many in this region aspire ... we believe ‘the new Europe’ is the best term yet on offer”. The US interest in supporting democratisation and development towards ‘free market allies of the Western world’ is clearly stated and this ‘new’ part of Europe is seemingly closer and thus more important to Washington than the older part according to the editorial. This is so as “the United States need friends and allies,

122 Kagan, Robert: “Power and Weakness” in *Policy Review*, no 113, 2002.

123 Dassù, Marta and Menotti, Roberto: “Europe and America in the Age of Bush” in *Survival*. 47(1), 2005, pp. 105-122.

124 International Broadcasting Bureau, www.ibb.gov.

125 Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Estonian, Greek (!), Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Macedonian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovene, Ukrainian.

partners and fellow promoters of the ideas which define the West of which both we and the peoples of the region we are addressing are fellow participants".¹²⁶

'New Europe' is thus seen as the US protégé in Europe serving the US interests by influencing EU's policies.¹²⁷ It is not merely a question of short-term political goals. Supporting 'new Europe' is rather seen by Washington as a way to keep the 'old West' cohesive by finding new spokesmen supporting new dynamics in European policy. Thus, from the US perspective, naming 'new Europe' is part of a broader process of defining the US role in the world and re-defining the West after the disappearance of its old opponent, i.e. the Cold War East, and the emergence of the new threat, global terrorism. In the new US grand strategy, the role of fixed and institutionalised alliance systems like NATO has been diminishing and they have been partly replaced by more flexible and adaptable alliances created for particular missions as has taken place in the case of Iraq.¹²⁸ Russia has also been transformed from the opponent to a potential partner. Overall, the main target of the US policy now consists of the Greater Middle East where the US needs European support but in general also the existence of a strong and wider Europe ready to stand beside the US. Thus, the support of the 'new Europe' includes also the notion of a 'wider Europe' and the continuation of 'westernisation' and integration of countries like the Ukraine and Georgia.¹²⁹

Return of the Baltic?

Baltic politicians have felt uncomfortable with being seen as part of a 'new Europe'.¹³⁰ It has not been seen as signalling freshness and vitality but is merely regarded as just another term aiming at preserving them as the other Europeans. But they obviously are not like other Europeans and currently do not even want to be. The Baltic states have clearly belonged to Euro-Atlanticist camp and their foreign policy orientation has been openly supportive of the US. This support has manifested itself for example in the form of sending troops to the Iraq War; i.e. a move that expresses a clear difference vis-à-vis the old core associated with France and Germany. Furthermore, the strong emphasis of a neo-liberal economic policy and a low attachment to the

126 New Europe Review, <http://www.neweuropereview.com/English/index.cfm>.

127 Joenniemi, Pertti: "America's Old/New Meets Russia's True/False: The Case of Europe's North" in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19(2), 2005, pp. 231-233.

128 Rhodes, Edward: "The Good, the Bad, and the Righteous: Understanding the Bush Vision of a New NATO Partnership". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 1, 33: 123-143, 2004.

129 Hamilton, Daniel S.: "Wider Europe and the West: Ten Lessons" in *New Europe Review* 2(3), 2005.

130 Vike-Freiberga: "What is Old and What is New? Europe after the Enlargement of the EU", 5th Annual Baltic Development Forum Summit, Riga, 6 October 2003, www.am.gov.lv; Kristina Ojula, "The European Union after the First of May", Bucharest, 5 April 2004, www.vm.ee.

idea of a welfare society distinguishes the new members from the old ones, in particular from their Nordic neighbours. Besides the two features linking them to the Euro-Atlantic space there is the Soviet legacy that still dominates their national imagination and attaches the Baltics to the post-Soviet space. None of these three features are solely Baltic, but the blend is distinctive as such to the Baltic states even if certain similarities exist among all of the so-called ‘new Europeans’. In fact, all of these features constitute more complex identity coordinates than they appear to be at first sight.

Euro-Atlantic Space

“Latvia is a *Baltic country* – but not just that. Latvia has already learned to think and work within the whole *Baltic Sea region*, but there is also more to it. Latvia is a *European country* and the European integration is an important political and human value for us. Latvia is a new *transatlantic state*” as well. This is the way Latvian’s foreign minister Indulis Berzins defined his country in 2002.¹³¹ This kind of layered and inclusive identification has been characteristic of the Balts for over a decade now. The importance of the US and the trans-Atlantic connection in political discourses concerning the Balts has been central and has clearly differentiated them from their Nordic neighbours and, since the Iraq war, also from the Franco-German axis. The omnipresent nature of the US that has been an integral part of the national rhetoric is not the result of the Iraq War but has in fact preceded it. Taking part in the coalition forces in Iraq was just a logical act following their longer term identification.¹³²

Along with some other former Eastern Europeans, the Baltic states did not hesitate to support the US policy in Iraq and have thus opposed the Franco-German line. This did not come as a great surprise. But why does the US carry such weight and have a dense and symbolically loaded meaning in the Baltic states? The Latvian foreign minister in the years 2002-2004, Sandra Kalniete, declared that the restoration of Latvian independence “owes its successful outcome largely to Latvia’s relations with the United States of America”.¹³³ The Estonian premier Juhan Parts justified, for his part, this support by arguing that Estonia’s voice would be better heard if the country joined the US-led coalition in Iraq. Yet this support has not been a purely tactical choice. Support for the US is still seen as a matter of security. Parts recalls the non-recognition policy of the US during the Soviet period and the crucial US sup-

131 Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia at the 15th session of the Baltic Assembly 3 Dec 1999, www.am.gov.lv; Italics added by the author.

132 Asmus, Ronald D. & Vondra, Alexandr: “The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe” in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18(2): 2005, pp. 203-216.

133 Kalniete, Sandra: “Latvia’s foreign policy at the crossroads of changes”, 27 January 2004, www.am.gov.lv.

port for the Baltic states during the 1990s. In making these points, Parts is not only soliciting Estonians' gratitude for US support; he is also reminding his audience that this support has been indispensable for saving, rescuing and securing national sovereignty.¹³⁴

Besides the official rhetoric, more extreme visions on the Euro-Atlantic space can be found, such as the pamphlet 'New Atlantic. Great Britain and the Future of a New Europe' written by Ivar Raig. The main message of Raig¹³⁵ is that "Transatlantic cooperation should become the driving force for reforming the European economy, as Franco-German reconciliation played crucial role for European economic integration so far". According to the author Europe is too small to succeed on the global market and it has to accept the fact that it has lost its leading role in world politics. Thus the only way to save Europe and the West that has been in crisis since 9/11 consists of close cooperation over the Atlantic and the creation of a North-Atlantic Trade Area.

In Estonia and Latvia, the Euro-Atlantic space is an important identity-coordinate and it is comprehended as a synonym of the West that is returning to a state of normalcy. The importance of such a stance has not been openly questioned even during the time when the first fallen Baltic soldiers were carried back to their national soil; instead they were treated as national heroes fighting for the security of their nation. The Euro-Atlantic space is so fundamental for the identification of the Balts that challenging it would also challenge their recent returning to the West. That is why the current crisis of the West truly affects the Balts and compels their contribution. This kind of emphasis on the trans-Atlantic community is similar to the vision of the Americans but there are also clear differences. Notably, the Balts' notion of security is still predominantly linked to Russia and traditional ideas pertaining to defence, whereas the US calls for a new kind of security thinking from its New European protégés.¹³⁶ Thus, the understandings regarding the West are not always congruent between 'new Europe' and the US even if it might appear to be the case at first sight.

Baltic Tigers

The Baltic states have based their economic miracle after gaining independence on a liberal economy policy, one premised on neo-liberal theories. This has put them at

134 Prime Minister Juhan Parts: interview for the newspaper *Postimees*, www.peaminister.ee.

135 Raig, Ivar: *New Atlantic. Great Britain and the Future of a New Europe*, Research Centre Free Europe

136 Zaborowski, Marcin and Longhurst, Kerry: "America's protégé in the east? The emergence of Poland as a regional leader" in *International Affairs* 79 (5), 2003, pp. 1009-1028.

loggerheads with certain countries and brought them closer to others. In particular, the Nordic countries have accused the Balts of being stowaways in the EU, while the joint article of the Estonian premier Parts and the British premier Blair calling for autonomy of taxation express a new linkage in Europe.¹³⁷ And obviously neo-liberal policies keep the Balts ideologically close to the American model.

Issue of economy are, however, not just economic in essence. There are also crucial political issues at stake, some of them pertaining also to identity-politics. During the past few years a new success story, one slowly replacing the old foundational narrative that looks back to the loss of the interwar state, has been invented. This narrative cherishes the economic miracle and locates it as the foundation and a new core of the nation. Economic success comes out as a source of national pride that needs to be secured so that national sovereignty can survive and flourish. Thus, Baltic politicians have already for some years reminded the domestic and foreign public about the growth rates of their economy and have depicted themselves as quick learners in the sphere of market economics. Recently, it has even been added that the Balts are more efficient and more successful in carrying out their reforms than the old, more established states and that they therefore really do have something to teach other Europeans. As Kristina Ojuland, the Estonian foreign minister, declared in a speech in the EU heartland of Brussels in October 2002, "Estonia has on the basis of its reforms and progress acquired enough self-confidence to be able to address with an innovatory spirit also the matter of reforming the European Union".¹³⁸ The Balts are no longer, it seems, emulating 'Western' Europeans as they were some years ago. They are instead now arguing that in certain key 'progressive' sectors they are actually ahead of many Western states and will soon overtake the rest. In the words of Ojuland, the Balts see themselves as the 'Tigers of Europe' a term which refers to the Asian examples of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore and, more recently, the EU's own 'Celtic Tiger', Ireland. Following Ojuland's formulation, they may be tiny but still 'Tiny Tigers will always be Tigers'.¹³⁹ The label of a 'Baltic Tiger' has recently been used also in characterising Latvia and Lithuania.¹⁴⁰

137 Joint article by Prime Ministers Juhan Parts and Tony Blair: "An Enlarged Europe needs competition", www.peaminister.ee. About criticism see e.g. Goble 2005, p. 12.

138 Kristina Ojuland: "Tiny Tigers will always be Tigers", Berlin, 15-16 November 2002; Kristina Ojuland, "An EU of 25 and Estonia's role in it", Brussels, 23 October 2002, www.vm.ee. See also V_ke-Freiberga: "Latvia's contribution to a New Europe", Vienna, 18 June 2001; Berzins, Indulis: "Latvia for Europe and Europe for Latvia" London 14-15 March 2002, www.am.gov.lv.

139 Ojuland, Kristina: "Tiny Tigers will always be Tigers", Berlin, 15-16 November 2002, www.vm.ee.

140 *Gateway Riga*, October 2004

The newest addition to the success story consists of the IT-sector – the symbol of the ultra-modern world. It has been emphasised how fast the IT-sector is expanding in the Baltics. A programme with the symbolic name of ‘Tiger’s Leap’ has aimed at connecting all Estonian schools, the future generations, to the internet, proving just how conscious this ultra-modernisation of Estonian society has been in recent times. It has changed from being a mere catchword to a concept symbolising the innovative character of the whole nation. Self-esteem is obviously high, as can be noticed from the following citation from the *Life in Estonia* magazine: “Estonia has achieved among the quickest information society development success stories in all of the world”.¹⁴¹

The Balts are purporting themselves as forerunners in comparison to the ‘old Europe’ of France and Germany. The latter are viewed as the uncompromising and stagnating part of the continent consequently to blame for the shrinking role of the EU in the global markets of the future. According to neo-liberal theories, growth rates, competitiveness and the flexibility to react to changes in global markets before they even happen are the main tools for the EU to survive. According to an Estonian economist, the EU truly needs a ‘new’ Europe in order to learn.¹⁴²

Soviet Legacy

The most striking proof of the presence of the Soviet legacy that seems still to be there a decade and a half after the collapse of the Soviet Union consists of the above-mentioned recent Russian-Baltic debate. Even if the explanation for this series of mutual accusations is obviously to be sought in the attitudes held by Moscow, any debate requires two partners. In fact, the reactions of the Balts are most telling. Besides the examples introduced earlier, another emblematic case consists of the fate of border treaties between Russia and its western neighbours, Estonia and Latvia. These treaties have now been under negotiation for over a decade.

The lost areas of the left-bank of the Narva-river and the Petseri-region in the Estonian case and the Abrene-region in the Latvian case have long been a part of the respective national symbolisms even if the areas in question are currently almost totally inhabited by ethnic Russians. The borders were changed after the annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union and when the interwar states constituted a

141 “e-Estonia. Success Driven by Untraditional Solutions”, *Life in Estonia*, Winter 2004/5, pp. 30-33. See also Kristina Ojula, “IT and Development – The Political Aspects”, 2 March 2004.

142 Varbalane, Urmas: “Does the broadening of EU detain its competitiveness in the world market?” Paper presented at seminar Five Session at Villa Tamekan 16.6.2005.

focal point for new independence the old borders were regarded as almost holy. Opinions have slowly changed since the late 1990s and although the loss of these territories has been accepted in practice, a certain reconciliation is still expected from the Russian side. It is called for in order to heal the national wounds.

Russia and Estonia finally managed to sign their border treaty on 18 May 2005. The signing initially looked like signalling the end of a long-running dispute, but surprise was still waiting. The Estonian Parliament ratified the treaty on 20 June but only after a political struggle and, importantly, it added a brief introduction referring to two declarations – the resolution of the Republic of Estonian Supreme Council of 20 August 1991 ‘On the National Independence of Estonia’ and the declaration of the Riigikogu of 7 October 1992 ‘On the Restoration of Constitutional Power’ – which both have references to the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and to the illegality of the Soviet Occupation.¹⁴³ Russia’s reaction was quick and harsh boiling down to a refusal to accept any text that alters the agreement between the respective governments. Russia would not ratify the treaty as the references to the Tartu Peace Treaty could open the door for further demands for re-arranging borders and requests concerning compensation.¹⁴⁴ Overall, a brief introduction that looked rather innocent has brought about another deadlock.

The Russian-Latvian negotiations reached a stalemate even before signing when the Latvians insisted that in the treaty Moscow apologise for the Soviet occupation.¹⁴⁵ The importance of references and correct formulations clearly indicates how the dispute over the Soviet legacy still dominates self-identification in the Baltic states. Although in an apparently more secure position brought about by the EU and NATO memberships, the primary interests of the foreign policy of new member states, as Ilves¹⁴⁶ argues, still lie in the East. The closer these states are to Russia, the

143 Eesti Vabariigi ja Vene Föderatsiooni vahelise Eesti-Vene riigipiiri lepingu ning 20.6.2005, Loppmenetluses seaduse eelnou 660 SE menetkusetapid 30 May 2005, Seletuskiri 13 June 2005, 660 SE I 305.2005, www.riigikogu.ee.

144 Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding Estonian Parliament’s Ratification of Border Treaties with Russia, 21 June 2005, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Concerning the Ratification of the Border Treaties with Russian by the Estonian Parliament, 22 June 2005, www.ln.mid.ru Estonian reaction: Statement by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 22 June 2005, 27 June 2005, www.vm.ee.

145 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information and Press Department, Commentary regarding a media question concerning the new linkage being put forward by the Latvian side to the signing of a State Border Treaty, 28 April 2005, www.ln.mid.ru.

146 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: “The Pleiades Join the Stars: Transatlanticism and East European Enlargement” in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19(2): 2005, p. 197.

more strongly they support the US.¹⁴⁷ The explanation for the resilient position of the East, or Russia, in national discourse needs to be sought by going far beyond security politics. In accounting for the resilience one needs to examine the past politics and how they relate to questions of national identity.

The Baltic states shared the same past experience with Russia and seemingly this shared Soviet legacy dominates self-identification in Russia as well in the Baltic states. Clearly, the notion of legacy requires a closer look. It appears, in this context, that Maria Todorova's ideas on the Balkans are useful to follow also in the Baltic case. For her the Balkans means primarily the Ottoman legacy that has dominated the national imagination of the Balkan nations since the 19th century. As in the Baltics, denying the legacy pertaining to the previous dominating empire has defined national narratives in the Balkans. The centrality of the processes of denying seems to demonstrate in both cases how influential this legacy still remains. Todorova¹⁴⁸ makes a division between 'legacy as continuity' and 'legacy as perception'. The first consists of visible signs in spheres such as buildings and architecture, in ethnic structure or in various practices. In this sense, the Soviet legacy is obviously present for example in the Soviet suburbs or in the presence of a Russian-speaking minority. The continuity of practices and values may be difficult to notice but at least many have received their education in the Soviet system and have Soviet degrees. These are signs impossible to delete and hide even if physical signs of the Soviet legacy are diminishing as the years go by. Still what matters is perception or interpretation and analysis of the signs, which are, as Todorova reminds us, an accumulating process of perceptions of each generations. The point is that the Balts cannot escape their Soviet legacy just by arguing that it was illegal; as long as they struggle against it by endeavours of denying it, this legacy will nonetheless dominate their self-identification. Thus, the question of the Soviet legacy is also an issue of the EU when it constitutes another sphere of mindscapes crossing the EU-Russian border.

The presence of the Soviet legacy can also be noticed in the increasing expressions of Baltic solidarity with other post-Soviet republics and in particular with the Ukraine and Georgia.¹⁴⁹ As Estonian premier Urmas Paet articulates his country's interests in June 2005: "The European Union itself must be prepared for accepting new mem-

147 Missirolì, Antonio: "Central Europe between the EU and NATO" in *Survival. The IISS Quarterly*, 46 (4), 2004, pp. 121-136.

148 Todorova, Maria: "Introduction: Learning Memory, Remembering Identity", in M. Todorova (ed.), *Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory* (New York: New York University Press), 2004, pp. 10-13.

149 See e.g. Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: "The Pleiades Join the Stars" p. 201.

bers. The membership perspective is a strong motivation for countries in the process of carrying out market economy and democratic reforms. This, in turn, promotes the spreading and deepening of stability and security in Europe.”¹⁵⁰ The Balts have thus given full support to further enlargements of the EU and NATO. The way in which the Balts comprehend the significance and the role of the so-called ‘wider Europe’ contrast with that held by ‘old Europeans’ who seek lasting borders and closure for the EU. Their perspective brings them closer to the US, which is also speaking for a ‘wider Europe’ that extends beyond the borders of the EU. But whereas the ultimate interests of the US are in the ‘Greater Middle East’, the Balts are just re-conceptualising what is Europe and where its borders should extend.¹⁵¹

Smart Baltics?

Even if the Balts have not felt comfortable with the notion of the ‘new Europe’ and certainly not with the ‘false Europe’, there is something fresh in their approach to Europe. Their consciousness and self-esteem have been rising during the past few years and they certainly do not want to be merely like others, to copy Western Europeans. Instead they want to have their own voice and characteristics. However, to be something unique, to be noticed by others requires a name. Subsequently, and for this purpose, it is possible to recognise traces of the return of the ‘Baltic’ label in the new framework. The ‘Baltic’ has obviously been in continuous usage but references to Baltic cooperation have been rare and often concerning joint military efforts.¹⁵² The new and more recent usage emphasises common interests within the EU. An interesting example of this case consists of Estonia, a country that most intensively tried to deny the whole label still some time ago. Recent expressions initiated by the Estonian foreign ministry give a new kind of emphasis to Baltic cooperation.

The somewhat unexpected return of the Baltic as a unifying concept was clearly evidenced in the spring of 2005 by the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the ‘Declaration on Unity and Co-operation by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’, i.e. a document that was not mentioned for years and whose 10th anniversary passed unnoticed. More generally, it appears that images of past cooperation are now presented in a positive manner. This stands in contrast to the previous tendencies of focusing on past failures. Estonian foreign minister Urmas Paet has concluded for his part that

150 Paet, Urmas: “Main Guidelines of Estonia’s Foreign Policy”, 7 June 2005. www.wm.ee.

151 Hamilton, Daniel S.: “Wider Europe and the West: Ten Lessons” in *New Europe Review* 2(3), 2005.

152 E.g. Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: “The Baltic States, the Baltic Sea Region, and the European Union”, 22 September 1998, Tallinn, www.vm.ee.

there is a new momentum for the Baltic group after the fulfilment of the EU and NATO memberships. There are, in his view, again common interests to be shared by all three Baltic states within a common framework. The Baltic label is now seen to be a flexible signifier that has complementary relations to other labels. It does deduct from the value of the others but rather adds something valuable to the overall constellation. In this context the Baltic's relation with the Nordic label is also revisited. The two, Baltics and Nordics, are presented to have 'different histories' and representing different levels of economic development. However, instead of declaring themselves as part of the Nordic, the new rhetoric points towards the closeness of the two groups and emphasises their 'common political and cultural traits'.¹⁵³

Acceptance of the 'Baltic' label would furnish the Baltic states a certain subjectivity. They would no more have to just accept existing labels like Nordic and new signifiers like 'new Europe' introduced by great powers but would be able to contribute to Europe-making in Europe's North with something of their own. One option is certainly opened up by the re-accepting and return of the Baltic label, albeit doing so by simultaneously redefining its context to symbolise not post-Soviet countries in transition but ultra-modern tigers. The concept of the Baltic offers the possibility, it seems, to rewrite the context as the label is widely known and accepted but and at the same time it lacks the connotations of being a burden from the past, i.e. a stigma branding the 'Balkans'. By being 'Baltic', the Balts are entering the EU and a broader political sphere as an interests group of their own, having their own vision of the future. They will not remain just the protégé of the US or obedient followers of Brussels. EU and NATO membership, a deepening transatlantic crisis diverging the US and Europe, as well as Russia's desperate search for its role in Europe, have all been conducive to the emergence of a new Europe. In this context the Baltic states seem to be provided with an opportunity to transform themselves from small to smart state and to use their marginal position to introduce challenging principles and norms to rethink Europe and the West as well. Whether they will be successful or not will be the theme of future studies.

153 "Baltic Cooperation: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania", Memorandum, 25 September 2005; Paet, Urmas: "Future Cooperation Trends of the Baltic and Nordic Countries", 28 April 2005, www.wm.ee.

Russia's Role in the Baltic Approaches to National Security and the European Security and Defence Policy¹⁵⁴

ELZBIETA TROMER

Introduction

Speaking the same language, the same 'broken English', we perceive things differently; 'we', being the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea: the Nordic and Baltic states. Different understandings of identical wordings may be part of the reason why we still know so relatively little about one another;¹⁵⁵ however, it may also serve as an explanation for how the Baltic states manage to manoeuvre within the European Security and Defence Community while remaining strong Atlanticists – a feature they share with the Nordics. The Baltic security managers also managed to implement the canon of 'new threats', as defined by NATO and the EU in their security political guidelines, while addressing the traditional territorial and stability threats as perceived by their electorates. The Balts are looking towards the Nordics for dialogue about Russia. Is it to be in vain?

154 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are three distinct political entities, just like Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The former three are occasionally referred to as 'Baltic' countries or Baltic states, whereas the latter five are collectively labelled the 'Nordic countries'. Such use of shorthand does not indicate the author's positive or negative attitudes to the states of interpretation of their history.

155 This paper draws heavily on my chapter in *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy* ed. by Alison, J.K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius, OUP, 2006). The chapter was written on the basis of analyses of the security political guidelines in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as supported by twenty interviews conducted in the Baltic and Nordic Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence in October-November 2004. These interviews have been supplemented with conversations together with students and colleagues at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia in 2003-5. While some of the material is partly reused and the original chapter is substantially longer and covers more issues, the purpose of this paper is significantly different.

In the early 1990s, the Nordic parliaments initiated financial support to the new democracies in what was then labelled ‘Eastern Europe’: investment means were assigned, as were means for financing military advisors and cultural cooperation. The intention was in line with the Western liberal tradition, which ascribes peace-bringing effects to foreign trade and investments. The reasoning behind such initiatives was that trade would spur cooperation and communication; key elements in the development of new state identities and security communities. In the 1990s, the Central- and Eastern European states were expected to become ‘like us’, the West European liberal democracies. The final aim was stipulated as ‘improved East-West relations’.¹⁵⁶ The vision was the creation of a security community around the Baltic Sea.

Today, fifteen years later, two questions arise: what did we achieve, and how much did we actually learn from the process? The relations in Europe are obviously peaceful, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states are members of NATO and the EU, and any conflicts, which are predominantly of an administrative character, are resolved by peaceful means. The outstanding question remains whether this development was prompted by the trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) directed at the CEE or due to other factors. By comparison, the development of the Nordic security community unfolded in the reverse order: it was not until the Nordic security community was anchored that trade between the Nordic countries actually reached any significant level;¹⁵⁷ however, this discussion is not to be addressed within this paper.¹⁵⁸

Instead, it will be demonstrated how difficult and complex the communication and cooperation process remain, even subsequent to all of us becoming members of the NATO and EU security communities. Previously, we knew that we did not speak the same language and were aware of the fact that misunderstandings may occur. Today, we no longer expect them to take place. Consequently, the Baltic security managers are placed in a dilemma between efforts to be loyal and dutiful members of the new communities and their concern for the fears perceived by the Baltic electorates. This

156 See for example the Danish Parliamentary debate on the developments in the Central and East European countries, 26.10.1989, *Folketingstidende 1989-90. Forhandlingerne I* column 726 ff., which also includes references to the Swedish parliamentary debate earlier the same month – and with a similar outcome, namely recommendation to establish investment funds for Central and Eastern Europe promoting FDI and foreign trade.

157 Wiberg, Haakan: “The Nordic Security community: past, present, future” in *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000*, DUPI, Copenhagen, 2000, pp. 121-137.

158 A PhD thesis on this issue is under preparation by the present author.

argument is supported by a couple of examples about what happens within the fields of security and economy, two areas deeply affected by the Baltic states' membership of NATO and the EU; membership that was longed for in order to obtain security, yet has also brought insecurity.

The examples focus on Russia, the biggest neighbour to both the Nordic and the Baltic states in the region; a potential member of the Baltic security community and a potential threat. Within NATO and the EU, the Balts are regarded as overdoing their fear of Russia, while they themselves often express disappointment over the lack of understanding for their concerns and lack of concern for the defence of their own values on the part of the 'old' EU and NATO:

The three examples concern the following issues:

1. The concepts of 'threats' and 'security'
2. The need for the governmental regulation of FDI
3. The failure of defence sector reforms in Russia

The Concepts of 'Threats' and 'Security'

Since becoming members of NATO and the EU, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have found themselves in a situation requiring the adaptation of their security political guidelines and their threat scenarios to those of NATO and the EU. Meanwhile, their domestic electorate was almost explicitly focused on the political and military disorder and other threats that events in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus might spill-over to their countries. The Baltic security managers were placed in a dilemma between, on the one hand, the demands of the EU and NATO to incorporate the 'new' threats in their security political guidelines, and, on the other hand, the expectations of their respective populations, to whom the newly gained independence and their states' sovereignty was one of the highest values to be defended – a value they expected reflected in the new states' official documents. The dilemma was – and to a wide extent remains – therefore between the 'new' and post modern threats versus the modern understanding of security with its focus on the 'old' territorial threats with Russia constituting the dividing line.

The circle is squared by assigning a role to Russia in which it will be supporting both the arguments in favour of a stronger focus on territorial security and those in favour of multilateral security arrangements. The latter are able to employ the language of the former in order to transform the words and phrases to represent what the electorate knows and believes, yet in order to achieve political support for multilateral

security arrangements with US backing. Central to this is the role of language and language structure and its manipulation – here it is not a pejorative term – for political message construction and political effect. The ‘new’ EU and NATO members have incorporated the ‘new’ threats as defined by the ‘old’ members. However, in order to make it acceptable to their societies, they had to employ a very special line of argument.

With the achievement of both NATO and EU membership, here in particular the ESDP, there is growing confidence in the Baltic states in a safer future with soft security issues being handled jointly within international security cooperation. However, there is also a considerable concern that handling hard security threats requires traditional power politics – a capacity not quite in sight within the ESDP structures – viewed through the eyes of military analysts from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; not so much because of a lack of military ‘hardware’ – though this, too, is considered a problem – as because of the lack of confidence in the efficiency of the EU decision-making processes in times of urgency.

The underlying reason is largely present in the understanding of the Baltic states of ‘national security’ concept – an understanding which is significantly different from the one applied by the ‘old’ EU members. The Baltic states’ understanding of ‘threats’ also sounds identical to – for example – that of the Nordic countries; but it is not. For the Baltic states, the essence of national security remains the protection of the autonomous nation state and its territory; for the societies in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the newly gained independence that enabled the three countries’ return to Europe – to the West – is sacrosanct. The state is in focus. Sovereignty and territorial integrity are to be preserved and protected along with their dividends: democracy and market economy, constitutional order and public safety.

However, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have joined the EU. The EU member states are heading towards a national security agenda in which the classic territorial threats are exchanged for threats against the stability of global economic and environmental systems and against the openness in the international system. The security concepts of the ‘old’ EU member states are embedded in an international framework in which the distinction between domestic and international has been eroded, where borders matter less and force is prohibited.

One dilemma in relation to the ESDP is that while the protection of democracy and the market economy as such is supported by the EU, the protection of national territories is not an issue. This dilemma is inflated by the fact that the threat perceived

by the Balts to their security comes from Russia – a country the EU and NATO no longer considers a potential enemy or threat, neither classical territorial nor ‘new’.

A similar dilemma is identified in the understanding of threats. Studies of the respective security political guidelines in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia¹⁵⁹ reveal that the definition of threats to their national security are nearly identical to those in similar documents produced by the Nordic – and EU – states: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and drugs and other forms of organised crime are at the top of their lists. Despite the focus on territorial integrity and sovereignty in their definitions of security, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia apply the EU post-modern definition of threats, which are, as stated above, unrelated to territorial integrity.

They aspired to NATO and EU membership primarily for security reasons; however, *insecurity* also resulted. First, belonging to NATO and the EU has significantly expanded the security interests of the Baltic states into regions of no previous security relevance – irrespective of geographical distances. Second, the list of ‘securitised’ issues became long and abstract. Consequently, none of the new threats are easily understood (and once understood, acceptance is a further issue) by the societies in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The average citizen will read much more frequently in the daily papers about Russian fighter planes violating the Baltic skies than about terrorist bomb threats in their capitals. ‘Terrorism’, an issue most strongly emphasised within the NATO and ESDP, is particularly questioned in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as a threat to the state as a political or military entity.

This dilemma is acknowledged by the ruling elites. In order to obtain support for joining the USA’s ‘Coalition of the willing’, the societies were therefore called upon for their determination to ensure the USA friendship even after NATO membership would be a reality. The arguments mounted were not based on the fear of terrorism or WMD from Iraq. Demonstration of loyalty was necessary, it was argued, ‘if we want others to come to our help when we need them.’ A price for solidarity was to be paid in order to hedge the Balts from the danger they considered relevant to *them*, i.e. Russia.¹⁶⁰

159 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Defence, Vilnius 2002 & 2004, www.gov.mod.lt; National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga 2003, www.am.gov.lv; National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 2004, www.vm.ee. These are henceforth referred to as Lithuania NSS, Latvia NSC and Estonia NSC, respectively.

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However, military threat from Russia is *not* on the security agenda in the EU or NATO – and not even to be mentioned, as such. This was emphasised in the course of the accession period to NATO and the EU. Moreover, the Baltic countries do not expect the EU to be a hard security provider. They regard the ESDP – the new structure that remains under development – as ‘not able to contribute to the security of our country.’¹⁶¹ The preferred provider of territorial security for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is NATO – the ‘old NATO’ with strong backing from the USA. What they hoped, however, was that the EU – with all its instruments and ‘power’ – would be helpful in dealing with Russia, as Russia, in the Baltic experience, prefers to deal with major powers.¹⁶²

However, disappointment is mounting in this respect. Recent examples are from the day when the Estonian air surveillance specialists counted roughly 15-20 Russian fighter planes spurting towards the west in battle formations – only to turn away just a few kilometres away from the Estonian and Latvian borders (18 August 2005),¹⁶³ or when a Russian SU-27 fighter plane crashed in Lithuania (15 September 2005). Both events, and a few other similar situations, were interpreted by the Baltic security managers as a Russian demonstration of force and a violation of the ‘Open Skies’ agreement. The Baltic capitals therefore expected support from the EU in rapprochement of Russia; however, their claim was rejected. Instead, they were told that such incidents are ‘bilateral affairs’ between the Baltic states and Russia and that they ought to deal directly with the Russian authorities.¹⁶⁴

In conclusion, the EU does not perceive Russia as constituting any military risk, nor is the risk of non-military threat from the region high on the EU agenda. Africa is the region envisaged for the ESDP operations, not CIS or Caucasus. But there is little understanding in Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn for why countries that remain relatively poor ought to engage themselves in the previous colonies of the ‘old Europe’. Their focus is oriented towards other parts of Europe’s immediate neighbourhood: the Caucasus and CIS; regions with failed or failing states.

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163 Eesti Päevaleht, August 26, 2005 p. 4.

164 Ilves, Thomas Hendrik, MEP for Estonia, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, during the ‘Wider Europe’ seminar, also Paet, Urmas, Estonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted by Vibeke Sperling in *Politiken*, 13 November 2005, “Det drejer sig om en EU-grænse. Det burde være en sag for EU” (“This is about an EU border. It ought to be a matter for the EU”), p. 9.

The Need for Government Regulation of Foreign Direct Investments

Economic security is of major concern for all three states. For Estonia, a threat of economic origin means fear that its economy, which is highly integrated in the world economic system, will be vulnerable to worldwide crises and/or the instability of foreign markets.¹⁶⁵ Lithuania's National Security Strategy is expressing concern for the dominance of its economy by "foreign capital investments of unclear origin".¹⁶⁶ The issue is about investments by Russian companies or by foreign capital with Russian background.

The problem is as follows: first, a lack of transparency in the Russian companies and their business methods; second, Russian geopolitical ambitions; third, the security political consequences of the increasing European dependency on Russian energy supplies.

There are substantial differences in business law and practices between Russian and EU companies. The list of reasons is long and may be summarised as follows: transparent corporate governance and accounting rules are in great demand by the Western business community undertaking investments in Russia. The absence of the appropriate corporate legislation combined with excessive regulation of an 'ad hoc' nature are both stumbling blocks for Western investments in Russia *and* hinder insight into Russian companies seeking investment opportunities in the Baltic and other states. Thus far, it appears as though there are joint interests across the Baltic Sea in relation to Russian corporate legislation.

However, when the EU companies were invited to the negotiating table¹⁶⁷ with Russian authorities in order to discuss the problems summarised as the 'Russian government's excessive regulations of business activities',¹⁶⁸ it appeared as though the focus of the EU companies was on barriers to Western investment opportunities in Russia. For the three Baltic states, however, the Russian government's excessive regulation of business activities gave rise to concern that Moscow is exploiting Russian investment in the Baltic states for political purposes; two different kinds of problems under the same heading.

¹⁶⁵ Estonia NSC, section 1.3.

¹⁶⁶ Lithuania NSS

¹⁶⁷ The EU-Russia 5th Industrialist Roundtable Meeting, 2003 Section 6 Creating favourable conditions for investments in Russia.

http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/business_dialogues/russia/russiaoverview

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

One example of Baltic fear for Russia exercising her geo-political ambitions through energy policy is the oil pipeline in Ventspils, Latvia. Nearly one-eighth of Russian oil exports were formerly piped to this port, helping make Ventspils' GDP per capita among the highest in the country. In February 2003, however, the Russian state pipeline monopoly, 'Transneft', shut off the oil. The theory in Latvia was that Russia was strangling Ventspils, so as to force the Latvian government to turn over 'Transneft' its remaining 39 % stake in the oil pipeline company. A more Russia-friendly – perhaps also a more updated – explanation could be that Russia had also begun operating under market economic terms and had identified cheaper transport routes.

Another example of misunderstandings comes from the Ukraine: just three hours after the results of the second Ukrainian election round were announced Turkmenistan threatened to cut the gas supply. It was assumed in the region that Russia was actually the driver behind this announcement. And finally, an example that is rooted in the concern in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that once NATO and EU countries are dependent on Russian energy supplies, they might become more likely to pander to Russian geo-political demands. The fear is that Russia wants to weaken the Baltic states' EU membership by exerting 'special provisions' for economic relations between Russia and the Baltic states, rendering the Baltic states 'second class' EU members, not fully in compliance with the EU set of rules. That is why it upset the Baltic security managers when the Russian participants argued in the course of the EU-Russia 5th Industrialist Roundtable in 2003 that application of the EU internal market rules may hurt the traditional trade interests of Russian industry in the Central and East European countries. Furthermore, they argued that the subordination of the national legislation of acceding states to the EU laws will invalidate a large number of bilateral trade- and economic relation agreements with these states. The responses from the European participants – none of whom were from the Baltic states – were made with the best intentions, but certainly did not assuage the Baltic concerns: it was concluded that special provisions have been negotiated and continue to be negotiated in areas of Russian interest in order to avoid or reduce the problems.¹⁶⁹ However, 'special provisions' is precisely what the Baltic countries fear. In particular, they aim for Schengen membership and consider any 'special provisions' as endangering this target. They want to be 'normal' members of the EU community.

169 The EU-Russia 5th Industrialist Roundtable Meeting, 2003 Section 2. The EU enlargement and bilateral cooperation http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/business_dialogues/russia/russiaoverview

For the Baltic states, any ‘special provisions’ are detrimental to their long-term aspirations.

The Baltic concern for the Russian geo-political appetite exercised by means of investments and energy policy is supported by US analyses. Several reports state that: “Russian energy policy is used as an instrument by the Kremlin and its power ministries as leverage to affect foreign security policy in importing countries, particularly in East Central Europe.”¹⁷⁰ The issue is not that the commercial attachés from the Russian embassies cooperate with their business community in the respective countries; that is what they are expected to do. The problem is that according to numerous foreign studies, the Russian government officials are steering the industrialists’ investments, and the origin of this capital is unclear.

Failure of Defence System Reforms in Russia

The third example pertains to the Baltic and Western European perceptions of the success – or failure – of Russian defence system reforms. In the Baltic eyes and ears, the Western European views on Russia are slightly naive. What they hear is that Western Europe believes Russia to be a democracy with a sort of market economy. The Russian military is perceived as being in such poor condition that the traditional Cold War ‘warning time’ has been expanded from ten hours during the Cold War to a comfortable ten years. Further, Russia is also perceived by Western European analysts as a country in which the state institutions are weak and the legitimacy of the armed forces hardly present. True defence system reform is therefore highly unlikely to succeed. The Western European conclusion is that the Russian defence reform – which receives internal praise – is best likened to a Potemkin village, i.e. a hollow construct intended to conceal a potentially damaging situation.

Baltic security managers agree with the conclusion regarding the failed Russian military reforms; however, they do not believe in Russia as a country acting according to the logic of a rational cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, they express doubts as to the extent to which membership in the club of ‘civilised states’ really means to President Mr. Putin. The Baltic military analysts are unconvinced that Russia has no instrument to pursue her imperial ambitions. And finally, they fear that the Russian military leadership is not wholly reconciled to the ‘loss’ of eastern Central Europe and

170 Smith, Keith C.: *Russian Energy Policy in the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine. A New Stealth Imperialism?*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 2004

that in a time of failed military reforms, they may be exposed to crazy – yet deadly – attacks launched by lunatics and uncontrolled military forces or individuals.

While many Western analysts seem appeased by Russia's lack of ability to carry out defence system reforms, the Baltic states therefore worry: they do not regard Russia as an immediate threat to their hard security; rather, the concern is for the potential failure of Russian military, political and economic reform and the prevalence of ever-stronger nationalistic trends. The 'pockets' of the efficiently functioning military machine may be used with or without the consent of Moscow. What is frustrating the Baltic security managers is the lack of will amongst their West European partners to take the Baltic security concerns seriously, followed by anger from the Western Europeans when the Balts approach the US on these issues.

Conclusion

Security communities mean that states identify with one another; that they perceive threats not as private matter for each state, but as the responsibility of each. To the extent that the new democracies have incorporated the 'new threats' defined by NATO in their security political guidelines, this task appears to be accomplished: 'they', the ex-members of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon, have re-dressed and adopted 'our' – the 'old' NATO and EU members' – definition of democracy, liberal economy, threats and security. The question raised in this paper is the extent of the change in the security perceptions amongst the Baltic states and the domestic consequences of these changes. Being as eager as we are to celebrate that they have joined us, do we actually learn anything about them? And if not, what does this mean for the deepening of the security community building process?

The solution is hardly that the Nordics ought to also begin to perceive Russia as a threat. Rather, we must acknowledge that despite the fact that we use the same terminology, we will have difficulties developing common remedies if we do not discuss the concepts, i.e. we must actually listen to one another.

If this sounds trite, then listen to a story told by a student at the Baltic Defence College referring to training he participated in a NATO country: the officers were trained in Russian strategic plans and Russian weapons. The officer in question had served in the Russian army, so he commented on the information that, in his opinion, was obsolete. The reaction was some moments of silence followed by the commander's resumption of his lecture as if nothing had happened. The lesson taken home by this particular officer was therefore: the westerners do not care to listen to us, so why should we waste our time? Or, as one Baltic security manager said in an

interview: “The best strategy within the EU is to shut up and do our work” – hardly an approach that furthers mutual understanding.¹⁷¹

The lessons learned in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius are that for the EU, Russia is a strategic partner and is not to be referred to as a threat. However, if the EU acquired a strategy, it could be helpful in discussions with Russia on the grounds that it is large and has more bargaining tools. The lesson that perhaps also could be learned, or at least discussed, is: what is the purpose of avoiding explicit mention of Russia in the security policy guidelines when so many hidden references are made to it in the same documents and in the political debate? How meaningful is it to require the same skills from their societies in 2006 as were basic for every newspaper reader in the Soviet times: i.e. to read between the lines? Though avoiding referring to Russia as a threat, Russia is put forward when support for ESDP and NATO is to be mounted. The argument that the Baltic states must participate in NATO and ESDP because “if we want to get support in time of crises ...” sounds in many Baltic ears like “in case of a threat from Russia.” A public debate on threats and national security involving all or at least as many as possible sections of the Baltic societies is therefore paramount to formulation of security policy. It is necessary to overcome the fear that addressing the hard and soft security aspects related to Russia is likely to stir up heated discussions. The lessons that the Nordic countries could share with the Balts are that heated discussions are prompting coherence in societies.

The Nordic countries have invested means and energy in establishing peaceful and constructive relations with their Baltic neighbours up to their inclusion in NATO and the EU. The assumption is that once ‘in’, they are to act as full-blown members, i.e. according to the same premises as everyone else. The Danish focus in particular is redirected to new areas. The above examples demonstrate that once in, a need for dialogue and cooperation remains. It is in the joint Baltic-Nordic interest to establish proper relations with Russia. Here, the Nordic policy appears to overlook the issue, while the Balts emphasise it. The Balts lack a partner within the EU and NATO to discuss the issues. The Nordic states seem to be afraid of opening ‘Pandora’s box’. Such an approach will hardly result in a constructive solution, and establishing a proper security community around the Baltic Sea is unthinkable, not even without Russia; also for the fact that Russia is needed within it.

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Russia: Geopolitical Views and Domestic Political Context

MARK URNOV

Russia is undergoing a difficult and complicated period of time characterised by very mixed processes unfolding within the country. In some spheres, modernisation goes hand-in-hand with growing traditionalism. In others, investment is countered by the flight of capital, growth by stagnation, reforms by counter-reforms, openness by isolationism etc. All of this generates tension, pressures and crises, rendering policies inconsistent and confusing forecasters.

In view of the specific subject matter of this book, I have arranged my presentation around 'the pressure points' that directly impact Russian foreign policy, including the Russian attitude to European integration. I will focus on the collision of two circumstances:

- the growing popularity of the notion of reinstalling Russia as a great power (currently propounded both by the Russian political elite and the general public);
- the crisis unfolding in the country that renders this idea unrealistic – if not outright dangerous – for the future of Russia.

The first part of the presentation (Geopolitical Views) describes the structure of the paradigm within which the Russian political class routinely perceives the global position of the country and the prevalent geopolitical concepts of the Russian political elite. The second part (Domestic Political Context) deals with the ongoing long-term critical phenomena in Russia. The third and final part (Scenarios for Russia's Future) examines a number of options that can be produced by attempts at implementing one geopolitical concept or another in the context of the crisis unfolding in the country.

Geopolitical Views

Russia's Geopolitical Paradigm

The set of geopolitical concepts, doctrines and views circulating in Russia over the past couple of centuries – and which are closely linked to key aspects of the Russian national identity – can be presented as elements of a two-dimensional space. One axis in the system of coordinates of this space represents the Russian role in world politics, while the other axis illustrates the geographic location of Russia's friends and foes.

The 'Russian Role in World Politics' Axis

To simplify and thus clarify the picture, one can reduce the possible options along this axis to the following two opposite positions: 'great power/superpower' and 'just another country'.

Over the last two centuries of Russian history, the dominant conception of Russia's fair/adequate/proper role in the world has been represented by the concept of a great power or superpower, i.e. a leading country playing a decisive role in the global political processes, especially in Europe. This concept has been quite popular amongst different parts of the Russian political elite as well as the public opinion. In the 20th century, there were only two relatively short periods of time (approximately one decade each) in which this concept was not dominant:

- from 1917 to the late 1920s
- from the late 1980s to the late 1990s.

These two waves of 'atypical' moods had their own specific causes and preconditions while being absolutely different in terms of aims, philosophy and political practices. In both cases, however, the Russian political and intellectual elites tended to view the country as a patient to be cured of this or that grave disease rather than as an example to be emulated by other countries. Whenever anti-great power sentiments grew weaker, a strong wave of sentiments of the opposite kind – pro-great power/nationalistic – would arise.

The 'Russian Friends and Foes' Axis

Since the mid-19th century, the Russian political and intellectual elites have had four main competing perceptions of the country's friends and enemies. The relative importance (popularity) of these perceptions and the words used to present them have varied over time; however, some of their key features have persevered. One of the more stable traits is the geographical location of the potential friends. In semi-tra-

ditional/semi-modern terms, these perceptions (or views) can be categorised as follows:

- Westernism: our possible allies are in the West. Russia is part of European civilisation, etc.
- Isolationism: Russia is tragically alone within a circle of countries which, in principle, cannot be trusted on the grounds that they are out to ruin and exploit Russia. Russia must deal with all of these countries, playing on their conflicts and contradictions in order to survive in a hostile environment.
- Anti-Western non-isolationism: the West is our traditional enemy. We must find friends and allies in the East to counter Western anti-Russian tricks and deception.
- Western/Oriental non-isolationism: Russia should not seek an economic or military alliance with either the West or the East (now China). Instead, we ought to keep our doors open to any foreign investment to maximise the competition of capital in Russia and to secure economic and political benefits from this rivalry.

Present-Day Situation

Looking back at Russian history, one can find relatively ‘mono-ideological’ periods, i.e. periods when some geopolitical concept or another prevailed, as well as periods characterised by a plurality of competing views. This has always depended on certain circumstances, primarily of domestic origin.

The contemporary situation can be described in terms of the gradual decline of plurality: some surviving vestiges of pluralism and competition remain, but a dominant view is already emerging. I do not know if any official Russian geopolitical doctrine exists as a comprehensive document. On the basis of the political decisions and official statements made over the past few years, however, it is easy enough to reconstruct the geopolitical vision that is becoming increasingly popular amongst the Russian ruling elite and which is shared by the vast majority of the population.

The key elements of this vision are as follows.

- Russia ought to be restored as a great power – at least as a regional if not global power. This is one of the top priorities, if not priority number one.
- Russia has no friends. Neither the East nor the West – in particular – can be trusted. Nobody wants to see Russia healthy and strong. A multi-polar world is therefore a political precondition for the Russian resurgence as a great power.

That is why Russia must put its stakes on multipolarity.

- One of the key political preconditions for the Russian re-emergence as a great power is the active use of two of the basic tools of influence available to the country today – its oil/gas resources and military technologies (the reason why these sectors ought to be under tight government control).
- In a multi-polar world, Russia should avoid aligning itself politically (institutionally) either with the traditional centres of the 20th century civilisation (the USA and Europe) or with the emergent centres of the 21st century (China and India). It ought to attempt to balance between them while playing the role of a ‘bridge’ between the two, thus exerting its influence on all of them. In this manner, it can maintain its key position in the global political processes and shield itself from possible attempts made by the West or China to subordinate (control) it.
- The main opponent of multipolarity at present is the US, which aspires to maintain its position as the ‘one and only’ superpower. The main focus should therefore be on cooperation with the East and with the anti-American circles in Europe.

In terms of the above-mentioned two-dimensional space, this vision could be described as one of ‘great power’ + a mix of ‘isolationism’ and ‘Western/Oriental non-isolationism’. Two other views also exist that are marginalised and weak, though more alive than dead:

- great power + Westernism: popular among a relatively small group of members of the political elite and some intellectuals.
- ‘Just another country’ + Westernism: popular among consistent liberals (about 3 % of the Russian population) and some middle-aged people.

The dominant concept cannot be denied as holding a certain appeal. While conforming to deep-seated aspects of the traditional Russian world view, this holds a strong emotional rallying power. For example, it serves as an anaesthetic to public opinion, helping it cope with the rather painful disillusionment and inferiority complex brought on by the tribulations of the transition period. On the other hand, this concept has a number of weak points, the worst being its inadequacy in the context of contemporary Russian realities, i.e. the Russian domestic political context in the broader sense of the word.

Domestic Political Context

The trouble is that a goal of restoring Russia as a superpower – or at least as a great regional power – is not realistic because of the deep crises of human resources (population crises); a problem of obsolete and worn-out industrial equipment; very serious problems related to the Russia-China neighbourhood; direct geographical contacts with the areas producing Islamic radicalism etc.

The State of Human Resources

Materials circulating in the mass media warrant the conclusion that Russia is in the midst of a profound population crisis. The key components of this crisis are:

- a demographic crisis
- a crisis of the quality of labour resources
- a crisis of the quality of the ruling elite
- a moral crisis of society.

The Demographic Crisis

The Russian population is shrinking by roughly 750,000 persons annually.¹⁷² According to demographic forecasts, by the middle of the 21st century, the Russian population will have dropped from 144 million to approximately 100 million or less. The key factor behind the falling population in Russia is undoubtedly the falling birth rate. On that count, Russia does not differ significantly from Europe. According to UN experts, the average birth rate in the world per woman dropped from 6 children in 1972 to 2.9 in 2002. In Europe, that indicator is currently 1.4. In the next few decades, the population will therefore fall in practically all of the European countries. By 2050, there will be 25-40 % fewer people than today. Worldwide population growth will continue until 2050, whereupon it will begin to taper off.¹⁷³

However, the fact that the population dynamics in Russia on the whole correspond to the population dynamics in Europe and the world does not remove the problem of the demographic crisis. In this far-from-stable world, the expected drop in population does not detract from the geopolitical significance of such indicators as:

- the size of the population in a given country relative to the size of the population of its neighbours, partners and rivals;

172 Майкл Мейер, Малолюдное будущее Newsweek, № 18, 04-10 октября 2004, p. 46.

173 Ibid., p. 46.

- the density and evenness, or otherwise, of the distribution of the population over the country's territory; and
- the ratio of population size to the amount of natural resources located within the territory of a given country.

One can readily find historical examples of when these indicators led to bloody struggles for 'living space' and the 'development of new territories'. The dynamics of these indicators for Russia are unfavourable in the foreseeable future. Here is but one illustration: by the middle of the 21st century, the Russian territory, occupying 13 % of the world's total land surface and containing vast amounts of minerals and a significant part of the black soil area of the world, will be home to a mere one percent of the Earth's population, less than for example Iran or Japan.¹⁷⁴ It would also be erroneous to think that the shrinking population is a process whose negative impact on our society will only manifest itself in the 'abstract', long-term future. Unfortunately, the country will face the negative consequences of this process in the near future.

Demographic forecasts indicate that in 2004-2005, the number of people coming of working age will continue to exceed the number of people retiring. Beginning in 2007, however, the number of people entering the workforce will be much lower than those dropping out: the relatively small cohort born in the 1990s entering the labour market will be unable to compensate for the outflow of the older generation. In other words, the number of students, young workers and draftees in the Russian army will fall dramatically. The consequences of even the latter circumstance may be very serious; especially in the absence of military reform. Finally, the demographic crisis is not confined to the shrinking numbers; it has many other aspects, e.g. high mortality and poor health.

According to the Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences National Public Health Research Institute, Yevgenii Tishuk, the mortality rate in the working age bracket in Russia is seven times higher than in developed countries. The 'super mortality among men' is a characteristic feature of the country. The life expectancy of Russian men in 2003 was 58.5 years, i.e. 15-20 years less than in Europe (the corresponding figure for women was 72.9 years, which is 3-4 years less than in Europe). Infant mortality in Russia is three times higher than the non-preventable

174 "There are some respectable forecasts that by 2050 put Russia at the 18th place among the world's most populous nations, behind Iran and some of the African countries", Vishnevsky says. "Then it will hardly be able to hold on to one-seventh of the world's land mass with all its wealth. Europe will face similar problems, and there is no way to drastically change this situation." (А. Вишнеvский. Как и почему вымирает Россия. Политический класс, № 2, февраль 2005, стр. 48).

level. In the last five years, Russia has never risen higher than the 172nd out of 193 in terms of the prevalence of tuberculosis.¹⁷⁵ According to some highly authoritative assessments, 20-25 % of the Russian population suffers from various mental afflictions.¹⁷⁶ For my own part, I would like to add that such wide prevalence of mental disturbances cannot but influence – substantially – the psychological climate in society at large.

Furthermore, the AIDS situation is hardly any better: in the foreseeable future, an AIDS epidemic can become a major brake on economic growth or possibly even trigger a decrease in the Russian GDP in absolute terms. According to Vadim Pokrovsky, academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and head of the Federal AIDS Prevention and Control Center, “today Russia has the world’s highest AIDS growth rate”. The programme director of the Transatlantic Partners Against Aids (TPAA), Alek Khachatryan, offers the following comments on the World Bank forecast for the spread of AIDS in Russia: “Under some of the HIV epidemic-spread scenarios, its contribution to the decrease of the Russian GDP will amount to 4.5 % by 2010. Unless drastic steps are taken to slow down the spread of the disease, in 2020 GDP growth will be 10.5 % below that of today solely because of the rise in the HIV-positive numbers.”¹⁷⁷

Alcoholism in Russia became a national catastrophe over the course of the 20th century. In 1914, alcohol consumption in Russia was approximately 2.5 litres per capita per year. According to the World Health Organization, alcohol consumption of 8 litres per capita per year is critical to the health of a population. Meanwhile, various estimates indicate that the figure for Russia is now 12-15 litres per capita per year. According to various estimates, alcohol-related male mortality amounts to 30-50 % of the total mortality.¹⁷⁸ To all appearances, however, the problem of drug addiction is no less acute than that of alcoholism.¹⁷⁹

175 «Человеческий ресурс и конкурентоспособность России в XXI веке». Совместное заседание Клуба «Открытый форум» и Ассоциация менеджеров. Москва, июнь 2004. ISBN 5-902500-07-9, p. 29-31.

176 See for example an interview of T. Dmitriyeva, Director of the Serbsky Center of Social and Forensic Psychiatry to a newspaper «Век» (№ 14, 2001, 6-12 апреля) and data of the all-Russia scientific-practical conference “Psychology and Psychotherapy. Psychotherapy of Children, Teenagers and Adults: Current Status and Outlook” held in 2002, www.strana.ru/print/109734.html.

177 RBC Daily, March 30, 2005.

178 Radio Liberty, *Время и мир*, August 9, 2005.

179 According to V. Khvorostyan, responsible for the Moscow drugs control authority, Russia now has roughly six million drug addicts [about 4 % of the population – M.U.]. And the trafficking of narcotics into Russia is so great that Khvorostyan describes it as a genuine threat to national security (Radio Liberty, *Новости дня*, July 29, 2005, www.svoboda.org/hotnews/2005/07/29/17.asp).

One of the more respected Russian demographers, N.M. Rimashevskaya, believes that over the past several decades in Russia, each successive generation has had a smaller health potential than the previous one.¹⁸⁰ These concurrent processes can be summarised in a succinct and chilling phrase: *the physical and psychological degradation of the Russian population*. The intensity of this degradation is largely exacerbated by the large-scale brain drain from Russia, which will be discussed in the next section.

Crisis of the Quality of Labour Resources

Russia has an acute shortage of skilled workers, technicians, nurses, and low-, medium- and high-level managers. The top managers of major Russian companies with whom I have spoken indicate that the lack of highly skilled workers jeopardises the expansion and modernisation of production, even for the most powerful private Russian corporations. The competition to attract qualified managerial personnel and qualified workers is becoming ever tougher. The practice of luring specialists away from rival companies has become widespread.

The shortage of skilled personnel is particularly acute in the public sector, where wages are much lower than in the private sector. Qualified personnel will become increasingly difficult to come by, primarily because of the continuation of a massive brain-drain. This applies to all working-age people who feel that they can compete in the labour markets in developed countries.

Another reason for the growing shortage of qualified human resources in Russia is the deterioration of the quality of the secondary and higher education. The ‘brilliance’ of the graduates of Russian secondary schools turns out to be no more than a myth. An OECD study in 32 countries places Russia in 29th place in terms of the literacy and math proficiency of its high school students. A survey of 2,000 students in Moscow carried out by the Russian Education Academy’s Education Sociology Center has shown that 40 % of the fifth-year students consider their knowledge to be superficial.¹⁸¹

However, the problem is not only about knowledge, but about deeper attitudes to life. Professor S. Myasoyedov, the Vice President of the Russian Business Education Association, notes that “our higher education continues to mass produce personnel basically for a planned rather than a market economy ... Its graduates are those who

180 N.M. Rimashevskaya’s remarks in the Nikitsky Club, March 16, 2005.

181 “Человеческий ресурс ...”, p. 18.

angrily demand from the state: 'Give us a job, guarantee stable wages' ... Those graduates who are active and enterprising and manage to prosper in a new life actually challenge the social ideals and values that had been drummed into their heads by the traditional academic system ...¹⁸²

The factors that have made Russian education what it is are too many to be enumerated, but some of them are undoubtedly economic. According to some estimates, Russia spends approximately 2.9 % of its GDP on education, as compared with 4-5 % in developed countries. In absolute figures, this means that by Western standards, Russian education is annually under-funded to the tune of some 8.5 billion dollars.¹⁸³ However, it is obvious that if a 'magic wand' were to make 8.5 billion dollars rain down on Russian education, it would not dramatically improve the quality of education; partly because of the lack of professional managers capable of spending money effectively, and partly because the quality of teachers in secondary schools and higher education institutions has become anything but brilliant over the years. As V. Sobkin, a member of the Russian Education Academy, states, they think of themselves as second-rate people and many of them are steeped in authoritarian traditions regarding education and upbringing.¹⁸⁴

On the strength of the above, the task of improving the quality of Russian education – education as a whole and not individual schools and universities – does not lend itself to a quick and easy solution. It would most likely require at least 15-20 years, even under the most favourable conditions. Whether we will have 'the most favourable conditions' over such a prolonged period is a question to which I have no answer.

Crisis of the Quality of the Ruling Elite

One of the key factors enabling any country to be competitive and survive is obviously the existence of a high quality, i.e. highly educated, professional and morally

182 Ibid., p. 27.

183 Ibid., p. 15.

184 A good illustration of Sobkin's remarks about the persevering authoritarian tradition in our higher learning can be found in a recent article written by Prof. A.I. Vdovin of the Moscow University History Department (chair of the 20th-21st Russian history); commenting on Stalin's 'struggle against cosmopolitanism,' Vdovin says that "from today's perspective the struggle that was being waged at the time looks quite justified and its lessons quite relevant to our period." (Вдовин А.И. «Национальный вопрос и национальная политика в годы великой отечественной войны 1941-1945 годов: мифы и реалии (часть 3) // Представительная власть – XXI век: законодательство, комментарии, проблемы. 2005, выпуск № 3 (63), с.5).

healthy ruling elite. It is equally obvious that the present ruling elite in Russia falls far short of such requirements.

The present-day political elite are generally characterised by contempt for the law, lack of respect for property and a hostile attitude to the economic elite. For example, the authorities wish to prevent any unsanctioned involvement of big business in politics (even if such participation conforms to methods universally accepted in stable democracy), and massive attempts at redistributing property in favour of groups and individuals that are close to the authorities have been documented in recent years.

By no means the only example of the warfare waged by the political elite against the economic elite – but perhaps amongst the most scandalous – are the twists and turns in the ‘YUKOS-Khodorkovsky case’, a case signalling the formation in Russia of a system of state-business relations characteristic of stagnant countries and marked by a continuous redistribution of property, with each new cycle initiated by the new group coming to power. The YUKOS case undermined whatever trust the Russian business community still had in the authorities, and especially in the judicial system, causing many Russian businessmen to abandon long-term investment programs and triggering the flight of capital from the country.

Another consequence of the attitude of the ruling elite to the legal system, private property and business is widespread corruption, which has assumed a scope that may be deadly for society and continues to grow. According to the INDEM foundation, the extent of the ‘corruption tax’ on the economy is now roughly 35 billion dollars annually, which is more than 10 % of the national GDP. According to a Transparency International Report for 2004, Russia ranks 90th out of 145 countries worldwide in terms of corruption. In 2005, the country fell further to 126th place.¹⁸⁵

The intensity and mechanisms of renewal of the ruling elite also leave something to be desired. The ruling elite in Russia is becoming more closed and is ageing. The influx of new people is diminishing constantly. The influx that continues is based pri-

185 http://www1.transparency.org/cpi/2005/dnld/media_pack_russian.pdf. It would be incorrect to place the blame for corruption exclusively on the top echelons of power. These problems are just as widespread at the middle and lower levels of the civil service. It is also debatable whether corruption in “high places” or in “low places” poses a greater danger to Russia. World experience shows that fighting corruption at the lower levels of government takes much more time than fighting it at the higher levels. “Grassroots” corruption hits small and medium business, i.e. those sectors of the economy which are the most important for effectively combating unemployment and poverty.

marily on personal loyalty to one or another power group and much less on professionalism, intelligence and integrity, in the opinion of O. Kryshtanovskaya, one of the most competent students of the Russian elite and Director of Applied Politics Institute.¹⁸⁶

It would have been naive, however, to expect post-communist Russia to have a higher quality elite than it has. The consequences of the 'elitocide' that took place during the Bolshevik revolution and later under the Soviet regime cannot be undone overnight. The only thing that can be said with confidence is that it will take at least two generations to overcome the present crisis; if indeed it is possible to overcome such a crisis at all.

The Moral Crisis of Society

I think Russian society has been in a profound state of moral crisis for at least a century. In the early 20th century, it took a turn for the worse and became one of the main causes of the collapse of the Russian empire and the subsequent emergence and strengthening of a communist totalitarian system in Russia which, in turn, deepened the crisis. The collapse of the Soviet regime and the social and economic problems it entailed understandably aggravated the situation. To lend from medical terminology, it transferred the moral crisis from a chronic to an acute form.

The atmosphere in contemporary Russia is marked by a profound mistrust among people; mistrust of collective actions and social institutions, including power institutions. Russian society is more atomised and egotistic than the so-called 'Western society'. The weakness of civil society structures in Russia, for example, is caused not only by the mentality of the elite, but also by the attitudes prevalent among 'rank-and-file' citizens.

The work ethic could have been better, to put it mildly. The honouring of obligations and simply a diligent attitude to work exist to a lesser degree than that required by modern organisations and production technologies. The mentality of achievement and personal initiative in Russian society is much less prevalent than the 'don't-stick-your-neck-out' attitude. The desire to work hard and earn good money is far from the norm – the more common attitude is to earn modestly, but not to 'over-work'. Stealing and corruption are perceived by the Russians as 'natural' and unavoid-

186 «Человеческий ресурс...», стр. 19.

able aspects of daily life.¹⁸⁷ Respect for private property, law and privacy – just like ecological awareness – are exceptions rather than the rule.

The views on economics are predominantly ‘anti-market’. A national survey conducted by the Expertise Foundation in 2004 has revealed that 70-75 % of Russians believe that “such key sectors such as energy, coal, oil, railways, etc. must be state-owned” and that “foreign capital should not be allowed into these sectors, otherwise Russia may lose its independence.” Half of the respondents see Russia’s strength in the fact that “working for the state has always been more highly regarded in this country than working for oneself.” Roughly 70 % of the respondents believe that “the state is obliged to guarantee a decent job and a decent living standard for every person.” Only 28 % have expressed the opposite opinion, that “the state should take care of only those who are really unable to work, that is, old folks, children and invalids.”

The views on politics and morality are dominated by authoritarian attitudes. In the above-mentioned survey by Expertise Foundation, the proposition that tougher punishment is an effective instrument for crime control and that under certain circumstances it is okay to keep a person in jail without trial was shared by 73-75 % of respondents. More than 60 % of the respondents affirmed that “this country needs not so much laws and political programmes as strong and energetic leaders who have popular trust”¹⁸⁸ and that “it is right to have public executions of terrorists”. Approximately 50 % of all Russians believe that “the President must be the all-powerful master of the land, only then do we have a chance”, and that “in Russia, people should be afraid of the authorities, otherwise they will have no respect for them”, “that those who hinder the president in the pursuit of his policy have no place in this country” and that “the most important job of the law enforcement bodies is to stop crime, even if it involves violating the rights of the accused”. Patriotism is often no more than compensation for the inferiority complex and therefore acquires perverted forms of aggressive nationalism and xenophobia. Some more results of the Expertise Foundation survey: 60 % of all respondents agree with the statement that “Russia should be feared if it is to be respected.” About as many people said they would like to limit the number of “people from the Caucasus” living in Russia. The share of those saying that “national minorities wield too much power in this country”

187 «Диагностика российской коррупции: социологический анализ», www.anti-corr.ru - 2.3.1. Взятка: кто виноват?

188 This and the following quotes are extracted from: М.Урнов, В. Касапара. Современная Россия: вызовы и ответы. М.: “Экспертиза”, 2005, pp. 46-65

and that the influence of Jews in various departments of public life should be limited has exceeded 40 %.

According to one of the more knowledgeable Russian experts on nationalism, Emil Payin, “political radicalism in the Russian regions is also on the rise. I talk about radicalism feeding on support for the slogan ‘Russia is for the Russians’. The share of the supporters of this idea has not gone below 53 % since 2000, occasionally rising as high as 61 %. The growth of organised groups professing patently fascist ideas is unprecedented and without parallel in the world history of the 20th century. Over the past couple years [2003-2004] their numbers have been doubling every year, and may be as high as 50-60,000 today. Since most of them reside in a few large cities, it can be assumed that in the near future their numbers will be quite comparable with those of the law enforcers serving in the same cities.”¹⁸⁹

As is frequently the case, the rise of authoritarian sentiments and nationalism is accompanied by growing apathy in politics and the economy. To expect that the moral crisis will be quickly overcome if “the people rally around the nation’s leader” (the mantra among some ‘nationally oriented’ experts) would be as naive as to hope that the quality of the ruling elite will quickly improve. Unfortunately, these are generational processes. They may, of course, be accelerated, but only between generations, e.g. by attempting to ensure that they extend for two or three generations as opposed to four or five generations.

Other Problems

One can discuss the population crisis endlessly. However, the above must suffice to draw the following conclusions:

- without overcoming this crisis, Russia is unlikely to be competitive by the standards of the 21st century,
- to overcome it, we need massive investments in human capital over a long period of time: in education, the social sphere, the Internet, roads, etc., much more massive investments than is the case today.

The question is whether we can afford to make such investments over the next 15-20 years. To answer the question, let us see which other major expenditures we will have

189 Payin, Emil: Remarks at the Open Forum meeting on “Ukraine and Russia: Political Regime Development Forecasts”, April 12, 2005, www.open-forum.ru.

to incur in the foreseeable future, provided, of course, we seek to become a competitive nation. Let me name just the most necessary and 'inevitable' expenditure items. First, bringing down the level of poverty, i.e. a rise in the overall income level (particularly for those working in the public sector). Secondly, massive renewal of production assets – 60-70 % of which are outdated and worn out physically, according to specialists.¹⁹⁰ Thirdly, ecological security, i.e. building reliable disposal sites for nuclear and other toxic waste, chemical weapons disposal facilities, dealing with discarded nuclear submarines, etc.

Fourth, the fight against terrorism, which merits further attention. One needs hardly argue that Russia, like all the countries in the Northern hemisphere, is engaged in a life-or-death struggle against an enemy which, according to the Strategic Assessments and Analysis Institute President A.V. Konovalov, represents a flexible 'network organisation' against which modern armies are powerless. The danger of this war for Russia is multiplied by the concatenation of four circumstances:

- Monstrous corruption, which (as highlighted by the terrorist acts in 2004 and numerous experiments staged by journalists and FSB workers) enables terrorists, for a very modest bribe, to carry explosives and travel anywhere.
- The presence in Russia of Muslim enclaves in which radical Islamism has been 'working' long and vigorously by attempting to influence them and drag them into the 'war of civilisations'. In some of these enclaves, this 'work' is greatly facilitated by the traditional ethnic complexities.
- The rise of Russian nationalism, which is ceasing to be confined to day-to-day life and acquires the features of an aggressive, intolerant ideology with a religious tinge.
- The interminable war in Chechnya, which is gradually involving other Caucasian territories, claims the lives of peaceful citizens in Chechnya and Russian servicemen and is a powerful stimulus for corruption and nationalism in Russia.

Time will tell whether we will be able to effectively fight terrorism. The circumstances of the Beslan tragedy provide few grounds for optimism. In the long term, however, this is a question of resources: financial, political, moral, etc. Obviously, a prolonged fight against mounting terrorism will inevitably increase spending on the security structures (special services, protection of numerous sensitive facilities, etc.).

190 N. Savelyev: Speech at the meeting of the Open Forum Club on the topic: "The European Union and the CIS. Prospects of Interaction", October 27, 2004, www.open-forum.ru.

In other words, it will call for the redistribution of the national financial resources in favour of 'guns' at the expense of 'butter'. It is likewise clear that if the country responds to terror by introducing authoritarian methods of administration, such redistribution will be particularly drastic and most probably extremely ineffective.

Finally, the fifth necessary expenditure item is the modernisation of the army. The problem of modernising the Russian armed forces, which is already acute, takes on added relevance in the light of the 'China factor'. China is known to have territorial claims to the Russian Far East.¹⁹¹ It is equally well known that there are currently roughly 8 million people in the Russian areas bordering China, while the population of the Chinese areas bordering on Russia is about 300 million. Perhaps a little less well known is the fact that a significant share of the 8 million are mixed families in which the father is Chinese and the mother is Russian, and that these families, unlike 'purely' Russian families, have many children, do not typically abuse alcohol and are good workers. It is also well known that the PRC leadership has committed itself to taking control over all of the Chinese communities across the world. In A. Vishnevsky's opinion: "After the war, China's population was 500 million. Today it is 1.3 billion – almost ten times as many as we have. But when we have 100 million and they are close to 1.5 billion, the ratio will be catastrophic, especially in view of the fact that the Asian part of Russia is depopulated."¹⁹² A. Konovalov thus describes the situation on the Russian-Chinese border: "It is the situation of a melting pot separated by a membrane. There is a growing vacuum in one half while the pressure is building up in the other half. When and how the membrane will break depends on the quality of the membrane, but it will break anyway."¹⁹³

But when and how will the 'membrane break'? Given the current rate of decline of the indigenous population in Russia and the growth of the Chinese community in our Far East, as well as the present rate of China's economic and military growth, I think that an aggravation of Russian-Chinese relations, if not an actual clash, is highly probable over the course of the next 15-20 years. I might be accused of exaggerating the danger and fear-mongering. Not true. Stated simply, if there is even a remote probability of conflict, one must be ready for it. As the wise Romans said, *si vis pacem, para bellum*.

191 Personally, I hold that the signing of a border treaty would camouflage rather than resolve this problem. The view of the Far East as traditionally Chinese land taken away from the country when it was weak is rooted in Chinese culture. The signing of the treaty will merely push this view into the background, but not altogether remove it. It can easily re-emerge in one way or another in other circumstances and manifest itself in politics.

192 А. Вишневский. Как и почему вымирает Россия. Политический класс, № 2, февраль 2005, p. 47.

193 «Человеческий ресурс...», p. 11.

Instead of being frightened, let us calmly consider the extent to which Russia can compete with China in the military sphere, at least as regards defence spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), one of the most prestigious security research centres in the world, total Russian defence spending is about one-third of that of China.¹⁹⁴ In other words, to secure itself against a possible conventional armed conflict with China, Russia, if it expects to be able to counter the threat single-handedly, ought to invest at least as much in its defence as China – and most probably more – in view of the massive superiority in terms of manpower of the ‘potential adversary’.

However, some experts say that a military clash between Russia and China is impossible, as both are nuclear powers and the conflict between them would assume the form of mutual nuclear deterrence rather than conventional warfare. This deterrence will be practiced as China will intensively expand into Russia and the FSU Asian republics economically and through migration, with a very real prospect of bringing a considerable part of Russian territory under its de facto control. Here is what one of Russia’s foremost scholars of China, V.G. Gelbras, has to say about China’s peaceful expansion:

- “[we] got hold of a Chinese plan that was considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as an important idea [...] The plan was to arrange for the infusion of Chinese through the Amur Oblast across Russian territory, thus exercising influence by controlling the mass of goods, concentrating goods at key points along the Trans-Siberian Railroad all the way to Moscow. Irkutsk was important to the Chinese, because it simultaneously controlled the movement of goods and people from Kazakhstan and into the Altai area, and also covered Buryatia. [...] It is now clear that there is another similar plan that provides for infiltration through Heihe towards Blagoveshchensk and through Suifenhe towards the Amur Oblast and on. Heihe and Suifenhe are large population centres. The plan provides for the inflow of both migrants and goods.”
- “China is seeking the early conversion of the SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organization] into a single integrated economic space. For China, the SCO is a tool for economically winning back those territories, which it considers to

194 In 2002, in terms of the purchasing power parity of currencies, Russian military spending stood at about 11 billion dollars versus 31 billion dollars in China. By comparison, India's spending was 13 billion dollars, Britain's, 36, Japan's 47 and America's, 336 billion. *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*. Appendix 6A, Tables of Military Expenditure.

have regarded as one of its possessions in the past, i.e. the expanses all the way to Lake Balkhash. No one in China makes a secret of that – gaining a foothold where they were in the past, asserting themselves in the Far East, in the entire Primorsky Krai and on Sakhalin. The Chinese believe it is their territory, just as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are. You must agree that Chengiz Khan, proclaimed as all but the father of the nation, was buried, according to legend, somewhere close to Lake Baikal.”¹⁹⁵

This less apocalyptic scenario of Russian-China relationships does not relieve Russia of the need to build up its military expenditure to maintain and develop its strategic and tactical nuclear forces – at least for the purpose of not finding itself under full control of its ‘big south-east brother’.

In other words, as in the case of terrorism, the existence of the ‘China factor’ confronts Russia with the notorious ‘guns or butter’ dilemma, with the odds stacked heavily against ‘butter’.

Scenarios for Russia’s Future

One of Russia’s strategic goals for the coming decade is to double the country’s GDP. Leaving aside the debate as to whether this is a feasible goal, it is questionable whether this growth is sufficient to simultaneously ensure the required volume of investments in all of the above areas? Unfortunately, the answer is more likely to be ‘no’ than ‘yes’.

According to some economic forecasts, a break between Russian and Chinese GNP will sharply increase in the decades to come.¹⁹⁶ This means that merely solving one problem – achieving parity for military spending with China – will require the increase of Russian defence spending on a scale exceeding all of the conceivable opportunities in the Russian economy.

195 «Новая газета», № 47 (04.07.2005) and № 49 (11.07.2005).

196 I will cite one estimate: according to a forecast made by a well-known American student of the Russian economy, Steven Rosefield, China’s GDP was 55% of America’s in 2000, whereas Russia’s GDP merely amounted to 10 % of that. In 2050, the respective figures will be 206 and 5 % (Rosefield disclosed his estimates when presenting his book about *Russia in the 21st Century: The Prodigal Superpower*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, at the Higher School of Economics on March 18, 2005). In other words, if Rosefield’s estimates are correct, the gap between the GDP of Russia and China, currently amounting to 5.5 times, will grow to 41 times by the mid-century.

If one adds the concerns relating to radical Islamism and international terrorism (for not to mention all of the other circumstances) to the 'China factor', it becomes plain to see that one can hardly expect a significant increase in the share of state expenditures on education, healthcare and other spheres in which the quality of the human resource directly depends. In other words, Russia does not have enough resources of its own to pursue a large-scale and comprehensive national policy aimed at overcoming the population crisis. Moreover, such resources are unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Russia may consequently find itself in a dangerous trap: a lack of adequate spending on overcoming the population crisis will lead to continuing deterioration of the quality of human resources, diminishing competitiveness and security of Russia, growing costs of maintaining security. This will subsequently lead to a gradually accelerating process of degradation of the human resources, to a fall of Russian competitiveness and lower levels of security ... I need hardly speak about the implications of this process.

It seems to me as though such a situation does not allow taking seriously an idea of the revival of the country as a Great Power. In other words, on one of the axes of geopolitical paradigms, the country has only one option: 'just a civilised country'. However, the Great Power notion is now dominant in the Russian political class. So let us consider it a little more attentively.

'Great Power Restoration' Approach

The most consistent adherents to the idea of the restoration of the great power believe that this goal is achievable on the basis of an isolationism and mobilisation of the 'state will'. I strongly doubt that this is an adequate solution to the problem. First, however strong 'state will' may be, Russia's own resources will never be adequate. Second, Russia already had some experience with the application of 'state will' under the communist regime, which dismally failed on the grounds that Soviet 'state will' exhausted the country's human resource to such an extent that it now must be nourished back to normal rather than mobilised. The natural resources have also proved finite, and their development without any concern for efficiency became impossible way back in the Soviet period. Third, building tank factories is no longer on the agenda; rather, what is now important is taking Russian society into the post-industrial age of development, which cannot be achieved by 'state will'. That which is necessary for Russia to accomplish this aim is not 'state will', but free individual creativity and private initiative. Fourth, 'state will' in a state that is corrupt means a will to steal

rather than build, and nothing good will come out of its application. Moreover, if this 'will' is compounded by the aggressive, high-sounding nationalism that is often professed by its supporters, the implementation of this project will bring about the break-up of the country; and very rapidly, at that.

The 'Western/Orient non-isolationism' strategy can also hardly be regarded as a suitable means for the restoration of great power. The idea of leaving the country experiencing deep systemic crisis alone between two competing giants – China and the West – seems quite dubious. Among other things, maintaining an equal distance from East and West does not resolve the problem of China's territorial claims to Russia, but converts it into rivalry between 'the West' and China over Russian territory.

'Just another Country' Approach

If the restoration of the 'Great Power' notion seems somewhat utopian, the prospect of the transformation of Russia into a normal civilised country with a sufficient standard of living appears realistic. In order to achieve this, however, it is necessary – as a first step – to recognise one obvious fact (as painful it is for the Russian consciousness): Russia will be unable to work out adequate solutions to its problems single-handedly. These problems are too numerous, serious and resource-consuming for any single country. The snag is not merely the constraints on the Russian financial resources: in order to modernise comprehensively and more or less rapidly, Russia requires long-term partners, not just for doing business, but also to address problems pertaining to security and culture (e.g. introduction of state-of-the-art managerial culture, work culture, the culture of corruption-free relations, etc.). In other words, Russia has a vital interest in strategic allies.

It is important to understand, however, that alliances in today's world are only possible on the basis of a solid economic foundation, i.e. with the broadest possible attraction of an ally's capital to Russia. We can hardly hope that Russia will forge defence or some other military or political alliances from scratch without a sound economic base. The world is pragmatic, and an ally will help defend only that which furthers its own interests; the more practical the interests, the more energetic the ally's efforts.

In practice, this implies that the country must foster an attractive investment climate, adopt transparent and stable laws, introduce low and stable taxes and guarantees regarding property rights, improve the judicial system and adopt behaviour patterns

vis-à-vis business that conform to clear-cut and sensible rules and commonly recognised norms of decency. Today, this would involve a revolution in the minds of the country's ruling elite.

Now a fundamental question: who can be the best strategic ally for Russia? The spectrum of possible choices is not rich. There are only two possible answers: the West or China. Let us start with 'the West', i.e. with the community of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic civilisation plus Japan. I regard this option as optimal. The reasons why are as follows. First, 'the West' has always been culturally akin to Russia. Of course, the impending cultural transformations in the US and Europe will provide an entirely new dimension to our proximity with 'the West' as compared with the present day. Nevertheless, I dare say that in spite of all the expected change, the Euro-Atlantic civilisation will remain closer to Russia than, say, Islamic or Chinese civilisation, at least on the strength of a shared cultural past and the common cultural eclectics of the present.

Second, an alliance with 'the West' would provide Russian society with a sufficiently strong 'liberal inoculation', which, I think, is badly needed in order to destroy a strong authoritarian syndrome entrenched both among the elites and in the mass mentality and constituting a major brake on modernisation.

Third, because 'the West' has an interest in a stable Russia, both as a source of energy and as an ally in the fight against the shared threat of Islamic extremism, as well as a country separating the Euro-Atlantic civilisation from China.

Finally, neither Europe nor the USA has an interest in the disintegration of Russia in view of its huge stockpiles of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as atomic power plants, chemical works, etc. Meanwhile, it would be naive to hope that Russia could become a part of NATO or the EU in the foreseeable future. There are many reasons why this is the case, and this is hardly the place to discuss them. I will therefore limit myself to stating this fact and merely add that the only possible form of integration with the Euro-Atlantic world in these circumstances is an interlocking of investment flows with subsequent expansion of the cooperation in the securing common economic complex.

Of course, influential interest groups in Europe and the USA remain that are committed to Cold War stereotypes. There are people with a gut hatred for Russia; people who would welcome its break-up. Fortunately, however, they do not set the tone,

making only a number of discordant noises. It is likewise clear that the political and economic elites of 'the West' have not been raised in monasteries and view world politics in terms of competition, domination, overpowering and the like. Of course, win-win strategies are taught in all management colleges, but they are yet to become the prevalent style of behaviour in both business and politics. This makes the above goal more difficult – but not impossible – to attain. Strictly speaking, it would be wrong for Russia to blame the West for that, because we ourselves are little different – and we can hopefully come to terms for that precise reason. Strategic partnership with 'the West' is therefore not a utopia; making it reality depends on Russia at least by half.

Now China. In Russian experts' community discussions, a theme of a 'Chinese option' sounds increasingly fatalistic. A number of Russian political scientists believe that the spread of Chinese influence (and perhaps the institutionalisation of Chinese control over Russian territories from the Far East to the Urals) over the next two or three decades is virtually inevitable, but that this is not a bad thing. They argue that China, with its imperial culture dating back many centuries, is wisely tolerant of the lifestyles of the minorities it dominates. Therefore, strategic rapprochement followed by the highly probable merger of a part of Russia with China will provide Russia much-needed stability and involvement with the main focus of economic growth in the 21st century.

Most Probable Trajectory

It is difficult to say at present which of the options we will choose (or get). Unlike long-term demographic forecasts, long-term political predictions seldom come true. Thus far, the choice largely depends on the acceptability of one response or another to the Russian elites and public opinion. In the not so distant future, however, it will be determined more by circumstances than by our preference.

If we project our current development trends into the future, the 'Just another country – Westernism' scenario seems the least likely, whereas the more probable options are the 'Western/Oriental non-isolationism' scheme evolving into the 'Chinese' scenario, or the 'great power-isolationistic' scenario evolving into the 'Chinese' scenario, or a mix of the 'Western/Oriental non-isolationism' and 'Isolationism' options, again ending in the 'Chinese' model.

One of the key factors facilitating the realisation of the 'Chinese' scenario is the fact that China is not preoccupied with human rights issues, private property protection problems, corruption problems etc. In the eyes of a very influential part of the

Russian political elite, the strategic alliance with China therefore holds strong competitive advantages. In the longer run, however, this scenario will render Russia a 'little brother' of a Great China.

In the end, life is more complex than any of our visions, let alone forecasts. So let's wait and see (if we live that long, as the pessimists like to joke!)

Russian Views on the Wider Europe Concept

ALEXANDER SERGOUNIN

There was a recent dramatic change both in Russia's perceptions of the EU and the EU-Russia relations. Two major factors forced Moscow to reassess its relations with Brussels. First, the 2004 EU enlargement has drastically changed both situation inside the EU and Union's relations with Moscow. Particularly, Russia is anxious about the possibility of emergence of a 'newcomers' club' which could be formed by countries that are not entirely friendly towards Russia (the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, etc.). Moscow blames newcomers for the lack of the progress in the EU-Russia dialogue on economy, trade, visa regime, transportation, Kaliningrad, etc.

Second, the adoption of the ENP by the EU in May 2004 marked another radical change in Brussels' policy towards Russia. The ENP brings about a lot of changes in the EU's relations with its new neighbours, including Russia.

Although the Russian foreign policy and academic communities were in general favourable to the prospects of cooperation with the EU they were quite sceptical about the ENP specifically.

First of all, both official Moscow and the Russian foreign policy schools (regardless the IR paradigm) were unhappy with the universalist approach of the ENP to the EU's cooperation with its neighbours. The scale of the EU-Russia cooperation and its importance for the European international relations subsystem are much greater than those with other neighbouring countries. For this reason, Russia does not understand why it should be treated in the same way as Moldova or Morocco and, instead, claims a special status and special relationship with Brussels.

Moscow is also discontented with the ENP because – in contrast with other regional/subregional co-operative projects (e.g. the NDI) – it leaves almost no room for Russia in setting the bilateral co-operative agenda. The concept is rather based on the assumption that the EU's neighbours should simply accept its rules of the game and

upgrade their legislation in accordance with European standards, rather than the EU developing specific models for each country. To overcome these shortcomings, Russian experts suggest that the ENP should be made more differentiated in order to take into account the peculiarities of each neighbouring country (including Russia) and also of particular regions (e.g., northern Europe). In short, the Russian foreign policy schools believe that in developing the Wider Europe initiative, the innovative elements of the existing projects (such as the NDI) should not be discarded.

To some extent, the EU has acknowledged the need for a more differentiated neighbourhood policies by putting forward a four EU-Russia common spaces initiative (economy, trade and environment; internal security; external security; research, education, culture). At the May 2005 EU-Russia Summit four roadmaps to the common spaces have been adopted.¹⁹⁷ Although Moscow had refused to join the ENP Russia has recently joined its financial instrument (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument) that should replace the existing programs (TACIS, TEMPUS, INTER-REG, etc.).

The Russian foreign policy schools are satisfied with the fact that the concept of the EU-Russia four common spaces somehow provides Moscow with a special status and reflects Russia's concerns on the initial version of the ENP. It also represents a more systemic and better co-ordinated approach to the EU-Russia cooperation. The four spaces also have a clearer set of priorities for such cooperation than previous documents. For example, the roadmap on the Common Economic Space (CES) quite logically suggests to start its creation from harmonisation and approximation of the EU and Russian economic legislation and standards. This could be a solid (and necessary) basis for further enhancement of the EU-Russia economic cooperation. Moscow is also satisfied with the linkage of all roadmaps with the need to ensure a greater freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital. Without these four freedoms (4Fs) the EU-Russia common spaces could become only empty declarations and the entire project hardly could be implemented.

197 Commission of the European Communities: *The Four Final Roadmaps to the EU-Russia Common Spaces*, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2005.

At the same time, many Russian experts are rather critical about the roadmaps. The critical comments boil down to the following arguments:

- First, the roadmaps still lack a detailed program and specific timetable how to implement these ambitious plans. They often look more like a declaration of intentions rather than such a program. To become real roadmaps detailed schedules and programs should be developed.
- One more concern is that it remains unclear how the ENP matches – in conceptual and institutional terms – the EU-Russia initiative on the development of 4Fs and four common spaces. As mentioned, Russia has rejected the ENP as such. But, on the other hand, the current EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) expires by the end of 2007. Will the ENP absorb the four freedoms/spaces concept when Russia signs a new agreement with the EU or will these two initiatives go separately?
- Moreover, both Moscow and Brussels are discontent with the slow progress in developing of specific common spaces. While CES and cooperation on research, education and culture develop rather dynamically, there is a lack of serious progress in two other common spaces – internal and external security.
- It is incomprehensible why the environmental issues are included to the first roadmap (CES). Given the magnitude of the ecological problems in Russia (and the existing EU-Russia co-operative experience in this field, e.g. the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, NDEP) it would be logical to put this problematique in a separate roadmap.
- A number of roadmaps' provisions look hardly feasible. For example, the roadmap no. 2 (internal security) suggests a soonest demarcation of the EU-Russia new borders. But in a view of the ongoing border conflicts between Russia, on the one hand, and Estonia and Latvia, on the other, this objective seems unrealistic. The same is true with the roadmap's suggestion to introduce (in the near future) for the Russian citizens improved international travel documents with biometric features. It is well-known that the Russian authorities feel difficulties even with providing Russian citizens with regular international passports. Likewise, calls on Russia to curb a rampant corruption and organised crime look very naive and unsubstantiated.
- The Kaliningrad Region which earlier (in the previous EU-Russia documents) had been considered as a potential 'pilot region' has not even been mentioned in the roadmaps. This questions the credibility of both the 'pilot project' concept and the EU-Russia eagerness to co-operate on Kaliningrad in real terms.

Coming back to the Russian assessments of the ENP it should be noted that Russian foreign policy schools (such as liberals and globalists) were concerned about the fact that this initiative is basically centralist in nature. They believe that the ENP may restrict region-to-region and cross-border cooperation in Eastern and Northern Europe. The emphasis in the ENP is clearly on the involvement of the EU and Russia at large, rather than of their regions.

In this context, it is important to note that regional cooperation in Europe should not be interpreted as an artificial top-down project. Instead, it should be understood as a bottom-up process with very lively grass roots and it is this that centralising tendencies in Russia and the EU threaten to undermine. In contrast, therefore, it can be argued that the best way to make a contribution to European regional cooperation is precisely to use the potential of the existing international networks of sub-national and non-governmental actors – rather than to bypass them via centralising initiatives such as the ENP. Instead, bottom-up actors should thus have an access to decision-making processes in the regional context and be treated in inclusive terms. According to Russian experts, whether the ENP will continue to support such proclamations is a matter for debate.

Russian liberals and globalists suggested that to maintain the regionalist nature of the existing and future projects Moscow and Brussels should give their local and regional entities the necessary leverage and means in order to enable their full-fledged participation in interregional and cross-border activities. These should not be seen as hampering, but as enriching national foreign policies.

Some Russian experts believe that it is important that attention should be paid not only to the 'reformist' Russian regions (such as St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Karelia and Kaliningrad), but also to regions with a relatively poor democratic record (Pskov, Murmansk, Archangel, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, Komi Republic, etc.).¹⁹⁸

In addition to increased cooperation between the EU and Russian regions, the most promising regional/subregional projects (such as the NDI) seems to require special financial facilities of its own. The aim should not just be one of creating synergies

198 Joenniemi, Pertti and Alexander Sergounin: *Russia and the European Union's Northern Dimension: Encounter or Clash of Civilisations?* Nizhny Novgorod: The Danish Institute for International Studies/Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University Press, 2003.

between existing EU policies, but to create a financial basis for specific region-related projects.

Moreover, Russian experts maintain, EU projects within specific areas should be co-ordinated with activities of other regional/subregional institutions (e.g., OSCE, Council of Europe, CBSS, BEAC, AC, Nordic Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, etc.) and the European Commission should be granted with sufficient powers to be able to co-operate with such bodies.¹⁹⁹

Russian experts also emphasise the need to use the experience and know-how of regional/subregional bodies as well as to establish an efficient division of labour among them, building on their respective competencies and geographical coverage, although in practice the implementation of such an idea could be difficult.

According to Russian specialists, at the first stage of implementation of the CES, a common regulatory mechanism in particular areas could be developed. Such a mechanism could include:

- Establish a regulatory dialogue, which includes a consultation mechanism. This dialogue could aim at enhanced transparency in the regulatory activity, exchange of information amongst regulators with the aim at promoting the gradual approximation of relevant legislation (including technical regulations) and practice for clearly identified priority industrial sectors of greatest mutual interest to be jointly defined;
- As soon as the priorities are determined, launch the work of gradual approximation of relevant legislation and practices;
- Identification of procedures for possible recognition of the results of conformity assessment of both sides, including certification of systems of quality and ecological management.

199 Ivanov, Igor: "Cooperation between the EU and Russia in the European North", in Marja Nissinen (ed.), *Foreign Ministers' Conference on the Northern Dimension, Helsinki, 11-12 November 1999. A Compilation of Speeches*, Unit for the Northern Dimension in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, 2000, pp. 7-9.

The Russian experts highlight the following sectors as a priority for the EU-Russia dialogue:

- ICT, Radio and Telecommunications Equipment
- Electrical Equipment and Machinery
- Medical devices
- Automotive industry
- Textiles
- Pharmaceuticals
- Forest-based and related industries
- Public procurement
- Intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights
- Investment
- Enterprise policy and economic dialogue
- Interregional and cross-border cooperation
- Financial services (banking, insurance, securities)
- Accounting/auditing and statistics
- Agriculture, forestry, timber, fisheries. Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures
- Environment

Some liberal-minded Russian experts believe that participation in selected EU activities and programs, including aspects, such as consumer protection, standards, environmental matters and research bodies, could be opened to some Russian regions (such as Kaliningrad) and then to the rest of Russia. For example, EU standards could be established for Kaliningrad-produced goods. A joint EU/Russia Standardisation Committee should also be created and efforts to support the further development of enterprise policy by Kaliningrad/Russia should accompany regulatory approximation.²⁰⁰ As mentioned, however, the EU-Russia Roadmap for the EU-Russia CES lacks this idea.

Some Russian experts even went as far as to suggest that Russia should accept some of the *acquis* (especially in areas such as economy, trade, banking, audit, transporta-

200 Ivchenko, Vladislav (ed.): *Economic Programming of the Development of the Exclave Region of Russia*, 2002 (in Russian); Anatoly P. Khlopetski, *A strategy of development of the Kaliningrad region as a 'pilot region' in the context of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union: international aspects of a regional strategy*, Kaliningrad, The Kaliningrad Branch of the All-Russian Co-ordination Council of Russian Industrialists, 2000 (in Russian); Andrei Klemeshev, Sergei Kozlov and Gennady Fyodorov, *The Island of Cooperation*, Kaliningrad, Kaliningrad State University Press, 2002 (in Russian).

tion, environment, ITs, higher education (Bologna process, etc.).²⁰¹ Of course, it should be done only in areas where Russia is ready to introduce European standards which do not contradict Russia's national interests.

According to some accounts, another step forward could be the creation of an EU-Russia Free Trade Area (FTA). This could be done both in parallel with and as a follow up to CES activities. A Free Trade Area is envisaged in the EU-Russia PCA, but no timetable has ever been attached to this. To implement this idea, objectives and benchmarks should be developed. In particular, this process could be started by concluding a free trade agreement with the Kaliningrad region and then replicating this experience to the rest of Russia. However, some Russian experts feel uneasy about this idea because it could lead to the erection of customs barriers between the *Oblast* and the rest of Russia, at least in the transitional period.²⁰² Moreover, the very idea of free/special economic zones which is linked to the FTA is not really compatible with the WTO regulations (to which Russia wants to joint). There is also a lot of difficulties with defining the rules of origins for mainland Russia- and Kaliningrad-produced goods.

Over the long run, upon the implementation of the CES and FTA projects the EU and Russia could think of creating a European Economic Area (EEA)-type arrangement that aims at the further harmonisation of European and Russian regulatory regimes. Again, Kaliningrad could be a pilot region in implementing such an ambitious project.

Many Russian experts (especially liberal institutionalists and globalists) call Moscow and Brussels to reinvigorate their dialogue on Kaliningrad. In particular, both Moscow and Brussels should give priority to actually making Kaliningrad a pilot region,²⁰³ rather than simply proclaiming it to be one. A number of suggestions have been made here. As mentioned, the Kaliningrad region could be the first (among Russia's regions) put into the context of the CES, FTA and EEA initiatives. Some experts suggest that the region should be provided with a *special status* within the Russian Federation. Moscow cannot treat the region similar to any inner/mainland territory. There is no need for Russia to give up completely its sovereignty over

201 Wellmann, Christian (ed.): *Support to Transforming Kaliningrad into a Pilot Region of EU-Russia Partnership*, Moscow/Kaliningrad, East-West Institute, 2005.

202 Fyodorov, Gennady and Yuri Zverev: *Personal communication*, April 30 2004.

203 The idea of Kaliningrad as a pilot region, a place for a joint EU-Russia cooperative experiment, was suggested by the then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at the EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki (1999).

Kaliningrad but, if Moscow wants to make the region a part of the European common space it should be provided with broader powers in the fields of foreign economic activities, taxation, property rights, customs formalities, border controls, consular services and so on. To provide such a status a Constitutional Law on the Kaliningrad Region should be passed by the federal centre.²⁰⁴

Russian specialists underline that to develop the EU-Russia cooperation and solve numerous problems in the bilateral relations a joint effort of various actors at different levels is needed. To date both Russia and the EU preferred to focus on the inter-governmental or supranational levels ignoring the role of the local government. A little attention is paid to this level both by decision-makers and academic community.²⁰⁵ Cooperation at the subnational level is underdeveloped. Meanwhile, it became a commonplace to ascertain that micro- and meso-levels are crucial for establishing horizontal networks and serve as a solid basis for the mechanism of interdependency. For example, the Euroregions project (based on the local government's engagement) is an important instrument for cooperation at the local level both within the EU and between the Union and its neighbours. As the European experience demonstrates, Euroregions is an efficient tool for solving transborder problems and overcoming socio-economic and cultural disparities between neighbouring regions. It could be a promising venue for subregional cooperation and promoting the 4Fs idea in Europe.

A number of Russian territories (such as Kaliningrad and Karelia) are involved in the Euroregions. For example, Kaliningrad Region's municipalities and counties partake in five Euroregions. Russian specialists note that despite some successful projects implemented within the Euroregions framework their overall results remain rather modest. Moreover, now the Euroregions are basically reduced to what common Russians call 'bureaucratic tourism', i.e. exchanges between municipal officials, and with rare exception (e.g., the Baltic Euroregion) do not promote economic cooperation and horizontal links at the people-to-people or NGO levels. Euroregions often duplicate each other and there is an unhealthy competition between them for fund-

204 Songal, Alexander: "Kaliningrad Oblast: towards a European dimension", in James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar and David Gowan (eds.) *The EU & Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the impact of EU enlargement*, Federal Trust, 2000, pp. 99-115.

205 Bilczak, V. S.: *Cross-border Economics*. Olsztyn, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Informatyki i Ekonomii, 2002; Klemeshev, Andrei: *The Russian Exclave in the Context of Globalization*, Kaliningrad, Kaliningrad State University Press (in Russian), 2004; Alevtina Vasilenko, "Euroregions with the Kaliningrad Region's participation as a pilot model for the use of the European transborder cooperation experience" (in Russian), http://www.auditorium.ru/aud/v/index.php?a=vconf&c=getForm&tr=thesisDesc&CounterThesis=1&cid_thesis=3011, 2004.

ing. Most of the Euroregions are unsustainable in terms of funding and heavily dependent support of either national or international donors. In other words, the Euroregions concept – being a potentially important tool for subregional cooperation – does not work properly.

To improve the situation and reinvigorate Euroregions with Russia's participation, experts suggest to make them, first of all, one of the locomotives of the EU-Russia cooperation on the CES/FTA business. While general rules are established at the national/supranational level, implementation of concrete projects should be done by local companies and governments. It is advisable that the creation of the CES and promotion of the 4Fs should become the main priority for the Euroregions.²⁰⁶

Russian specialists believe that Euroregions also can contribute to facilitation of movement of people and goods in Eastern and Northern Europe by building new and developing existing border crossings and transport infrastructure in the area. Currently local governments prefer to shoulder this responsibility on the federal budget. However, by providing local government with more powers in taxation, local authorities will feel themselves more responsible for this business, on the one hand, and get more funds for implementing projects, on the other.

It is also suggested that a better division of labour should be established between Euroregions. Some of them could keep its current specialisation on subregional economic planning, support of private entrepreneurship, environment protection and home and justice affairs, including fighting organised crime (the Baltic Euroregion, Karelia). Others could focus on cross-border trade and developing the transportation infrastructure (Saule Euroregion) or pay more attention to development of people-to-people contacts, education, culture and cooperation between NGOs (the Neman, Lyna-Lava and Sheshupe Euroregions). In addition, some of them (e.g., the Neman Euroregion) could focus on engaging Belarus (which is becoming an important priority for the ENP) in subregional cooperation. Border crossings development could be a joint sphere of responsibility for all Euroregions.

206 Vasilenko, Alevtina: "Euroregions with the Kaliningrad Region's participation as a pilot model for the use of the European transborder cooperation experience" (in Russian), http://www.auditorium.ru/aud/v/index.php?a=vconf&c=getForm&cr=thesisDesc&CounterThesis=1&cid_thesis=3011, 2004; Wellmann, Christian (ed.): *Support to Transforming Kaliningrad into a Pilot Region of EU-Russia Partnership*, Moscow/Kaliningrad, East-West Institute, 2005.

Russian experts underline that the very nature of the existing (semi-dormant) Euroregions should be changed. Not only municipal officials should be participants of exchange programs, other actors such as local businessmen, NGOs, journalists, students and teachers should be also involved. To strengthen cooperation within a Euroregion and its institutional basis joint structures – ventures, chambers of commerce, professional associations, NGOs, education institutions, etc. – should be developed. Local actors should not wait for Moscow's permission and should be more proactive and initiative-minded. By the way, even the current Russian legislation allows local actors to establish links with similar actors in foreign countries (the Russian Foreign Ministry only asks for information about these contacts, visits and joint projects). The main problems are the lack of finance and psychological inertia that was inherited from the Soviet time. However, with coming of a more sustainable economy and increase in living standards as well as overcoming the Soviet-type mentality (through civic activism and growing international contacts) these problems could be successfully solved.

According to Russian specialists, establishment of a proper legal basis for Euroregions should also be an important priority for Russia. Moscow ratified the European convention on border cooperation as late as 2003. Russia does not have border treaties with Latvia and Estonia and this hampers trans-boundary cooperation in the subregion. There is also a clear need to pass a federal law on Euroregions because not only Kaliningrad but also other Russian regions (Karelia, Murmansk, Pskov, etc.) experience difficulties in this area.

To conclude, despite the general critical attitude of Russian policy making and expert communities to the Wider Europe/ENP project, the Russian political discourse did not degenerate into an anti-European/xenophobic/chauvinistic debate. Rather, it is quite of a pro-European and creative/constructive character. Russian politicians and experts (of course, with some exceptions) criticise the ENP initiative in a way to suggest alternatives and recommendations how to improve this concept. They believe that there is an impressive co-operative agenda for the future of the EU-Russia relations. The most important thing is to design new conceptual approaches (including the ENP, four EU-Russia common spaces) in a way to draw lessons from the previous co-operative experience, make it more flexible and differentiated, suggest fresh ideas to solve existing problems and provide a further spur for EU-Russia bilateral relations.

Concluding Remarks: The Big Picture and the Small

PERTTI JOENNIEMI

Is there anything interesting underway in the European North with the region being more often than not viewed as peripheral, marginal and even remote? Does it make sense to argue that the North has frequently succeeded in gaining considerable subjectivity in the sphere of Europe-making during the post-Cold War period?

A number of scholars have come to the conclusion that there is indeed something significant underway in Europe's North. In the first place, the various actors of the region – above all the Nordics – were rather quick in capitalising the option of change that opened up with the end of the Cold War. Having been profoundly divided by the conflict between East and West with region-formation not even existing as an idea (with the exception of Nordic cooperation), the North has not merely caught up with the rest of Europe. It has, in fact, turned into one of the most regionalised parts of the continent. Borders, previously seen as lines of exclusion and defence, have changed in meaning with the emergence of a rather rich patchwork of various Euro-regions, trans-boundary arrangements, cross-border projects and those of twinning. Old divides and suspicions have to a large extent – with some exceptions – been replaced by building a new sense of regional community as exemplified by the Baltic Sea cooperation, Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation and Arctic cooperation.

As summarised by Marco Antonsich – an Italian scholar – the policies pursued are not just reactive in essence. He holds that the stress on regionalisation is there “as a discursive strategy adopted by ‘small’ nations in order to ‘customise’ an EU originally and structurally built by ‘big’ nations”. Whilst the North was once considered a ‘void’ or an ‘empty space’, it now constitutes a space so rich in spatial identity markers that it can even ‘export’ them elsewhere in Europe. The new postmodern discourse underpinning the North is not structured in terms of ‘either-or’, but is an open ‘both-and’ project, blurring former borders of the territorial state-based logic. The region thus has, he claims, features of a ‘laboratory’ and a ‘model’ constituent of

the European constellations of power.²⁰⁷ The postmodern features could also signal that the key modern concern of statist security has declined in salience with debates increasingly focusing on issues such as how to gain centrality and prominence in the process of Europe-making and how to avoid being pushed into the periphery in terms of power and influence.

But Is It Really So?

However, more recently the tone has been more cautious in describing the unfolding of regionalism and the impact that the North has on the figure of Europe.²⁰⁸ Projects such as the Northern Dimension (ND) have not progressed in any straight-forward manner, regional endeavours in Europe's North seem to have slowed down, the modern ways of conceptualising political space – including concerns pertaining to statist security – have been far more resilient than perhaps expected (this then amounting to border disputes and persistent forms of othering), and the rest of Europe seems to have been less interested than expected in following a path leading to a postmodern 'Europe of the regions'. In sum, both the pull and the push for Europe's North to gain a constitutive role in the context of Europe-making have left much to hope for.

As to the big picture, particularly the policies pursued by the post-enlargement EU tends to be crucial, and this also seems to be the case as to the unfolding of Europe's North. The gist of European integration consisted over a long period of time of leaving behind the legacy of mutual hostility which has informed European history for quite a number of centuries. This emphasis on the elimination of intra-European rivalry implied that the EU did not aim at developing distinct and clearly articulated policies vis-à-vis its exterior. As argued by Christopher Browning,²⁰⁹ the guiding metaphor was that of a fuzzy, 'neo-medieval' Europe. The openness that was there – and the fact that the EU did not pursue any clearly defined policy of its own – provided space for the various northern actors to step in. The model pursued allowed for power to be dispersed with multiple regional centres competing against and/or complementing each other.

207 Antonsich, Marco: "Regionalization as a way for Northern 'small' nations to be heard in the new EU", in *The New North of Europe*. Final Conference. Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP. Helsinki, 8 October, The Finnish Institute for International Affairs, 2002, pp. 1-4.

208 Browning, Christopher: "Westphalian, Imperial, Neomedieval: The Geopolitics of Europe and the Role of the North", in Browning, Christopher (ed.), *Remaking Europe in the Margins. Northern Europe after the Enlargement*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

209 *Ibid*, pp. 85-101.

Now it appears that the *imperial* as well as the *Westphalian* metaphors have gained in strength, and they have done so at the expense of the neo-medieval one. The previous openness with Brussels inviting for local initiatives rather than pursuing distinct policies of its own and spurring regional formations is no longer there, at least not to the same extent than before. The encounter with new challenges particularly in Europe's East have compelled the EU to formulate the ENP, i.e. a rather *standardised* and far more *centralised* policy applicable in the neighbourhoods more generally. The new policy is premised on conditionality, although detached from membership in the Union, and there is increased emphasis on bilateral relations between the EU and the countries part of the ENP. This, then, amounts to a downgrading of the emphasis on regionalism and regional formations as intermediary spaces between the inside and the outside of the EU.²¹⁰ Regionalism is, in principle, still included as a desired goal. However, the Action Plans – part of the implementation of the ENP – are signed with the individual partners and tailored largely pending individual circumstances, and this does not seem to leave much space for the partner-countries to come together and formulate policies in a multilateral context that could to some extent also deviate from those aspired by the EU. This would hamper the overall aim of conditionality in changing the setting.

Moreover, the core argument underlying the new policies consists of security. This was apparent already in the context of the EU's new security doctrine (EES), with the doctrine being premised on the view that enlargement brings the EU "closer to troubled areas".²¹¹ Overall, the exterior appears to be conceptualised through the usage of a cosmos/chaos configuration, the danger being that troubles could spill over from the latter to the former. This, on the one hand, calls for a more strict bordering and the establishment of a clear division between the inside and the outside and, on the other hand, for efforts of impacting the 'ring of fiends' established through the ENP by inviting for closer cooperation, notably on conditions set by the EU itself. Security is the ultimate argument for drawing a much more firm line between the 'ins' and the 'outs' and yet compelling the EU to try to extend its influence beyond such a border in order to bolster goals such as stability. The bordering also impacts regionalist endeavours by establishing a more distinct hierarchy between actors part of the EU and those bound to remain outside, yet members of 'the ring of friends'.

210 Del Sarto, Raffaella and Schumacher, Tobias: "From the EMP to the ENP: What is at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean" in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10 (1), 2005, pp. 17-38.

211 See, the Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. Security Strategy* (Brussels, 12 December 2003), at <http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/reports/78367.pdf>.

With Russia having decided to stay aloof from the ENP as such, Europe's North seems to be less impacted by the new policies of neighbourhood than the East and the South. Yet the emergence of the ENP is highly relevant also in regard to the North. This is so as the new neighbourhood policies are taken to be *generally applicable*. The ENP has been put forward as a single, all-encompassing frame thus also including the North and because – due to the all-encompassing aspirations part of the new policy – the various financial instruments part of region-building will be narrowed down to a single one (ENPI). In essence, the ENP downgrades the differences between the North and the two far more problematic areas of Europe's South and the East in establishing a frame common to all of them. Thus, Europe's North have rather limited options of trying to purport itself as a 'laboratory' or aiming in some way to be ahead of the other regions. Instead of taking the lead or showing the way, also the North is expected to stay loyal to the policies defined by Brussels. Having a profile of one's own turns into a liability in the context of the ENP. Notably, Russia's refusal to stay aloof from the ENP implies that Europe's North nonetheless has to be treated as a special case, although the impact is mitigated by Russia's decision to join the ENPI (despite not being part of the ENP itself).

Other External Impediments

Obviously, the ENP has failed to turn into a route of joint EU-Russia relations. As such, the approach chosen by the EU was inclusive for a start, and yet Russia decided to turn down the offer of becoming a partner. This is so as the new programme has been seen as being too intrusive. Moreover, due to its strict conditionality and an alleged hegemonic purpose, the ENP has been regarded as too condescending for Russia to support. Overall, Russia is aspiring for the position of a 'strategic partner' in the context of the four 'common spaces' rather than abiding to the logic of the ENP (except the financial aspects of the ENP).

The problems part of the EU-Russia relationship appear to indicative of Russia experiencing in general difficulties in defining itself in a manner that would allow it to contribute actively to the process of Europe-making. The situation looked far more promising at the beginning of the 1990s than is the case now. Forceful voices then thematised Russia as being the other of the Soviet Union (with the Stalinist past interpreted as a deviation in the country's development, a digression to be corrected and done away with) and on its way of becoming an integral part of Europe, one defined as a 'Europe whole and free'. However, policies premised on such an inclusive self-understanding turned rather problematic both internally and externally. Internally, it was felt that the aspiration of joining Europe exposed Russia to too much critique making it difficult to fix the meaning of the country during a period

that was too volatile to start with, and externally, Russia largely remained in the category of Europe's Other in being depicted as the power which in the past prevented Europe from being its true self. As stated by Ole Wæver: "Shortsightedly, Russia was not offered the Europe necessary for Russian politicians to claim that developments left Russia in a role with which to identify".²¹²

Yet, despite the disappointments, Europe remains an integral part of Russia's self-understanding, and as argued by Viatcheslav Morozov: "The relationship to Europe, however problematic, is absolutely indispensable for *any* definition of Russia."²¹³ This seems to compel Russia to devise itself a Europe of its own, with Russia not moving from the 20th century towards the Europe of the 21st century but rather in the direction of the Europe of the 19th century. This tendency entails stress on the importance of the state, efforts of concentrating power in the hands of the President as well as stress on a vertical rather than a horizontal structuring of the project. This endeavour leaves little space for regionalisation (or any other post-sovereign and postmodern fluctuations) and does not speak for the creation of overlapping spaces and border-transcending regionalisation. Increasingly, Russia seems to come out as 'a reluctant regionaliser'²¹⁴ (cf. Haukkala, 2001) and this applies also to Europe's North.

The United States, although geographically distant, nonetheless has a considerable impact on the unfolding of 'européanness', including to some extent also the North. It has, in this regard, been of importance that the US has during the post-Cold War years been leaning on the metaphor of a 'Europe whole and free' (manifested in one of its aspects the Nato-membership of Poland and the Baltic states) and has also for the part of the North contributed to weakening of a strict opposition between the East and the West. More instrumentally, the line pursued has amounted to the US not only backing various regionalist endeavours but also launching an initiative of its own: the Northern European Initiative (NEI; nowadays called e-PINE, standing for 'Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe'). From the US perspective, it appears that Northern Europe has stood out as a kind of laboratory for the pursuance of par-

212 Wæver, Ole: "The EU as a Security Actor. Reflections of a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders", in Kelstrup, Morten and Williams, Michael, C., (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*. London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 275.

213 Morozov, Viatcheslav: "New Borderlines in a United Europe: Democracy, Imperialism and the Copenhagen Criteria", in *Russia's North West and the European Union: A Playground for Innovations*. Project Proceedings. Nizhny Novgorod, 20-05, p. 76.

214 Haukkala, Hiski: "Two Reluctant Regionalizers: The European Union and Russia in Europe's North", *Working Papers* 32, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

ticularly activist regionalist policies. The experimentation – hinging, for example, on postmodern and post-sovereign concepts such as that of the ‘New Hansa’ – indicates that it has been quite easy for the US to engage itself in inclusive policies spurring bottom-up policies and regional integration in this part of Europe.²¹⁵

Moreover, the benevolent US attitude towards Northern Europe appears to have survived the change from the Clinton administration to that of President Bush. The support for integrationist policies is still present, although pursued somewhat less vigorously. Importantly, there seems to have been little interest or reason to extend the Rumsfeldian old/new Europe contestation to cover also Europe’s North. By siding with the type of policies pursued by the EU, the US has been an acceptable partner for each and everybody, including more often than not also Russia.

The Regional Setting

For sure, the North’s political scenery has experienced drastic changes with the demise of the Cold War, disappearance of the Soviet Union, unification of Germany and the independence of the Baltic countries. Yet, these upheavals notwithstanding, the risk of entering a negative spiral has remained modest as old divides and suspicions have to a considerable degree been replaced by a sense of regional community. Borders, previously seen as lines of exclusion and defence, have changed in meaning turning into sites of cooperation. It may, more generally, be noted that questions of security have become conducive to solving a range of conflictual issues through a pooling of forces – and this is in stark contrast to the patterns of the Cold War era in which ‘security’ considerations were a reason to avoid interaction.

It has, however, to be noted that the process of de-securitisation and going back to normal politics is far from completed. Actually, there is still much to hope for. Although Russia has by and large been able to live with NATO’s enlargement (and has been rather positive about the enlargement of the EU), the tendency to frame issues in terms of statist security prevails. Similarly, Poland and the Baltic countries share a similar habit. Their ‘return to Europe’ seems to be premised on the idea of returning to a Europe where Russia remains a rather non-European entity. Their reading of the past is rather different from the general EU-related framing emphasising the need for self-reflection and self-negation in order for Europe’s notorious past not to become its future. The self-understanding part of the Polish and Baltic dis-

215 Browning, Christopher: “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Regional Cooperation. The United States and the Northern European Initiative”. *European Security*, 8 (4), 2001.

courses rests on the narrative of them having been abducted from Europe, deprived of their natural right to belong to a European civilisation, and therefore one of its key foundations consists of the negation of Russia as a hostile, non-European entity.²¹⁶

In sum, the existence of two rather different discourses as to the essence of Europe and Europeanness leads constantly to clashes also within the EU with the Poles and the Balts arguing that the EU is too soft with Russia, and that they are themselves frequently positioned in a category of second-rank Europeans with the Union being prepared to compromise as to the interests of its smaller members in its dealing with Russia. The mutual othering part of their relationship with Russia implies that it has turned quite difficult to arrive at a formal agreement concerning the Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Estonian borders.

Similarly, the German-Russian gas pipeline project has turned conflictual being framed by Poland and the Balts predominantly as a security issue. The project has evoked plenty of historical memories and has been regarded as proof of the tendency of Polish and Baltic state's concerns becoming sidelined. The pipeline could – with a different and more normal framing – have been seen as exemplifying good cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region and made part of the Northern Dimension inspired interaction. Now this is not the case and instead the project testifies – with the lack of common framing – that even cooperation and increased interdependence may bring about clashes.

Not So, But the Struggle Goes On

It may, in general, be concluded that the North is far from a 'void' or 'empty place'. It has, in fact, succeeded in gaining considerable subjectivity in the sphere of Europe-making and stands rather exemplary as to the consequences of unleashing the force of regional and local dynamics. The North is in this regard faring far better than Europe's South not to speak about the East. Yet it seems clear that in being drawn – with the emergence of the ENP – into a standardised setting of EU-policies with the conditions prevailing in the East and the South basically determining what the policies pursued vis-à-vis the various neighbourhoods are about, the North is bound to suffer. There is less room for the North, it appears, as something exemplary and a

216 Kuus, Merje: "Europe's Eastern Expansion and the Re-inscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe" in *Progress in Human Geography*, 28 (4), pp. 472-489, 2004. Morozov, Viatcheslav: "New Borderlines in a United Europe: Democracy, Imperialism and the Copenhagen Criteria" in *Russia's North West and the European Union: A Playground for Innovations*. Project Proceedings. Nizhny Novgorod, 2005, pp. 74-85.

kind of ‘laboratory’ experimenting with new, postmodern approaches in an increasingly concentric and EU-driven order.

In a broad perspective, the dynamism that originated mainly with the regional and local actors seems to have to some extent stalled, although the various institutions established are still there and continue to yield results. The stalling pertains to both intra-regional as well as external reasons. The ambition of catapulting the North into a major European regional formation is not a broadly shared one. Or to put it differently, the frames used by various relevant actors do not seem to resonate in such a manner that the long-term visions for the part of Europe’s North would point to increased subjectivity on the all-European scene.

Some openings seem to remain, however. It is far from certain that the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy will turn out as a success, and although leaning increasingly on Westphalian as well as imperial designs (and being to some extent stuck between these two incompatible models), the neo-medieval one is still around. Notably, towards the end of 2005 the governments part of the Northern Dimension came together and decided to elevate Iceland, Norway and Russia to full-fledged partners in order to bolster and breed new life into the ND.

In fact, it appears that Russia’s decision to stay outside the ENP but to join the ENPI seems to have spurred re-evaluation and revising of the Northern Dimension. Consequently, a ‘new’ ND seems to be in the pipeline.

At the Northern Dimension Ministerial Meeting, held in Brussels in November 2005, there was agreement about the means to shape the future of the policy to be pursued after 2006. It was stated that a new ND concept will “provide a stable and permanent basis for this policy, as opposed to the previous three-year plans”.²¹⁷ Guidelines were agreed upon for the development of a political declaration and a policy framework document for the policies to be pursued from 2007 onwards.²¹⁸ The declaration and the policy framework document are under preparation and negotiated, on the one hand, between the EU-countries part of the ND (including the Commission) and then, on the other hand, between the Commission and individually Russia, Iceland as well as Norway. Both documents are taken to be ‘permanent’

217 See Council of the European Union, press release 14701/05 (Presse 305).

218 The document is available at:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/guidelines05.pdf

in nature and – pending progress during the second half of 2006 and the decisions of a ministerial meeting to be held in parallel to the next EU-Russia top level meeting – enter into force in 2007.

So, what is the difference between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ ND? The guidelines for the process state that “the ND policy is now becoming a joint project of its parties”, this implying that there is a deliberate effort to bolster the position of the non-EU members (previously called ‘partners’), above all Russia. It is also stated that the ND policy should be used “as a political and operational framework for promoting the implementation of the EU-Russia Common Spaces at regional/sub-regional/local level in the North with full participation of Norway and Iceland”. Furthermore, “Belarus should be encouraged to participate in expert level cooperation in the ND framework”.

The stress on the ND as a multilateral vehicle focusing on regional schemes is clearly there, albeit at the same time the main emphasis is on the EU-Russia relationship and the Four Common Spaces. The ND should be considered, according to the guidelines “as a regional expression of the Common Spaces”. The ENP comes in through the backdoor in the sense that it is envisaged that the ENPI will turn into a central source of the EU financing for ND activities, albeit the ENP does not seem to figure as a hegemonic approach and instrument in Europe’s North as there is constant stress on the multilateral process and equality among the members.

In sum, the move appears to contradict various efforts of drawing an increasingly distinct border between EU-members and the others (visible in the context of the ENP). It seems to testify to efforts of strengthening simultaneously the multilateral rather than the bilateral relations in Europe’s North. One might argue, on the basis of the move, that the North still has features of a ‘laboratory’ and functions as a testing ground for policies that deviate from those pursued in other parts of Europe. The ENP conditions also the North, albeit appears to tolerate a diversified pattern and region-specific policies. One should perhaps not exaggerate the meaning and impact of a single decision such as the one reached at the recent ND Ministerial meeting, but it is in any case interesting and may indicate that the aspiration to strive towards a rather regionalised North is still around and very much alive.

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This volume departs from the idea that the Baltic Sea region can be regarded as a significant laboratory in view of wider European developments. Local and regional resources have over the recent years been mobilized rather successfully. This has been done by transcending previous borderlines in order to create social and economic well-being as well as stability.

The various contributions in this book explore this development and the policies of the various relevant actors. In particular, questions are posed as to the impact of the enlargement in 2004 and the more recent European developments. This includes the EU devising itself a new neighborhood (ENP) policy. Is there something in the region that others can learn from? Are the actors in the region able to take stock of their own achievements and utilize them in a broader European environment? Moreover, how are these achievements related to the more recent endeavors to create a more standardized European configuration with the policies of the core assumed to be applicable through-out Europe?

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